Currency reforms in Russia. Pavlov's ruble: what is worth remembering about the last monetary reform of the USSR Results of economic policy S.Yu. Witte

28.03.2024

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1. Russia became an empire in...
1700
1725
1721
1725

2. Factors that determined the relationship between Rus' and the Golden Horde
issuance of labels for the great reign of Vladimir
appointment of Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Rus'
payment of tribute to the Golden Horde by the Russian principalities
distribution of lands by the khans of the Golden Horde into patrimonial possession
the presence of land holdings of the Golden Horde in Rus'

3. Statements of the Norman theory of the origin of the Old Russian state
the calling of the Varangians and their unification of the Slavic tribes is the main foundation of the Old Russian state
the Normans had a developed state and annexed the Slavic lands to it
The Varangians controlled all sea and river trade routes in Europe and in the 9th century established their control over trade routes from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea
the inability of the Slavic tribes to create their own statehood without the influence of more civilized neighbors
Rurik was not a real historical figure

4. Before the adoption of Russkaya Pravda, people were tried for crimes...
based on the prince’s personal order on a specific fact
based on community decision
by the verdict of the Magi
based on traditions, rules passed down from generation to generation

5. The term “condition” is associated with accession to the throne...
juvenile Ivan Antonovich
Anna Ioannovna
Elizaveta Petrovna
Catherine II

6. The manifesto of February 19, 1861 provided the peasants with...
personal freedom
freedom to leave the community
the right to independently dispose of existing land
equal rights with the nobility

7. The rules that prohibited peasants from complaining about their masters were abolished...
Catherine II in the last year of her reign
Paul I
Alexander I
Nicholas I

8. The “lesson summers” established in 1597 introduced...
localism
punishments for “dashing people”
five-year search period for fugitive peasants
the period of transition of peasants from one owner to another

9. Executive power in cities according to the City Regulations of 1870 belonged to...
City Duma
city government
to the governor
to the mayor

10. Oprichnina existed in...
1565 – 1572
1583 – 1597
1558 – 1583
1605 – 1613

11. On Lake Peipsi, the Novgorodians defeated...
Swedes
Poles
Teutonic Knights
Germans and Danes

12. The power of the Golden Horde in the Russian lands existed since ....
1223 to 1380
1240 to 1480
1237 to 1410
1242 to 1480

13. The ideology of the “official nationality” is...
doctrine “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality”
the idea “Moscow is the Third Rome”
Marxist-Leninist theory
doctrine of revolutionary populism

14. Railway construction at the end of the 19th century. was carried out mainly due to...
foreign capital
private Russian banks
states
state and foreign banks

15. Peasants received the right to enter higher educational institutions and the public service under ...
Alexandra I
Peter I
Alexandra II
Catherine II

16. The concept of “boyar rule” is associated with the period of childhood...
Ivan IV
Fedor Ivanovich
Peter I
Peter II

17. Military settlements were created according to the project ...
M. Speransky
A. Arakcheeva
M. Kutuzova
Alexandra I

18. The main provisions of the judicial reform of Alexander II
abolition of the estates court
separation of court from administration
creation of special courts to consider political cases
introduction of the institute of sworn attorneys (bar)
abolition of the State Council and Senate

19. Reasons for Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War
economic and technical backwardness of Russia from the advanced countries of Europe
existence of serfdom
opposition in society against war
Russia's lack of allies
unsuccessful offensive of Russian troops in Turkey

20. The monetary reform, which ensured the convertibility of the ruble, was carried out by S. Yu. Witte in... the year
1894
1895
1897
1898

21. The coat of arms of the Moscow state under Ivan IV represented an image ...
Double headed eagle
St. George the Victorious
Savior Not Made by Hands
Andrew the First-Called

22. Letter of grant to the cities of Catherine II...
introduced the election of mayor and street elders
divided the city into parts led by bailiffs and elders
approved city estates and formed city councils
created noble assemblies

23. Oprichnina was characterized by...
carrying out local government reforms
creation of Streltsy cavalry units
a policy of mass repression against the boyars and other opponents of the tsar’s autocratic power
division of Russian lands into “oprichnina” and “zemshchina” with different principles of governance
the presence of an absolute monarchy

24. “Counter-reforms” of Alexander III were expressed as follows:
widespread use of emergency legislation, tightening police control in the country
restriction of university autonomy
abolition of the principles of independence, transparency and competition in legal proceedings
tightening supervision over zemstvo institutions
support for liberal publications
Russification of national borders

