The war unleashed by Nazi Germany caused great damage to the Soviet Union. More than 25 million Soviet citizens died at the fronts, behind enemy lines, and in concentration camps. Many hundreds of thousands of people were mutilated and could not return to full-blooded human life. The country lost its best production personnel, technical support for production was suspended, and commodity-money turnover sharply decreased.

On September 13, 1945, the Pravda newspaper published a message from the Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders. The occupiers plundered, destroyed and burned 1,700 cities, more than 70 thousand villages and hamlets on the territory of the USSR, and deprived 25 million people of their homes. About 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand km of railway track, 13 thousand railway bridges, 16 thousand steam locomotives, and over 400 thousand carriages were disabled. The Nazis plundered and ruined 98 thousand collective farms, about 2 thousand state farms, 3 thousand machine and tractor stations, stole 17 million cattle, 47 million sheep, goats, and pigs. During the war years, USSR agriculture lost 7 million horses, 137 thousand tractors and much more. The list of Hitler's atrocities took up several newspaper pages.

The direct damage caused by the invaders amounted to 679 billion rubles, which is approximately equal to the total capital investments of the USSR during the first four five-year plans. If we take into account the expenses of our country on restructuring industry on a war footing, waging war and the loss of income from areas captured by the Nazis, then the damage amounted to 2 trillion. 596 billion rubles. For comparison, all state budget revenues in 1940 amounted to 180 billion rubles.

As a result of the losses incurred, the national economy was thrown back: in the production of cement and the processing of industrial wood to the level of 1928-1929, in the production of coal, steel, and ferrous metals to the level of 1934-1938, i.e. for no less than 10 years.

During the war years, much of the equipment was badly worn out, and much was no longer usable. The curtailment of military production affected primarily heavy industry enterprises, where the volume of output in 1946 was 27% less than in 1945. In the light and food industries, the transition to peaceful production occurred much earlier. Already in 1946, the production of consumer goods increased by 13% compared to the previous year. However, as before, priority remained with heavy industry, which was fueled by income from the sale of consumer goods.

The problem of personnel was also extremely acute. Thus, compared with the pre-war period, the total number of workers and employees in the national economy decreased by more than 5 million people (from 33.9 million in 1940 to 28.6 million in 1945), including . in industry - by 14%, in transport - by 9, in agriculture - by 15%. The bulk of the labor force was made up of women, old people and teenagers. The composition of those employed in production has also deteriorated sharply. Thus, the number of engineers in industry in 1945 was 126 thousand less than in 1940.

It is also necessary to take into account that the Soviet people were in dire need of literally everything. In cities, a rationing system for the distribution of food and many consumer goods was maintained. A regular card issued monthly about 2 kg of meat and fish, 400 g of fat, 1.5 kg of cereals and pasta.

At the same time, a significant part of the funds went to the defense of the USSR and international assistance to people's democracies.

Country Recovery Program

Recovery National economy and its partial restructuring in a peaceful manner began in the summer of 1943 - the moment of the mass expulsion of the fascists from the occupied territories of the country.

The main provisions of the program for the restoration and further development of the national economy were set out in Stalin’s speech to voters in the first post-war elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 9, 1946.

Five-year plan for the restoration and development of the USSR economy for 1946-1950. provided for the accelerated development of the Soviet economy, raising the living standards of the people, and strengthening the country's defense power. Industry was supposed to reach the pre-war level already in 1948, and by the end of the five-year plan it should have exceeded it by 48%. Twice as much money was allocated for capital construction as for all pre-war five-year plans combined. The total volume of capital investments amounted to 250.3 billion rubles. 157.7 billion were allocated for industry, and 19.9 billion rubles for agriculture. The plan also provided for an increase in the production of consumer goods and the replacement of the card system with expanded state trade. It was envisaged to reduce prices for all goods, increase wages, large-scale housing and cultural construction, expand the healthcare system, public education, etc. Although the already meager funds were devoured by the military-nuclear moloch. In accordance with the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR, similar plans were adopted in all 16 union and 20 autonomous republics.

The Soviet people steadfastly endured the hardships of post-war devastation. The idealized pre-war life, and most importantly, the victory over fascism, fueled the people's confidence in a wonderful future, their readiness to endure all the difficulties and hardships, and the desire to work hard.

Already in 1945, about 5 million people who were forcibly taken to work in Germany, 2.5 million Soviet prisoners of war, most of whom ended up in Gulag camps, returned to the USSR. Until 1948, the Soviet Army was reduced by almost 8.5 million people.

The victory over fascism caused a great political and labor upsurge of the entire Soviet people. The forms of labor activity were different. The enthusiasm of the workers was actively supported by party and trade union bodies, the Komsomol and the administration. However, most organizational activities were not limited to analysis economic phenomena, but to the requirements of the political situation. Without discussing the fundamental issues of reality, a simple, traditional and so far reliable method was used - “to push or attribute.”

At the end of the 40s, the struggle between two lines of development continued economic mechanism: one - aimed at strict centralization, comprehensive control, order methods, and the other - at expanding the economic independence of production, introducing cost accounting, and the material interest of workers.

In the leadership of the country and locally, people began to appear who, in the practice of state and economic management, were convinced that emergency management measures suppressed economic independence and the initiative of workers, which led to public apathy, economic stagnation, increased command-bureaucratic actions and political repression. Already at the end of the 40s, society did not accept command methods of management and organization during the war, as well as production dictates and neglect of the social and spiritual needs of man. The war ended, but the difficulties and unsettled life remained.

Although the public consciousness was ready to accept new “enemies of the people,” it increasingly felt the need for reforms. However, the reform trend was significantly at odds with the interests administrative system. The logic of reform would ultimately lead to the realization of the need not for private, but for fundamental changes in public life, which in practice would show the harmfulness of the administrative-command apparatus and the socio-political system. Realizing the danger of the collapse of the created management system, the party-bureaucratic apparatus strengthened the proven methods of work - promises, lies, dictatorship.

Transition of industry to a peaceful direction

In the field of industrial production in the post-war years, a number of complex tasks were solved simultaneously: the transition from military production to the production of civilian products; restoration of destroyed enterprises; expansion of production and product range; construction of new enterprises; technical re-equipment and mastering advanced technologies. During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, it was necessary not only to restore the pre-war level of industrial production, but also to exceed it by almost half.

The successful implementation of the assigned tasks was due to: a unified state plan covering all sectors of the national economy, which made it possible to centralize the distribution of the country's budget; the industry of the eastern regions of the USSR, which, after reconversion, became a powerful basis for the speedy restoration of the western and central regions affected by the war; additional funds received from government loans, high prices for food and consumer goods, and low wages.

During the restoration and further development of the national economy with the technical re-equipment of production, the growth of the cultural and technical level of the working class, and the improvement of production processes, close and constant cooperation between engineers and scientists was a vital necessity. Without such a union, it became impossible to solve complex economic problems and further technical progress.

In March-April 1947, a competition began between engineering and technical workers in industry to increase labor productivity and reduce the labor intensity of products based on improving technology and introducing advanced work methods. The initiator of the competition, the Ural technologist of the third mechanical shop of the Kirov Tractor Plant, A. Ivanov, by updating production technology, improving the skills of workers and using the experience of innovators, achieved an outstanding result at his site: the labor productivity of machine operators increased by 2 times, 30% of workers were released, 11 metal-cutting machines , the cost of manufacturing parts has sharply decreased. On May 17, 1947, Pravda wrote: “If every technologist in his area acts as creatively as A. Ivanov, then industry will achieve a significant increase in labor productivity, better use of machines and available equipment, and an increase in production output... It is necessary support in every possible way this new manifestation of creative activity and Soviet patriotism of engineering and technical workers.” On May 30, 1947, the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions adopted a resolution on organizing the All-Union Competition of Technologists. Thus, it was no longer single specialists, but entire groups of engineers who accepted obligations aimed at improving technology, introducing mechanization and reducing the labor intensity of production operations, further increasing labor productivity, and ensuring savings in raw materials.