25. The era of Alexander III dates back to...
war with Turkey
formation of the RSDLP
appointment of S.Yu. Witte as head of government
adoption of the “Regulations on measures to protect state security and public peace”

26. “Right of the Ladder” is a procedure for replacing the Grand Duke’s table in which...
the eldest in the Rurik family became the Grand Duke
the Grand Duke transferred power to his son
the Grand Duke was elected at the princely congress
the Grand Duke could appoint a successor

27. The first sovereign of all Rus' from the great princes became...
Dmitry Donskoy
Vasily II the Dark
Ivan III
Ivan IV

28. During the last third of the 19th century, the number of workers in Russia tripled and amounted to ... million. Human
15
3
8
5

29. The Battle of Lake Peipsi took place in ... year
1242

30. Reforms carried out during the reign of Alexander II
judicial
parliamentary
military
zemstvo
constitutional
urban
administrative

31. Administrative-territorial structure of the Russian state in the 16th century
appanage principalities headed by a prince
provinces headed by a governor
estates headed by a boyar
counties headed by a governor, volosts headed by a volostel

33. Countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition
Japan
Great Britain
Austria
France
USSR
Spain
USA
China

34. Reasons for the Bolshevik victory in the civil war
support for Soviet power by the majority of workers and peasants
creation of a well-organized and disciplined Red Army
better logistical support for the Red Army compared to the white movement
organizing and leading role of the party
support for private property and legalization of the free market

35. The project for the municipalization of land was put forward by the party ...
Social Democrats (Mensheviks)
cadets
Social Revolutionaries
Bolsheviks

36. Lenin’s plan for the formation of the USSR provided for ...
reconstruction of the Russian state on a socialist basis
formation of a federation of Soviet republics on the principles of voluntariness and equality
creation of a confederation consisting of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
entry of the Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, ZSFSR into the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy

37. The path of agricultural development proposed by V.I. Lenin
development of individual peasant farming
planting communes
development of farming on leased lands
development of all forms of cooperation

38. The institution that exercised control over the activities of Soviet authorities in the 1920s
workers' and peasants' inspection (RKI)
All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK)
all-Russian emergency commission
Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh)

39. The essence of the Cuban missile crisis
collision of Soviet and American warships in the Caribbean Sea
threat of military conflict between the USSR and the USA due to the transfer of Soviet missiles to Cuba
American intervention against Cuba in the Bay of Cochinos
US deployment of nuclear missiles on the destroyer "Kariba" near the borders of the USSR

40. The main feature of social and political life in the USSR in the 70-80s of the XX century.
expansion of openness and democracy
deepening the gap between program statements, ideological guidelines of the party and real deeds
weakening of party control as a result of the “swelling” of the CPSU
violation of the principle of stability of nomenclature

41. Measures to boost agriculture taken in 1953-1955.
redistribution of national income in favor of the countryside
development of virgin lands
creation of agro-industrial complexes
agricultural mechanization
liquidation of collective farms, creation of state farms

42. The Cuban missile crisis took place in ... year
1959
1962
1963
1964

43. New authorities created during the perestroika period
Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
President of the USSR and Presidents of the Republics
The State Duma
congresses of people's deputies of the republics

44. The first composition of the Provisional Government was dominated by...
Social Revolutionaries
Mensheviks
cadets
rights

45. Years of the IV Five-Year Plan
1941 – 1945
1946 – 1950
1951-1955
1956-1960

46. The main task of the IV five-year plan
restoration and further development of the economy destroyed during the war
to industrialize Siberia
create an atomic bomb
strengthening foreign policy

47. The Second Congress of Soviets adopted...
peace decree
decree on land
Constitution of Russia
Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia
decree establishing the Council of People's Commissars
decision to abolish the death penalty

48. The CPSU (b) was renamed the CPSU at ... the party congress
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII

49. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council during the Civil War
I.Stalin
V. Lenin
Ya. Sverdlov
L. Trotsky

51. The plan for Germany’s “lightning war” against the USSR included ...
ending the war within three months and capturing the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line
capture of the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine
occupation of the North-West of the country
occupation of Siberia and the Far East

52. Phenomena characterizing the crisis in Russia of 1998-1999.
dissolution of the State Duma by the President
the collapse of many banks and companies
removal of the President from office
frequent changes of heads of government
ruble devaluation

53. New economic management body established in 1957
Gosplan
Economic councils
VSNKh
line ministries

54. The reason why I.V. Stalin and his supporters began to curtail the NEP in 1928.
the economic principles of the NEP did not correspond to the principles of directive public administration, which were firmly established by the end of the 1920s.
NEP did not justify itself economically
the international situation forced the change of course
this was the result of J.V. Stalin’s strategy aimed at strengthening the position of the party.