During 1946, industrial production was restructured to produce civilian products, and in 1948 the pre-war production level was already exceeded by 18%, including in heavy industry by 30%.

During the recovery period, special attention was paid to ferrous metallurgy enterprises and coal mines of Donbass. In honor of their restoration, special award medals were established. However, the pre-war level of coal production in the Donbass was achieved only in 1950, and the metallurgical industry of the Ukrainian SSR, which produced 75% of the country’s total metal before the war, was restored only in 1951.

Along with the restoration of old ones, the construction of new industrial facilities was underway. Power plants were built: Farhadskaya (Uzbek SSR), Sevanskaya (Armenian SSR), Kramskaya and Sukhumskaya (Georgian SSR), Rybinskaya (on the Volga), Shchekinskaya (Moscow region), etc. Metallurgical complexes were founded in Rustavi (Transcaucasia), Bogovat (Uzbekistan ), Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc plant, pipe-rolling plants in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) and Nikopol (Ukrainian SSR), etc.

Between the Volga and the Urals, new oil fields were intensively developed. The so-called Second Baku already in 1950 provided 44% of the country’s total oil production, although another 80% of the country’s fuel was allocated to coal.

In total, 6,200 large enterprises were built and restored during the five-year plan. However, the five-year target for commissioning new production facilities in the iron and steel industry, the coal industry and the construction of power plants was not fulfilled.

In general, targets were exceeded for the production of metals, coal and oil production, electricity generation, etc. However, a number of industries and especially the production of consumer goods have not reached pre-war levels.

The situation of agriculture after the Great Patriotic War

One of the most important tasks of the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to restore agriculture and ensure the further development of agricultural production in general. Without a general rise in agriculture, it was impossible to improve the financial situation of the working people, abolish the rationing system for the distribution of food and consumer goods, and provide industry with raw materials.

Meanwhile, the damage caused by the Nazi occupiers to collective farms alone amounted to 181 billion rubles. In terms of the size of sown areas, the country was at the level of 1913. Gross agricultural output in 1945 was 60% of the 1940 level. During the war years, the machine and tractor fleet was reduced by an average of a third, the number of horses was halved. There were farms where they plowed on their own and sowed by hand from a basket. The human losses were especially noticeable. The difficulties of the recovery period were aggravated by the severe drought of 1946. In addition, spending on agriculture during the Fourth Five-Year Plan was almost 4 times less than on industry.

In the most difficult conditions, collective and state farms and MTS were mainly restored in a short period of time. Industrial enterprises and townspeople provided great assistance to collective farms. In 1946, 3/4 of the sown areas of the occupied regions were brought into working condition.

By the end of the five-year plan, gross agricultural output was expected to exceed the 1940 level by 27%. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 1947) adopted a resolution “On measures to boost agriculture in the post-war period,” which emphasized the technical equipment of agriculture with tractors, cars, and various agricultural machines. And yet, there was not enough equipment on the collective farms; moreover, it was ineffective, there was a lot of downtime, and there was a lack of spare parts. The situation with mechanization in livestock farming was unsatisfactory.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the capacity of rural power plants tripled. In 1950, 76% of state farms and 15% of collective farms were electrified, compared to 4% in 1940.

Serious attention was paid to the promotion and implementation of scientific achievements and best practices in agriculture. Three-year agro-zootechnical on-the-job training courses for collective farmers were of great importance.

At the same time, in the process of restoring agriculture locally, and often in the center, serious mistakes were made. The grass-fed system of field cultivation was routinely planted, which led to a reduction in the crops of grain and legumes and hampered the production of the grain needed by the country. Excessively centralized planning, multi-stage and incompetent bureaucratic leadership fettered the economic initiative of peasants, led to irrational distribution of agricultural crops, violated the timing of sowing, harvesting, etc.

The development of agricultural production was significantly hampered by low procurement prices for grain, potatoes, meat and other products, as well as raw materials that the state received from collective farms as mandatory deliveries. Procurement prices not only did not cover the cost of their production, but did not even justify transportation costs for the delivery of procured products. The payment for a collective farmer's workday was extremely low and did not stimulate his interest in work.

At the same time, high taxes were levied on collective farmers (tax on personal plots, personal livestock, beehives, fruit trees, etc.).

The standard of living of the population after the Great Patriotic War

The main indicator of the living standard of the Soviet people was the growth national income, the physical volume of which in 1950 tons exceeded the pre-war level by 1.62 times. This enabled the Soviet government to abolish the card system for the distribution of food and consumer goods in December 1947. At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out in a ratio of ten to one, i.e. one old-style chervonets was exchanged for one ruble of new money. Cash deposits in savings banks and the State Bank were revalued by preferential terms. The monetary reform did not affect wages workers and employees, labor income of peasants, which remained in the same amount. In this way, excess (issued) and counterfeit money, and a significant part of the population’s cash savings, were confiscated.

The standard of living of the population was characterized by wages and retail prices for food and household industrial goods. After the war, before the abolition of the card distribution system, retail prices increased on average 3 times compared to 1940: for food by 3.6 times, for industrial goods - by 2.2 times. Over the years, wages for workers and employees have increased only 1.5 times. The average wage in the national economy in 1940 was 33 rubles; in 1945 - 43.4 rubles; in 1948 - 48 rubles; in 1950 - 64 rubles. per month, from which it was necessary to deduct the amount for subscription to government loans. Employees had the highest wages scientific activity-in on average per month 46.7 rubles. in 1940 and 38-48 rubles. in 1950. Thus, the abundance in stores of food, consumer goods and even luxury goods (gold, furs, etc.) was a consequence of the low purchasing power of the bulk of the population.

In 1950, per capita consumption was: meat - 26 kg, milk and dairy products - 172 kg, outerwear - 0.3 pieces. etc. Many cultural and household items - televisions, washing machines, radios, etc. were considered luxury goods.

The improvement in the financial situation of broad sections of the population was ensured by a reduction in retail prices for consumer goods and household services. In state trade, prices decreased every year in April. If their level before the abolition of the card distribution system is taken as 100%, then on March 1, 1949 their index was 71%, on April 1, 1954 - 43%, and yet prices were more than 1/3 higher than the pre-war level. From price reductions to to a greater extent people with high earnings won: trade workers, Catering, various procurements, material supplies, as well as employees of administrative bodies.

It was very difficult for the peasants, who were actually forcibly attached to the land. In the early 50s, a collective farmer received 16.4 rubles for his hard work. per month, i.e. 4 times less than a worker. Wheat was bought from collective farms for 1 kopeck. per kilogram at a retail price for flour of 31 kopecks. and so on.

In a letter to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G. Malenkov, a student of the Smolensk Military-Political School N. Menshikov wrote: “As a communist, it pains me to hear such a question from collective farmers: “Do you know whether the collective farms will be dissolved soon? ... there is no strength to live like this.” further"".

The difficult situation after the war was with the housing stock, the restoration and construction of which was carried out simultaneously and in conjunction with industrial construction. If in 1940 the average per capita urban population was 6.7 square meters. m, then in 1950 - 7 sq. m, and yet many lived in basements, and the bulk of the population lived in communal apartments.

Thus, the standard of living of the population was still far from normal and largely depended on investments in heavy industry, defense, and international assistance.

Changes in territories included in the USSR

A feature of the restoration and development of the national economy were transformations in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Right Bank Moldova, which joined the USSR in 1939-1940, as well as in the Tuva Autonomous Region, Transcarpathian, Kaliningrad and Sakhalin regions, which were included in composition of the USSR in 1944-1945.