55. Political processes that took place in the 30s
Shakhty case
case of the Labor Peasant Party
Mingrelian affair
case of Daniel and Sinyavsky
doctors' business
Industrial Party case
Leningrad case

On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the uncontrollability of the economy as a whole was already acutely felt, and in these conditions the problem of public money and its management automatically came to the fore. 14

January 1991

B.S. was appointed Chairman of the USSR Government. Pavlov (1937-2003), former Minister of Finance of the USSR for two years, one of the most competent and decisive financiers and statesmen of the late Soviet period. The monetary reform of 1991, carried out under his leadership, provided for the exchange of cash, and only large bills (50 and 100 rubles of the 1961 model for new ones issued in 1991), to combat speculation, corruption, smuggling, and the production of counterfeit money , unearned income. Cash in the amount of a month's salary was subject to exchange. Deposits in savings banks in the amount of more than 10 thousand rubles. were temporarily frozen for a period of half a year. At the same time, for two months, the issuance of cash to citizens from their deposits in banks was limited to 500 rubles. per month. In conditions of a decline in production and an acute shortage of goods, the reform carried out, in principle, did not affect the overall economic situation. It was confiscatory in nature, but was milder than in 1947; less than 15% of banknotes were confiscated, compared to 50% in 1947.97 On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, despite all the good intentions of the government, the exchange of money was chaotic and caused discontent among the population.

During further liberalization, a colossal increase in prices was observed, which only confirmed the insignificance of the effect of this reform, which did not affect the non-cash sphere of payments, which was the huge underwater part of the iceberg that determined the crisis of the payment system as a whole. The collapse of the USSR, which began in the fall of 1991, and the refusal of the republics to transfer funds to the union budget led to a significant increase in the issue of money by the State Bank of the USSR. The reasons for carrying out monetary reforms in the former Soviet republics and issuing national currencies at this time were the collapse of the USSR and the formation of 15

new independent states that set the task of creating national monetary systems. In 1993, in the context of great changes and contradictions in the power structures, a kind of monetary reform was carried out in Russia, during which the cash money supply of neighboring countries, which no longer supplied goods, but only accumulated debt on non-cash payments, was decisively separated from the Russian monetary system . All bank and treasury notes of the State Bank of the USSR, banknotes of the 1961 - 1992 model. were withdrawn from circulation. The 1961 coins were not withdrawn from circulation. Only Bank of Russia banknotes of the 1993 model were issued and remained in circulation in denominations of 100, 200, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000 and 50000 rubles. Citizens of the Russian Federation were given the right to exchange up to 100 thousand rubles in person once. with the remaining amounts credited to a time deposit in Sberbank of Russia. The exchange limit for non-citizens temporarily staying in Russia was set at 15 thousand rubles. Thus, in an officially almost imperceptible action that was not announced at the time as a monetary reform, the Soviet ruble was replaced in circulation by new banknotes of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Initially, the status of the ruble as the national currency of Russia was determined by the Law of the Russian Federation “On the monetary system of the Russian Federation” dated September 25, 1992.

No. 3537-1. Later, in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted on December 12, 1993, in Art. 75 stated: “The monetary unit (currency) of the Russian Federation is the ruble.” And further, on April 26, 1995, the Federal Law “On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)” was adopted, which abolished the previous law on the monetary system, but repeated the wording from it: “The official monetary unit (currency) of Russia is the ruble. One ruble consists of 100 kopecks.” (v. 3).

However, throughout the subsequent 1990s, the monetary economy in the country continued to spiral out of control and became quantitatively unmanageable. A new crisis was approaching in the absence of positive changes from attempts to achieve activity in production through privatization and ensure the receipt of taxes from privatized enterprises into the treasury.

In 1998, Russia carried out a monetary reform in the form of denomination. On August 4, 1997, President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin (1931-2007) issued a Decree changing the nominal value of ruble banknotes, as well as changing the price scale in a ratio of 1:1000. In accordance with the decisions of the Committee of Directors, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation took a set of measures to change the nominal value of the Russian ruble, which was reflected in banknotes and coins.