Socialist transformations begin from the moment the Nazi troops are expelled from these territories. By decision of the Soviet and party bodies, specific measures are being taken to liquidate all bodies and institutions of nationalist power and create party, Soviet state and local institutions. The main core of party and state events were operational groups of party and Soviet activists, representatives of partisans and underground fighters, as well as local residents demobilized from the Soviet Army.

A fierce struggle with the bodies of Soviet power was waged by nationalists - capitalist elements in the city, kulaks in the countryside, and the clergy, who had well-armed secret detachments.

To establish the new government, it was necessary to carry out socialist transformations throughout the entire economic complex. Along with the nationalization process, there was a restoration of industrial enterprises and the expansion of the material and technical base of the republics. As a result, industrial output in 1950 in Estonia exceeded the pre-war level by 3.4 times, in Latvia by 3 times, etc. Industrial production was significantly expanded, new branches were mastered, enterprises were equipped with first-class machines and the latest technological equipment.

In an atmosphere of intense struggle, changes also took place in agriculture, where the sad experience of collectivization of the countryside and the struggle against landowners and kulaks was also used. Violent methods of agricultural transformation led to the expropriation and liquidation of the kulaks, who made up the bulk of the rural population of the Baltic states, as well as to the expulsion from their homes of all those who resisted.

Particularly striking changes occurred in the Tuvan village. Semi-patriarchal and feudal relations prevailed here, and a significant part of the Arat population led a nomadic lifestyle. Thanks to the help of the Soviet peoples and the strong-willed party-Soviet leadership, the peasantry of the Tuva Autonomous Region, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, moved to “socialism.”

The political process, or more precisely, the population’s dogmatic memorization of Marxist-Leninist theory, “mastery of the method of socialist realism” and “scientific communism,” was complex and difficult, and in many ways incomprehensible. In the field of culture and education there was a massive ideological filling and Russification.

Thus, using traditional methods, from class positions and with the help of party and administrative pressure, the restoration and development of the USSR took place.

Sources and literature

The secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts: Stat. study. M., 1991.

Zubkova E.Yu. Society and reform, 1945-1964. M., 1993.

Knyshevsky Extraction: The Mystery of German Reparations. M., 1994.

Manenkov A.I. Cultural construction in the post-war village (1946-1950). M., 1991.

Polyak G.B. Post-war restoration of the national economy. M., 1986.

Khanin T.E. Dynamics of economic development of the USSR. Novosibirsk, 1991.

The Nazi invaders inflicted enormous damage on the country. The occupiers destroyed and burned hundreds of cities, over 70 thousand towns, villages and hamlets, about 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand km of railway track, ruined and plundered 98 thousand collective farms, 1876 state farms and 2890 MTS. The war caused enormous damage to agriculture: sown areas were reduced by 1/4, field cultivation deteriorated, yields and the level of mechanization decreased, and the working population decreased. In general, material damage to the USSR amounted to 2569 billion rubles. (in pre-war prices), including 679 billion - the cost of those stolen and destroyed by the enemy material assets. The USSR lost 30% of its national wealth.
...
During the 4th Five-Year Plan, 6,200 large industrial enterprises were restored, built and put into operation (the Dnieper hydroelectric station, metallurgy, factories in the South, Donbass mines were restored). By the end of 1948, industry throughout the country had reached pre-war levels. Gross industrial output by 1950 had increased 13 times compared to 1913, and by 72% compared to pre-war 1940 (against the planned 48%). Capital investments in the national economy amounted to 48 billion rubles. Cities were reborn from the ashes, new towns and villages were built [over the five-year period, 201 million m2 of total (useful) area were restored and built in cities, urban-type settlements and rural areas].
...
Gross industrial output in 1955 increased 24.6 times compared to 1913, 3.2 times compared to 1940. The volume of production in 1955 compared to 1950 increased by 85% (plan target 70%). Capital investments in the national economy amounted to 91.1 billion rubles. 3,200 new industrial enterprises were put into operation. ... As a result of the implementation of the 4th and 5th five-year plans, the value of all production fixed assets by 1955 increased by 2 times compared to 1940, and national income by 2.8 times

Source:
THE USSR. The era of socialism
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd edition
http://enc.lib.rus.ec/bse/008/106/977.htm
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The material damage caused to the Soviet country by the fascist invaders amounted to 679 billion rubles. (in 1941 prices). Of these, state enterprises and institutions account for 287 billion rubles, collective farms - 181 billion rubles, rural and urban residents - 192 billion rubles, cooperative, trade union and other public organizations - 19 billion rubles. This amount, equal to 1/3 of the country’s total social wealth, does not include losses such as a decrease in national income from the cessation or reduction of the work of state enterprises, cooperatives, collective farms, the cost of food and supplies confiscated by the German occupation forces, military expenses of the USSR, as well as losses from the slowdown in the rate of economic development of the country as a result of enemy actions during 1941-1945.
...
During the war years, the size of the consumption sphere decreased the most, primarily the volume of production of group "B", which in 1945 amounted to 59% of the pre-war level, agricultural products and retail trade turnover, which decreased to 60% and 45%, respectively.
...
The production of capital goods in industry in 1945 was 12% higher than the pre-war level. This allowed, during the post-war perestroika, in solving the problems of the fastest restoration and development of the entire national economy, to rely on the priority development of the production of means of production, using the power of the military industry for peaceful needs.
...
During the Great Patriotic War, the structure of social production and national income changed radically. In the composition of national income during the war, the share of consumption decreased from 74% in 1940 to 67% in 1942, savings - from 19 to 4%, and the share of military expenditures (not counting personal consumption of military personnel) increased from 7% in 1940 to 29% in 1942. As a result of the post-war economic restructuring in short time pre-war ratios in the distribution of national income were restored. In 1950, 74% of the national income was allocated to satisfy the material and cultural needs of the population, and 26% was used to expand production and for other national and public needs.
...
Tasks of the Fourth Five-Year Plan for the production of national income, the volume of capital investments, gross industrial output, mechanical engineering, basic products of other branches of heavy industry, freight turnover railways were significantly overfulfilled.

The successful implementation of the program for the restoration of the former occupied areas, and the excess of the pre-war level of industrial production made it possible to increase national income in 1950 by 64% compared to 1940, while according to the five-year plan it was planned to exceed the pre-war level by 38%. The significant increase in the production of national income and its distribution in these years made it possible to direct a significantly larger mass of national income for the purposes of accumulation and consumption than was provided for by the five-year plan. As a result of the rapid growth of national income in expenditures state budget allocations for financing the national economy and social and cultural construction increased. The state budget was carried out year after year with revenues exceeding expenses.

The achievement and significant excess in 1950 of the pre-war level in terms of the main indicators of the national economy were the result of the high rates of expanded reproduction achieved as a result of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Thus, the production of national income increased by the end of the five-year plan compared to 1945 by almost 2 times, gross industrial output - by 1.9 times, gross agricultural output - by 1.6 times, freight turnover of all types of transport - by 1.9 times

As a result of the implementation of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the material and technical base of the national economy was significantly expanded through restoration, reconstruction and construction of new enterprises. The five-year plan for capital construction in the national economy was exceeded by 22%. Capital investments of state, cooperative enterprises and organizations, collective farms and the population for the restoration and development of the national economy in 1946-1950. were 2.3 times higher than the investments of the pre-war years of the third five-year plan.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 6,200 large industrial enterprises were built, restored and put into operation. The fixed assets of the national economy as a whole increased in 1950 by 23% compared to 1940, including production fixed assets - by 34%, of which the fixed production assets of industry - by 58%. The average annual growth rate of gross industrial output in the fourth five-year plan was 13.6% compared to 13.2% in the three pre-war years. At the same time, the production of means of production (group "A") increased annually by 12.8%, and the production of consumer goods (group "B") - by 15.7%. The average annual absolute gains and growth rates of the main species have increased significantly industrial products. Thus, the average annual absolute increase in electricity in the fourth five-year plan amounted to 9.6 billion kWh instead of 4.0 billion in the three pre-war years, and the average annual growth rate of electricity increased from 10.1 to 16.1%. The average annual increase in coal production increased from 12.7 million tons to 22.4 million tons, and the average annual growth rate - from 9.1 to 11.8%. The average annual increase in steel production was 3.0 million tons versus 0.2 million tons, and the average annual growth rate was 17.4% versus 1.1%.

The decisive role in the post-war reconstruction and further development of the Soviet economy belonged to mechanical engineering, the power of which increased sharply as a result of the switch of military industry enterprises to the production of civilian products. In 1950, mechanical engineering production exceeded the 1940 level by 2.3 times. Over the years of the Five-Year Plan, the mechanical engineering industry has mainly updated the range of products. This made it possible to provide the necessary basis for the further development of all sectors of the national economy on a new technical basis.

"History of the socialist economy of the USSR." T. 6
"Country of Soviets for 50 years." - M.: Statistics. 1967. P. 32.
"Country of Soviets for 50 years." P. 30
Voznesensky N.A. Military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. - M.: Gospoditizdat. 1947. P. 67.
Message from the USSR State Planning Committee and the USSR Central Statistical Office "On the results of the implementation of the fourth (first post-war) five-year plan of the USSR for 1946-1950." - M.: Gospolitizdat. 1951. P. 17.
"Country of Soviets for 50 years." P. 30.
"National Economy of the USSR". 1956. P. 29, 32; Message from the State Planning Committee and the Central Statistical Office of the USSR "On the results of the implementation of the fourth (first post-war) five-year plan of the USSR for 1946-1950." P. 10.
"Achievements of Soviet power over 40 years in numbers." - M.: Gosstatizdat. 1957. pp. 44-45.
Message from the State Planning Committee and the Central Statistical Office of the USSR "On the results of the implementation of the fourth (first post-war) five-year plan of the USSR for 1946-1950." pp. 7-8.

Source:
V. Ivanchenko N.A. Voznesensky: an experience that went down in history
http://institutiones.com/personalities/668-voznesenskiy.html
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As a result of military operations, the temporary occupation of part of the territory, the barbarity and atrocities of the German fascists, our state suffered economic and human resource damage unprecedented in history. The Soviet Union lost about 30% of its national wealth and 27 million people. 1,710 cities and towns, more than 70 thousand villages and hamlets were destroyed. In industry alone, fixed assets worth 42 billion rubles were disabled. The total economic damage caused to our state amounted to 2.6 trillion. rub. at pre-war prices.

After the end of the war, despite the efforts of the Soviet people to restore the national economy during the war, the destruction was so great that, according to the main indicators, the pre-war level of its development was not achieved and amounted to (in%): Volume of industrial output - 91 to the level of 1940. , coal mining - 90, oil - 62, iron smelting - 59, steel - 67, textile production - 41, freight turnover of all types of transport - 76, retail turnover - 43, average annual number of workers and employees - 87. Cultivated areas decreased by 37 million . ha, and the number of livestock decreased by 7 million heads. Under the influence of these factors, the country's national income in 1945 amounted to 83% of the 1940 level.

The war had the most serious impact on the state of the country's labor resources. The number of workers and employees decreased by 5.3 million people, including in industry - by 2.4 million people. In rural areas, the number of working-age population decreased by 1/3, working-age men - by 60%.
...
The Nazis destroyed and plundered more than 40% of all collective and state farms. The working-age population in rural areas decreased from 35.4 million to 23.9 million people. The number of tractors in agriculture was 59% of the pre-war level, and the number of horses decreased from 14.5 million to 6.5 million heads. The volume of gross agricultural output decreased by 40%. After the Great Patriotic War, the level of agricultural production compared to the pre-war level turned out to be lower than the level after the First World War and the Civil War.

In the first year of the post-war Five-Year Plan, natural disasters added to the enormous damage caused to agriculture by the war. In 1946, Ukraine, Moldova, the regions of the Central Chernozem zone, the Lower and part of the Middle Volga region were gripped by drought. This was the worst drought to hit our country in fifty years. This year, collective and state farms harvested grain 2.6 times less than before the war. The drought also had a hard impact on livestock farming. In drought-stricken areas, the number of cattle alone decreased by 1.5 million heads.
...
During the years of the first post-war five-year plan, as a result of the restoration of industrial and agricultural production, the quickly carried out conversion of military production, the volume of industrial production increased by 73% compared to 1940, capital investments - three times, labor productivity - by 37%, and national income produced - by 64%.

In the 50s, the country's economy developed dynamically. Over 10 years, the average annual growth rate of gross industrial output was 11.7%, gross agricultural output - 5.0%, fixed production assets - 9.9%, generated national income - 10.27%, trade turnover - 11.4%.

The pre-war level of industrial production in Germany was restored somewhat later than in other European countries, only in 1951. And not only because of the great war destruction. The restoration of the economy was delayed by the reforms carried out in the country to liquidate the war industry, to break up monopolies, and delayed the financial exhaustion of the country and the reparations imposed on Germany.

But then German industry began to develop rapidly. Average annual growth rate of industrial production in Germany in 1950-1966. amounted to 9.2%. During the period from 1948 to 1990, industrial production in Germany increased 12 times, while the production of developed capitalist countries as a whole increased 5.7 times. More than 9% of the industrial output of developed capitalist countries is produced in Germany.

The accelerated economic growth of Germany, defeated in the war, and its advancement in the 50s. journalists named 2nd place in the world " economic miracle". How was this “miracle” explained?

First, by updating fixed capital with increased state participation and low military spending. Because the pre-war level of production was restored somewhat later than in other countries, then, consequently, the renewal of fixed capital was completed somewhat later, later - that means on a higher technical basis, because over these few years production technology managed to take some steps forward.

Capital renewal was carried out largely by the state, because corporations weakened by “unbundling” were unable to carry out technical re-equipment. Therefore, in the first post-war years, taxes on corporate profits here reached 90-94%, and the state used these funds for a radical reconstruction of industry.

The opportunity to spend large amounts of money on reconstruction increased due to the fact that in the 50s. Only 5-6% of the state budget went to military spending: the Potsdam Agreements prohibited Germany from arming itself. Because the funds that were spent in other countries on improving weapons were invested here in experimental factories and workshops, in scientific research. As a result, Germany was ahead of other countries in terms of the technical level of industry.

Secondly, in the post-war years it became possible to develop those non-military branches of production that had been suppressed by the fascist state for many years. Demand for goods! These industries could be satisfied, but, unlike other countries, for this it was necessary to build new factories here. Therefore, in the 50s. investment in industry in Germany reached a quarter of the national product, while in England or the USA they amounted to no more than 17%.

But these were temporary factors. While German industry was developing and satiating the accumulated demand, while the reconstruction of industry was being completed, enterprises were being reconstructed in other countries, the domestic market became narrow again.

As the domestic market narrowed, exports of industrial products began to increase. Taking 3rd place among developed capitalist countries in industrial production, Germany ranks 2nd in exports. It exports much more goods than Japan, and almost as much as the United States exports. In 1989, the Federal Republic of Germany accounted for 11.4% of the total exports of developed capitalist countries, and the United States accounted for 12%. Germany exports more goods than England and France combined

Chronicle of the Day. Seventh post-war price decline in the USSR:

This law became the basis for the activities of all communist parties building socialism and even the governments of some capitalist countries seeking to mitigate the consequences of economic crises. This will be discussed further.

Stalin's annual price reduction and wage increase is nothing more than an increase in the investment of workers and employees, pensioners and students of the entire huge country in its economy. For example, if a citizen’s purchasing power increases, he spends more money on food and, by investing in agriculture and the food industry, increases their sales volume and, naturally, the profit of these industries.