The agreed principles of the reform provided for the gradual exchange of banknotes and coins during their normal, regular circulation in order to eliminate any losses for citizens. The denomination of the ruble provided, starting from 1998, for the parallel circulation of new and old banknotes and coins, while the withdrawal of old banknotes was to take place without restrictions in a ratio of 1000:1 through the usual channels of monetary circulation - trade in goods, trade in services, transactions of banking institutions. The issue of banknotes and coins of the 1997 model was carried out through the institutions of the Bank of Russia and credit organizations to ensure the payment of wages, pensions, benefits and other cash payments. In accordance with the planned activities, Bank of Russia banknotes of the previous issue (1993-1995), which replaced Soviet rubles, as well as USSR coins and Bank of Russia coins issued in 1961-1996. (including USSR coins of 1, 2 and 3 kopecks issued before 1991) were to be gradually withdrawn from circulation. After this, the payment turnover of Russia would have to consist of banknotes of the Bank of Russia issued in 1997 in denominations of 5, 10, 50, 100, 500 rubles. and new coins of the 1997 sample in 1, 5, 10, 50 kopecks. and 1, 2, 5 rubles. For ease of use and a smooth transition to the new rubles, their appearance remained the same, with a nominal value reduced by 1000 times and with the introduction of new security features on banknotes. It was assumed that by January 1, 1999, banknotes of earlier issues would be largely out of circulation, while the official exchange of banknotes that would not have been exchanged or used would be extended without restrictions until 2002 inclusive. These initial plans were announced in advance and had already begun to be implemented until the default occurred in August 1998.

The plan to replace the money was openly announced in advance. However, in the process of its implementation in the run-up to the August 1998 crisis, which had both domestic and international roots, and after it, the same signs of confiscatory monetary reforms that were carried out several times during Soviet times were revealed. Subsequently, it became obvious that the monetary and financial authorities, by proposing such a reform, seemed to anticipate the “default” that would soon occur and therefore tried to smooth out the expected extremely negative phenomena in advance. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which still retained the traditions of operating under Soviet conditions, took precautions to hedge against more dramatic events in the future due to wasteful short-term borrowing at home and abroad. These measures consisted of issuing short-term, really unsecured government credit bonds (GKOs) and releasing them to the external unstable speculative market. Thus, the monetary crisis actually began already in 1997 in connection with the preparations openly announced on August 4 by President B.N. Yeltsin and the hidden confiscation monetary reform that turned out to be true. This reform began in conditions of relative stability of the money market and the presence of internal convertibility of the ruble, and therefore the mass of ordinary people could not help but get the impression that the market, by inertia, remained stable. Under these conditions, the authors rightly considered that there should be no panic. Perhaps only a few could have foreseen that a complete collapse of the financial system would soon occur, which would include a state internal and external “default” and a sharp drop in the value of the ruble, which would effectively confiscate the ruble cash savings of the population (once again!). So the question remained open, unclear, what total amount of old rubles was actually exchanged for denominated rubles, which, in fact, would show the scale of the hidden monetary confiscation.

In modern economic publications devoted to the “default” in Russia, there are two different points of view on the dramatic events that took place: explanatory and highly critical...

The first point of view explains what measures were taken and why, despite everything, the crisis still occurred and was inevitable. According to this position, unfortunately, nothing could be done in the unfavorable conditions that accompanied the initial period of transformation. As international experience has shown, the most common modern method of mobilizing additional financial resources is the issuance of government-guaranteed short-term loans in the form of bonds, which complied with the requirements of the IMF. The financial crisis in Southeast Asia began to manifest itself at the end of 1997 - beginning of 1998, which indirectly increased the risks in Russia regarding foreign investment. Attempts by the government to extend the terms of payment of obligations were unsuccessful, while the market lost confidence in the government's actions. By June 1998, Russia's international credit ratings had dropped significantly. There was a massive outflow of foreign capital from Russia. At the same time, the already very small official gold and foreign exchange reserves fell sharply to an insignificant level - to $2 billion. Moreover, the population already had tens of billions of dollars that did not “work” in any way in the economy and were not connected with the banking system. On July 20, 1998, it was announced that the issuance of short-term government securities would cease.

The second point of view regarding the “default” that occurred is critical. Its basis lies in the fallacy, inefficiency, and doom of failure of the budget and tax policies adopted from the very beginning, which led to a huge increase in public debt.