If his income has increased, he spends more money on clothes and shoes - the light industry helps out. If he has enough money, he builds himself a new or improves existing housing, purchases building materials, makes the building materials industry more profitable and construction organizations, and so on.

If a citizen has money left over from necessary purchases or there is a need to raise money for a large purchase, he invested the money in the savings bank and from this the savings bank developed. The depositor received interest, and the bank guaranteed him the safety of his money. Such an economy ensured the constant development of all sectors of the country's economy without crises.

Post-war annual decline in retail prices.

Already two and a half years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, in December 1947, a monetary reform was carried out in the USSR, cards for food and industrial goods were abolished, and uniform reduced state retail prices for consumer goods were introduced.

At this first stage of price reduction, the reduction in prices for consumer goods in state retail trade alone amounted to 57 billion rubles during the year. In addition to the reduction in prices on the collective farm and cooperative markets, prices were reduced by 29 billion rubles. In total, budget losses in 1947 from lower retail prices amounted to 86 billion rubles.

This amount was a net loss for the state budget, which was covered due to increased labor productivity, increased production of consumer goods and reduced production costs.

On March 1, 1949, the second stage of reducing prices for consumer goods in state trade in the amount of 48 billion rubles was completed, in addition, in cooperative and collective farm trade - in the amount of 23 billion rubles.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stated that “as a result of a new reduction in prices, the purchasing power of the ruble will again significantly increase and the ruble exchange rate will improve compared to the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the real wages of workers and intellectuals will again increase and costs will again significantly decrease peasants for the purchase of industrial goods."

“In this event, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government showed with renewed vigor a great concern for the working people, for their prosperity, for the growth of well-being and culture,” reported in the editorial of the Pravda newspaper on March 1, 1949.

By the indicated Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prices were reduced in the following amounts:

• bread, flour and bakery products, cereals and pasta, meat and sausages, fish and fish products, butter and ghee, wool and silk fabrics, furs, hardware and electrical goods, cameras and binoculars, and a number of other goods - for 10 %;


• coats, suits, dresses and other garments made of woolen fabrics - by 12%;


• dresses, shirts, blouses and other garments made of silk fabrics, shoes, hats - by 15%;


• cheese and cheese, perfumes, hardware and saddlery, individual tailoring, dishes and household appliances made of plastic, motorcycles and bicycles, radios, pianos, accordions, button accordions, gramophone records, jewelry, typewriters - by 20%;


• TVs, vodka - by 25%;


• salt, cement, gramophones, watches, hay - by 30%.

The same Resolution reduced prices accordingly: in restaurants, canteens, tea houses and other catering establishments. (Pravda newspaper, March 1, 1949)

All over the country, meetings and rallies were held at enterprises, at which the workers were informed of the Resolution “On a new reduction in prices...”

Reductions in retail prices in the USSR, especially after the Great Patriotic War, during Stalin’s lifetime, were carried out annually. The first post-war five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR was completed ahead of schedule - in four years and three months. The production of grain, meat, oil, cotton, flax, and wool increased significantly.

National income in the last year of the five-year plan increased by 64% compared to 1940, and by 12% over the last year. An editorial in the Pravda newspaper on April 1, 1952 noted:

“Comrade Stalin teaches that the essential features of the basic economic law of socialism are to ensure maximum satisfaction of the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the entire society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology.”

This Stalin's politics ensured the development of the USSR economy without crises for many decades.

On April 1, 1952, based on the powerful growth of industry and agriculture, the fifth post-war price reduction was carried out totaling 53 billion rubles, which caused general jubilation among the population.

How high were the growth rates of industry during the years of Stalin’s five-year plans is shown by the following data:

“Produced national income in 1950, compared to 1913, increased 8.8 times, all industrial output - 13 times, production of means of production (group A) - 27 times, productivity social labor- 8.4 times." (National Economy of the USSR for 60 years. P.12. M. 1977)

After Stalin's death, and even after the condemnation of his personality cult, a policy of regular salary increases was implemented, prices remained unchanged.

With the cessation of the decline in retail prices, the growth rate of national income began to decline. In 1980-85 it averaged only 3% per year. The XXV11th Congress of the CPSU set the task of increasing the growth rate of national income in 1986-90 to 5% on average per year. (Materials of the XXV11th Congress of the CPSU. P. 228, M. 1987) Let us recall that during the Stalin period the growth rate of national income was 9-12% per year.

Fragment from the book of the Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association “ZUBR” Elena Mazur and Nikolai Lativok “1932-1933: famine in Europe and America. 1992-2009: genocide in Ukraine. Facts and documents. Analysis. Series “For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.”

Elena Mazur, Nikolay Lativok

In the entire history of mankind, no country has suffered such damage as a result of military action. The USSR lost about 30% of its national wealth. The death toll was 27 million people, the number of wounded and maimed cannot be accurately calculated. In 1946, the population of the USSR, amounting to 172 million people, barely exceeded the level of 1933. 1,710 cities and towns (60% of their total number), over 70 thousand villages and villages, about 32 thousand industrial enterprises, 65 thousand kilometers of railways, 25 million people lost their homes. 100 thousand collective and state farms were ruined, 7 million heads of cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million heads of sheep and goats were slaughtered or driven to Germany. The amount of direct losses caused by the war in 1945 was estimated at 679 billion rubles, which was 5.5 times the national income of the USSR in 1940.

True, the volume of industrial production decreased slightly – by only 9%. But it must be taken into account that the bulk of the production was the production of weapons. And peaceful industries have greatly reduced their output. By the end of the war, consumer goods were produced 2 times less than before it. In 1945, the industry of the areas liberated from occupation produced only 30% of pre-war production. The greatest damage was caused to ferrous metallurgy (the country was set back by more than 10-12 years in metal production and ore mining), oil (the lag was 15 years), coal, chemical, energy, and mechanical engineering.

The relatively small (about 9%) decrease in the overall level of industrial production is explained by the unprecedented scale of evacuation. Up to 2.6 thousand enterprises were evacuated, of which more than 1.5 thousand were large. This began the accelerated development of the eastern regions, where 3.5 thousand large enterprises were put into operation, and military production increased at a particularly rapid pace. As a result, the industrial power of the Urals increased by 3.6 times, Western Siberia by 2.8 times, and the Volga region by 2.4 times. With a general reduction industrial potential heavy industry (the so-called group “A” - production of means of production) exceeded the pre-war level by 12%. Its share in the total volume of industrial production increased in 1945 to 74.9%.

This was achieved largely due to a sharp drop in production of already poorly developed industries and the food industry. In 1945, the production of cotton fabrics amounted to only 41% of the 1941 level, shoes – 30%, sugar – 21%, etc. Thus, the war not only caused colossal damage to industry, but also changed its geographical and especially industrial structure. Therefore, in some respects, the war can be considered as another, very specific stage in the further industrialization of the USSR.

Since 1943, as the occupiers were expelled, the USSR began to restore the economy destroyed by the war. In addition to these works, industrial conversion had to be carried out, since by 1945 more than 50% of industrial production was accounted for by military products. But the conversion was partial, since simultaneously with the reduction specific gravity With the production of military equipment and ammunition, the military-industrial complex (MIC) was modernized and new types of weapons were developed. In September 1945, a message appeared in the press that the USSR had successfully tested the first atomic bomb, and in August 1953, a hydrogen bomb. During these same years, mass demobilization took place. The personnel of the armed forces decreased from 11.4 million people. in May 1945 to 2.9 million in 1948. True, the size of the army soon increased again in connection with the Korean War: in the early 1950s. it reached almost 6 million people. In 1952, direct military expenditures amounted to 25% of the state budget, i.e. only 2 times less than in the war year of 1944.

Unlike the reconstruction process after the Civil War, there was no need to rebuild the entire industry. The value of industrial fixed assets in 1946 was equal to the pre-war value: in the East of the country, as much was built during the war as was destroyed in the West. Therefore, restoration now came down to three processes: restoration of what had been destroyed in areas subject to occupation, demobilization of part of the industry, and return of part of the evacuated enterprises to their old places. Many enterprises established in new locations remained there.

The pre-war level of industrial production was restored in 1948, and in 1950 industry produced 70% more than in 1940. The pre-war level of national income was restored only in 1950, but official figures for the dynamics of industrial production during this time need clarification. The economic recovery was accompanied by a slight increase in people's living standards compared to pre-war times. In 1947, food rationing cards were abolished, and then prices were lowered for several years. In 1947, the average price level was three times higher than in 1940, and the reduction in prices made it possible to reduce their level by 2.2 times, so that even after the reduction they remained somewhat higher than the pre-war level. In addition, the decline in prices was accompanied by the withdrawal of part of the money earned from the population in the form of compulsory loans. Thus, the standard of living in 1946 - 1950. did not increase, but only approached the level of 1940, without reaching it.

The post-war economic growth of the USSR had several sources. First of all, the planned economy still retained the mobilization character inherent in it during the first five-year plans and during the war. Millions of people were organized in an organized manner to restore the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, metallurgical plants of Krivoy Rog, Donbass mines, as well as to build new factories, hydroelectric power stations, etc. The USSR received reparations from Germany in the amount of 4.3 billion dollars. As reparations, industrial equipment, including factory complexes, was imported into the USSR from Germany and other defeated countries. 1.5 million German and 0.5 million Japanese prisoners of war worked in the USSR. In addition, approximately 8-9 million prisoners were kept in the Gulag system during this period, whose work was practically unpaid.

Among the sources economic growth can be attributed to the ongoing policy of redistribution of funds from the social sphere in favor of heavy industry. Every year, the country's population had to subscribe to government loans for an average of 1-1.5 monthly wages. Total for 1946-1956 11 loans were placed. As before, the main burden of generating funds for heavy industry was borne by agriculture, which emerged from the war weakened. During the war, more than 40% of all collective and state farms were destroyed. The working-age population decreased from 34.4 million people. to 23.9 million. The number of tractors was 59% of the pre-war level, and the number of horses decreased from 14.5 to 6.5 million heads. In general, the volume of gross output decreased by 40%. After the war, the level of agricultural production compared to pre-war was lower than the level after the First World War and the Civil War. A severe drought (the worst in the previous 50 years) once again significantly undermined the economic potential of agricultural regions: Moldova, the Lower Volga region, the Central Black Earth regions, and Crimea.

The pre-war level of agricultural production was restored in the first half of the 50s, i.e. much later than in industry. But this restored level was at the same time the level of agriculture in Tsarist Russia on the eve of the First World War. The grains were now collected at 88 million tons. per year (in Russia on the eve of the war 86 million tons). Cattle in the first half of the 50s. there were 56-57 million heads (in 1916 – 58.4 million). 5 million tons of meat were produced. (the same number in 1913)

True, at this time progress was made in the mechanization of agricultural production. By the beginning of the 50s. the number of tractors increased by 2 times compared to pre-war, and grain combines by 2.5 times. But the process of raising the technical level of agriculture itself would be one-sided. The so-called “basic field work” was mechanized: cropping, sowing, harvesting and threshing grain, while livestock farming, production of industrial crops, potatoes and vegetables were almost unaffected by mechanization processes. If the listed “main field work” was now 80-90% mechanized, and not 50-60% as before the war, then flax harvesting was only 30%, and potato harvesting was 10%. At the same time, under technical progress It was mechanization that was understood, and the production of fertilizers and land reclamation remained aloof from this process.

As in the pre-war years, unequal exchange of goods between city and countryside continued using pricing policies. Government procurement prices for major products changed very slowly and did not reflect changes in production costs. Thus, purchase prices for milk reimbursed only a fifth of the costs of its production; for grain - a tenth; for meat - twentieth. All losses were covered by subsidies or through government loans, which, as a rule, were not returned but written off. The peasants, receiving almost nothing for their workdays, lived off their personal subsidiary plots. On private plots, which occupied several percent of the country's cultivated area, vegetables, potatoes were grown, and livestock was kept.

But starting in 1946, the state began to cut back on household plots and impose significant monetary taxes on farms. In addition, each peasant household had to submit a tax in kind in meat, milk and other products. Such practices in relation to the rural population continued to become more severe. In 1948, it was strongly “recommended” that collective farmers “sell” their small livestock to the state, although the collective farm charter allowed them to be kept. In response to this “recommendation,” the peasants began to slaughter their livestock, as a result of which more than 2 million pigs, goats, sheep and other animals were slaughtered in six months.

It became increasingly difficult for collective farmers to sell their products on the market, as fees and taxes on income from sales increased sharply. In addition, products could be sold on the market only if there was a certificate stating that the relevant farm had fulfilled its obligations to the state. If there was no document, the products were confiscated, and the peasants themselves were fined. In 1947, the mandatory requirement of working a minimum of workdays for collective farmers was confirmed. In case of failure to comply, criminal penalties could be applied to them. Thus, as in the years of the first five-year plans, the post-war village survived on the brink of starvation.

Control over farms by MTS and their political departments has again increased. MTS again received the right to distribute planned tasks among collective farms. Higher organizations, through the MTS system, determined the timing of sowing, harvesting and other agrotechnical work for farms. MTS also carried out mandatory procurement of agricultural products and charged collective farms payment in kind for fulfilling mechanized work etc. Moreover, in the early 1950s. Collective farms were consolidated under the same pretext of strengthening the processes of mechanization of agricultural production. In fact, the consolidation of collective farms simplified state control over farms through MTS. The number of collective farms decreased from 237 thousand in 1950 to 93 thousand in 1953.

Despite these measures, agriculture developed slowly. Even in the relatively favorable year of 1952. year, the gross grain harvest did not reach the level of 1940, and the yield in 1949 - 1953. was only 7.7 centners per hectare. (In 1913 - 8.2 centners per hectare). In 1953, the number of cattle was less than in 1916, and the population over these years grew by 30 - 40 million people, i.e. the food problem remained very acute. The population of large cities was supplied intermittently.

In 1952, I. Stalin published the work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” in which he continued to insist on the priority development of heavy industry and accelerating the process of transforming collective farm-cooperative property into national (state) property. It was especially emphasized that the collective farms, which nominally still remained the owners of the products produced, were a temporary, transitional structure. In order to increase the efficiency of agriculture, in 1948, the grandiose “Stalinist Plan for the Transformation of Nature” was adopted, in accordance with which the creation of forest shelter belts in the southern and south-eastern regions of the European part of the USSR was adopted to retain moisture in the fields and reduce the harmful effects of dry winds on agricultural crops. land. This plan also provided for the construction of an irrigation system in Central Asia - the Great Karakum Canal, through which water from the Amu Darya was supposed to flow to irrigate fields in Turkmenistan. Shelter forest belts protect fields from dry winds, improve the water regime of the soil, humidify the air and create a favorable microclimate for crops, and prevent the blowing out of the top fertile layer and soil erosion. In order to give afforestation in the steppe and forest-steppe regions an organized character and state scope, the “Plan for field protective plantings, the introduction of grass-based crop rotations, the construction of ponds and reservoirs to ensure high and sustainable yields in the steppe and forest-steppe regions of the European part of the USSR” was adopted.