The August 1998 crisis demonstrated the groundlessness of efforts to stabilize the exchange rate in conditions of an uncontrolled market, degradation and decline in economic production and financial management. The deterioration of the balance of payments and the onset of the financial crisis in Asia were not taken into account with sufficient foresight. Sporadic attempts to stabilize the exchange rate through foreign exchange interventions by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, given insufficient resources, were doomed to failure. The excessive domestic demand for US dollars on the part of residents and non-residents could not be satisfied either by borrowing abroad or by intensive spending of the remaining official gold and foreign exchange reserves. The result became inevitable - internal and external “default”.

Western speculative investment funds, including those from the United States, also suffered relatively large losses.

The artificially introduced “currency corridor” ceased to exist, while spontaneous floating of the exchange rate became the usual norm. This became possible due to the government’s adoption of a firm policy to replenish the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia through contributions from exporters of significant, constantly increasing revenues from the export of energy products at world prices with a steady upward trend. The presence of the Bank of Russia in the foreign exchange market began to be determined by the task of equalizing emerging fluctuations through the purchase and sale of currency. This was preceded by an unprecedented drop in the ruble exchange rate: from August 15, 1998, the official exchange rate was 6.3 rubles. for 1 dollar decreased by the end of 1999 to 27 rubles. for 1 dollar. In less than a year and a half, the ruble has depreciated 4.3 times.

The exchange rate of the Russian ruble, regularly announced by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, has acquired the significance of a solid economic category. The official exchange rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation began to be used for all payments between the state and enterprises, associations and citizens, as well as for taxation and accounting. On the basis of the official exchange rate, numerous transactions for the purchase and sale of foreign currency were concluded on the domestic market, and since the summer of 2006, the Russian ruble became available in cash and partially convertible abroad, thereby becoming a significant international monetary instrument.

Already in August 1998, the Government of the Russian Federation announced a plan to overcome the crisis, which included:

convertibility currency ruble Russian

Let us consider the history of the development of the Russian monetary unit from the point of view of its convertibility and its interaction with foreign currency.

Russia's foreign economic relations have long been characterized by a high degree of state centralization. Even under Ivan IV, state monopolies were established on trade in bread, hemp, rhubarb, potash, tar, and caviar; bans have been imposed on the export of salt and wax. Later, the state monopoly extended to the export of sables, honey, lard, and mast timber. A ban on the export of silver and gold, as well as full-fledged coins, has long existed and persisted for quite a long time.

In the 17th century, there was a decree on the mandatory delivery to the treasury (sale at a forced exchange rate) of gold and foreign currency (efimok) brought from abroad (New Trade Charter of 1667).

Under Peter I, any type of trade with foreigners, including within one’s own country, had to be carried out with payment in gold or efimkas and with their obligatory delivery to the treasury.

Russian mercantilism consisted of numerous prohibitions and restrictions. The administrative ban on the export of precious metals remained until the 19th century.

The experience of “motto” politics accumulated in Russia in the 19th century deserves special attention. Its goal was to increase the gold reserves and strengthen the Russian credit ruble. In the fall, when grain exports increased the exchange rate of the ruble, credit notes and Russian government bonds were thrown onto the world market, providing good gold and foreign exchange earnings, and also preventing a further increase in the ruble exchange rate.

In the spring, when grain exports were declining, which could lead to an undesirable drop in the value of the ruble, the State Bank of Russia used part of its gold reserves to buy Russian banknotes on the world market.

The foreign stock market played a major role in monetary policy in pre-October Russia. Almost half of government securities were placed abroad.

In the USSR, for many years, the ruble exchange rate was fixed and sharply overvalued, i.e. did not meet the solvency parity of currencies. Back in the 60s. 1 currency ruble cost 1.2-1.3 dollars. The currency ruble was an artificial unit used in foreign economic calculations. The ordinary ruble was inconvertible: Soviet banknotes were not exchanged for foreign currency. Foreign trade and international payments were balanced by additional supplies of goods or sales of gold. The main support of this system is the state currency monopoly, which assumes that the holder of foreign currency is only the state, which has the exclusive right to dispose of it. Currency speculation was brutally persecuted; in the Criminal Code of the USSR this crime was punishable by execution. The currency monopoly reflected a closed autarkic model of the economy.