Particular attention was paid to afforestation. During 1950-1965 provided for the creation in 16 regions of 8 large forest belts with a total length of 5320 km. In addition, it was planned to plant protective forest belts on the fields of state and collective farms with a total area of ​​5 million 709 thousand hectares. Work began in the spring of 1949. Until 1951, strips were laid on an area of ​​1 million 852 thousand hectares. Their length is more than 6 thousand km. Forest plantations created more than 40 years ago still protect 25 million hectares. lands and are an example of the peaceful application of human energy and caring attitude towards the earth and nature.

In accordance with the plan for the transformation of nature, the construction of huge hydroelectric power stations on the Volga, Dnieper, and other rivers (Gorky, Kakhovskaya, Kuibyshevskaya, Saratov, Stalingrad) also began. All these stations were put into operation in the 1950-1960s. In 1952, the Volga-Don Canal was built, connecting five seas into a single system: White, Baltic, Caspian, Azov, Black.

As stated above, the card system was abolished in 1947. Its abolition was planned for the end of 1946, but due to drought and crop failure this did not happen. The abolition was carried out only at the end of 1947. The USSR was one of the first European countries to abolish card distribution. But before abolishing the rationing, the government established uniform food prices to replace the previously existing rationing and commercial prices. As a result, the cost of basic food products for the urban population has increased. So, the price is 1 kg. black bread was 1 rub., but became 3 rubles. 40 kopecks, price 1 kg. meat increased from 14 to 30 rubles, sugar - from 5.5 to 15 rubles, butter - from 28 to 66 rubles, milk - from 2.5 to 8 rubles. At the same time, the minimum wage was 300 rubles. per month True, for low- and medium-paid categories of workers and employees, along with uniform prices, “bread allowances” were established on average of about 110 rubles. per month, but these allowances did not solve the general problem of income.

At the same time, a monetary reform was carried out. Its necessity was determined by the imbalance of the monetary system during the war year, since the sharp increase in military spending required the release into circulation of a huge amount of money that was not backed by consumer goods and services. Due to a significant reduction in retail trade turnover, the population found itself with more money than was required for the normal functioning of the economy, and therefore the purchasing power of money fell. In addition, the country had many counterfeit money, released by the Nazis during the war.

On December 14, 1947, the Government Decree “On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods” was issued. Old money was exchanged for new money at a rate of 10:1 within a week. For those who kept money in savings bank accounts, the exchange was more preferential. So, deposits up to 3 thousand rubles. remained unchanged and were not subject to revaluation. Deposits in the amount of 3 to 10 thousand rubles. exchanged at the rate of 3:2, and deposits over 19 thousand - 2:1.

At the same time, all previously issued government loans were combined into a single new 2 percent loan, and old bonds were exchanged for new ones in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of the freely marketable loan of 1930 - in a ratio of 5:1. With the help of such methods, excess waste was removed money supply, and the reform itself acquired a mainly confiscatory character. During the reform, it was mainly rural residents who suffered, who, as a rule, kept their savings at home, and speculators who made money during the war and did not have time to sell large sums of cash.

On January 1, 1950, the government recognized the need to increase official rate ruble against foreign currencies and determined it in accordance with the gold content of the ruble (0.222168 of pure gold), although in those years this fact did not have any economic significance, since the established official ruble exchange rate was not used in any calculations.

All the years of the first five-year plans, the war and post-war years were for the country a time of extreme, extraordinary development. During this period, the urgent needs of the population were postponed until later. For almost 25 years the economy has been working under the greatest strain. All the successes achieved were paid at a superhuman price. According to official statistics, the average nominal wage of workers increased between 1928 and 1954. more than 2 times. According to other sources, during this period the cost of living in the USSR increased 9–10 times, as retail prices rose constantly. But if the general index of retail prices in state and cooperative trade in 1928 is taken as 1, then in 1932 it was 2.6, in 1940 - 6.4, in 1947 -20.1, in 1950 –11.9. Real wages for this period, excluding taxes and loan subscriptions, but including the wage supplement in the form of free medical care, education and other social services, changed as follows: if we take the wage level in 1928 as 1, then 1937 it was 0.86; in 1940 -0.78; in 1944 –0.64; in 1948 –0.59; in 1952 –0.94; 1954 -2.19.

Meanwhile, in the memory of people of the older generation, the opinion has taken root that under Stalin prices decreased every year, and after him they only increased. But the secret to lowering prices should be sought in the huge jump that occurred after the start of collectivization. Thus, retail prices for rye bread increased in 1928-1952. almost 19 times, for beef – 17 times, for pork – 20.5; for sugar – 15; for sunflower oil at 33; for eggs – 19.3; for potatoes - 11 times. Therefore, it was not difficult to implement an annual price reduction—by several percent—for basic food products. In addition, this price reduction was carried out due to the actual decrease in the standard of living of collective farmers, since, as indicated above, the growth rate of purchase prices for agricultural products was much higher than the growth of retail prices. And finally, the majority of the rural population hardly felt this reduction in prices, since government supplies in rural areas were very poor.

The housing issue remained extremely acute. Many workers and their families in the cities lived in dormitories, communal apartments, barracks and basements. During these years, housing construction was carried out on a very limited scale. The main budget allocations were spent on the military-industrial complex, heavy industry, and the energy system. The further development of the USSR economy rested on its excessive centralization. All economic issues were resolved only in the center, and local economic authorities were strictly limited in resolving any matters. The main material and monetary resources necessary to fulfill planned targets were distributed through a significant number of authorities. Departmental disunity and mismanagement led to constant downtime in production and large material losses.

An army of special commissioners, or “pushers,” grew up, who were engaged in obtaining raw materials and scarce materials in factories and ministries. Reports from heads of enterprises and ministers were full of additions to the fulfillment and overfulfillment of plans, so statistical data should be taken critically due to their certain unreliability. An example is the report of G.M. Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress (1952), in which it was said that the grain problem in the USSR had been solved and that a harvest of 8 billion poods had been harvested. And just two years later it was announced that data on agricultural development were inaccurate.

After the war, various administrative reforms were carried out several times, but they did not make fundamental changes to the essence of the planned system. In March 1946, the people's commissariats turned into ministries, and the people's commissars into ministers, and this meant that they were no longer people's commissars. Civilian ranks and classes were established, vaguely reminiscent of the “table of ranks” of Peter I. Tightening economic system left its mark on the whole social life countries.

After the war (1946), public persecution of writers, composers, theater figures and film directors began. The goal of these companies was to force the creative intelligentsia to work strictly in the spirit of “party spirit” and “socialist realism”. Discussions in philosophy, biology, linguistics, political economy, which began in 1947. The fight against “cosmopolitanism” and “adulation of the West” was encouraged. the incitement of chauvinism and anti-Semitism intensified. Since 1948, repressions have been renewed.

Choice economic strategy The USSR was determined by its political course. In this case, it depended primarily on the will of Stalin, the balance of forces in the ruling circles, as well as on the international situation and especially on its understanding by the Soviet leadership. The foreign economic factor determined both the degree of conversion and the amount of resources allocated to the development of the military-industrial complex (MIC), as well as the level of economic cooperation with Western powers, and in particular the possibility of obtaining foreign loans and investments. These were fundamental circumstances that largely determined the scale of savings, their structure (in particular, the share of domestic savings in gross domestic product) and the degree of closedness of the Soviet economy.

Victory in the war dramatically changed the international situation. The USSR became not only a full member, but also one of the leaders of the world community; his relations with the Western powers acquired a partnership, even, it seemed, friendly character. However, it was not so much about the wider inclusion of the USSR in the global economic context, but about the choice of an economic development model. The war changed the social atmosphere and gave impetus to the democratic renewal of the system and hopes for change for the better. Fear began to gradually disappear in the public consciousness. The war taught me to think critically. For many, it was the “discovery” of the West. Millions of citizens visited abroad for the first time (more than 6 million people in the active army and another 3.5 million people repatriated). They were able to evaluate the achievements of Western civilization themselves and compare them with Soviet ones.

Unprecedentedly broad cooperation with “imperialist” countries in the fight against a common enemy, the weakening of ideological manipulation during the war years shook the established stereotypes and aroused interest and sympathy for the West. Reformist sentiments also penetrated into the Bolshevik elite, which was noticeably renewed during the war years. The war accustomed management circles to initiative and relegated the fight against pests and enemies of the people to the background.

During the war years, the degree of centralized state regulation of some sectors of the economy decreased. As a result, in areas not subject to occupation, the incomes of rural residents increased slightly. Concern for the survival of the population and the fulfillment of government tasks prompted local authorities to encourage small-scale production. A return to peaceful life required: either legitimization, institutionalization of these innovations, significant adjustments to pre-war economic policy, or a return to the previous over-centralized economic model with a hypertrophied military sector (even civilian enterprises had at the same time a military profile, mobilization capacities in case of war), the strictest administrative and political control over the activities of the enterprise administration and all workers.

Already in 1945 - 1946. When considering the draft 4th Five-Year Plan, a discussion arose about ways to restore and develop the economy. In these and subsequent years, a number of leaders of various ranks emerged who advocated softening or changing certain aspects of economic policy, balanced development of the national economy, and some decentralization of its management. Similar proposals were also made during the development and closed discussion of the new Constitution and the new party program.

Among them were the Secretary of the Central Committee, the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU A. Zhdanov, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee N. Voznesensky, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR N. Rodionov and others. The First Secretary of the Kursk Regional Committee of the CPSU P. Doroshenko proposed to reorganize collective farms, radically change the role of peasant families and transform them into the main structural unit of agricultural production. These leaders supported their calculations with an analysis of the international situation, believing that the transition to peaceful life would cause an acute economic and political crisis, which would not only prevent any threat of creating an anti-Soviet coalition of Western powers, but, on the contrary, would promise the USSR new opportunities, in particular, as market for crisis-ridden Western economies.

Supporters of a return to the pre-war model, among whom were G. Malenkov, L. Beria (who headed the most important military projects), and leaders of heavy industry, on the contrary, appealed to the works of the economist E. Varga, who refuted the theory of the imminent and inevitable crisis of capitalism and proved its ability to adaptation. Believing that this made the international situation potentially explosive, Malenkov and Beria advocated the accelerated development of the military-industrial complex.

They managed to win their first major victory with the approval of the 4th Five-Year Plan. Adopted in May 1946, the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy for 1946-1950. contained very intense tasks and proclaimed as the main task: “Ensure the priority restoration and development of heavy industry and railway transport.” It was supposed already in 1946 to “complete the post-war restructuring of the national economy” and in the near future not only to catch up, but also to surpass “the achievements of science outside the USSR.” However, many aspects of the economic strategy were not yet fully defined. The tasks of the 4th Five-Year Plan did not exclude some variability in development.

However, the progressive collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition, the struggle with the Western powers for the division of Europe and the beginning cold war contributed to the final victory of supporters of centralization and development of the military-industrial complex, behind whom stood Stalin. In the absence of the threat of fascism uniting the world, the initially inherent contradictions within the anti-Hitler coalition, the geopolitical interests of the powers inevitably led to a new split of the world into warring blocs.

After the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) and the defeat of Japan (the act of surrender of which was signed on September 2, 1945), the contradictions between the allies intensified sharply. The most important reason for the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition and the beginning of military-political confrontation was the struggle for spheres of influence. Already in 1945, through the efforts of the Soviet authorities, people's democratic governments controlled by the USSR were created throughout Eastern Europe. The transformation of Eastern Europe into a virtual protectorate of the USSR came as a surprise to many Western politicians, who still viewed communist ideology as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, rather than Stalin's emerging imperial ambitions and cold geopolitical calculations.

All these countries were provided with intensive material, financial and military assistance, the true extent of which was always kept secret. It is only known that as preferential long-term loans in 1945 - 1952. they were provided with 15 billion rubles. ($3 billion). Such huge funds for those times were provided to countries in response to the implementation of socio-economic transformations in them according to the Soviet model.

The United States, in turn, sent enormous material assistance to Western European countries in the amount of $12.4 billion as part of the Marshall Plan. These funds were used not only for post-war economic recovery, but also to strengthen the military and political influence of the United States in the region. On October 4, 1946, W. Churchill publicly accused the USSR of having fenced off Eastern Europe“Iron Curtain” and called for organizing pressure on the USSR. Essentially, it was a call for open confrontation with the USSR. Nevertheless, the inertia of allied relations still persisted for some time. In 1949, with the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the NATO bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact organization were created - the split of Europe into two hostile camps was finally formalized, which had the most negative (primarily economic) consequences for the internal life of the USSR.

The fact is that at the turn of the 1940-1950s. Industrially developed countries began to introduce the achievements of the modern scientific and technological revolution (STR) into production, and this led them to a new, post-industrial stage of economic development. The Soviet economy, due to its over-centralization, insufficient initiative and entrepreneurship in various economic structures, turned out to be incapable of widespread introduction of scientific and technical developments into production (except for the military-industrial complex) and began to lag behind developed countries market economy. In addition, these countries began to noticeably outstrip the USSR in terms of the standard of living of the population and in ensuring various democratic rights and freedoms. The USSR sought to prevent the “pernicious influence” of the West on the Soviet people, using the resources of the repressive apparatus.

Stalin was also pushed to tighten domestic policy and unleash a new round of terror. personal experience, and some internal factors, in particular, the famine of 1946, which contributed to a sharp tightening of state control over the countryside and an aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the cities. In 1947, the USSR refused to participate in the Marshall Plan. In 1947, the Berlin crisis broke out, almost leading to a military conflict with the United States. The hardliners' final victory was sealed by the defeat of their opponents. N. Voznesensky (accused of underestimating the indicators of the 4th Five-Year Plan), P. Rodionov and many other economic managers were repressed. The targets of the 4th Five-Year Plan were revised towards even greater increases; new, super-intense tasks were given to military production.

Despite the relative stabilization in Europe, the parties were actively developing plans for a new war, with the United States focusing on atomic bombings. But in the USSR in 1949, a nuclear device was detonated for the first time. In 1950, North Korea, with the help of China and the USSR, tried to reunite the country by armed means. The United States and 15 other countries came out on the side of South Korea under the UN flag. In the northeastern regions of the USSR, near Alaska, accelerated construction of airfields and bases began, and assignments for weapons production increased sharply. These many other signs indicated accelerated preparations for armed conflict with the United States.

This determined economic policy recent years Stalin's USSR. The country not only returned to its previous economic model, but also lived literally in the pre-war regime. The accelerated development of heavy industry was accompanied by propaganda campaigns and the deployment of terror. Without it, without non-economic coercion, it would have been impossible to pursue such an economic policy. Repressions began to increase after the war in the western regions of the USSR; they affected Soviet prisoners of war who found themselves in camps after their return, and were then used against various representatives of the intelligentsia, military personnel, etc. The last hopes were finally dashed by the campaign against cosmopolitanism that unfolded from the end of 1948. By playing on the patriotic sentiments of the Soviet people, the authorities thereby tried to erase from people’s consciousness the interest and sympathy for the West that arose during the war years, to strengthen the ideological isolation of the country, to incite chauvinist and anti-Semitic feelings and urgently renew the image of the external enemy, which was shaken during the war.

The unfolding new round of mass terror was interrupted by the death of Stalin. Nevertheless, for 1945-1953. the number of prisoners in GULAG camps and colonies alone increased from 1.5 to 2.5 million people. As a result of the post-war wave of repressions, 5.5 - 6.5 million people ended up in prison and exile. With the hands of prisoners, numerous major facilities of the fourth and fifth five-year plans were built in the nuclear, metallurgical, energy industries, as well as in transport.