The years of perestroika were characterized, as often happens with a weak

currencies, multiple exchange rates (official, commercial, tourist, market); Directive methods of currency management continued to prevail. The official rate dropped to 64.3 rubles. per dollar, the weighted average changes in the exchange rates of the 6 leading world currencies in the “basket” were recognized as a reference point for exchange rate movements.

Liberalization of the foreign exchange market in the early 90s. led to a gigantic jump in prices for hard currency. Among the factors that stimulated the growth of exchange rates for the dollar and other hard currency are the following:

-feedback between the forced monetary emission, growth of the money supply and the exchange rate;
-the dollar or mark plays the role of a reliable means of storage;

individuals and legal entities with financial assets prefer to store them in stable hard currency;

- at least a third of ruble receipts on the foreign exchange market came from the former republics of the USSR;
- dollars and other hard currency are necessary for shuttle operations of purchasing prestigious goods abroad that are not replaced by domestic production or centralized imports (cigarettes, wines, cosmetics, etc.). At the same time, our “importers” preferred products sold abroad at bargain prices and found channels for purchasing goods with the local value added tax waived. High prices on the domestic market covered the costs of the overvalued dollar exchange rate.

Stabilization or even some depreciation of the dollar since mid-1993. is, to a large extent, the result of foreign exchange interventions by the Central Bank.

But the Central Bank's foreign exchange operations are not indifferent to internal monetary circulation (the size of the money supply). If banks buy foreign currency, then they not only lower the exchange rate of the domestic currency, but also introduce additional monetary funds into circulation, while the likely increased demand for goods causes a general rise in prices, i.e. a new wave of inflation.

Large sales of foreign currency from the reserves of the State Bank - a measure aimed at stabilizing the market exchange rate of the national currency, leads to the withdrawal of part of the cash or check cash from circulation and, thus, slows down the inflation process. But here, too, secondary consequences are revealed: the anti-inflationary lever is triggered if the proceeds are not spent. In addition, this measure is generally of an auxiliary nature and may accompany the economic recovery that has begun. Otherwise, the result will only be the depletion of foreign exchange resources and the further provision of domestic currency.

This is how Russia’s monetary policy developed at the historical stage. But I am more interested in the position of the ruble at the latest, including the present, stages of the development of our state.

Changes that have occurred from the early 90s of the twentieth century to the present day:

On July 1, 1992, the system of multiple exchange rates was eliminated. From now on, the rate fixed as a result of trading on the MICEX is recognized as the official one.

During 1993, the last remnants of this system - subsidized import coefficients - were abolished. On May 16, 1996, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to ensure the transition to ruble convertibility,” which approved the proposals of the government and the Central Bank for Russia to accept the obligations imposed on IMF member countries by Article 8 of the Fund’s Charter in the field of the national currency convertibility regime on current foreign exchange transactions. On June 1, 1996, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergei Dubinin sent a message to the IMF Board of Directors about Russia’s accession to the requirements of Article 8 of the Fund’s Charter. At the end of June, it was assumed that the IMF Board of Directors would make a decision on Russia’s official accession to this article. During the second half of 1996, the government and the Central Bank, in accordance with the provisions of the IMF charter, must eliminate the remaining restrictions in the field of current foreign trade operations, in particular, abandon the division of bank accounts into types “T” (current) and “I” (investment), established by the instructions Central Bank No. 16 of 1993. As a result, non-residents will have the opportunity to directly use ruble proceeds for investment purposes, as well as freely export profits in rubles or hard currency. However, the government and the Central Bank will liberalize foreign trade payments simultaneously with strengthening control over operations related to the movement of capital. Currency control will also be extended to ruble transfers abroad. The Central Bank will also have to decide on such a change to its instruction No. 16 in order to prevent non-residents from dumping GKOs on the market, destabilizing its ruble funds. Late 1996 - late 1990s. Trading in rubles on foreign currency markets begins and then gradually expands. A number of foreign banks are beginning to exchange rubles for local national currencies.

Since May 17, 1996, the Central Bank independently determines the official exchange rate of the ruble, taking into account both exchange trading and the interbank market.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia needed to join the agreement of the central (national) banks of the countries that own hard currency currency on a mechanism for mutual maintenance of exchange rates. Only then can the ruble officially be considered accepted into the club of convertible currencies.

Well, the transition to full convertibility of the ruble was unofficially carried out in the spring of 2006 in the Address of the President of Russia to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation dated May 10, 2006, where it was proposed to ensure full convertibility of the ruble by July 1, 2006. But only on January 1, 2007, a new version of the Federal Law “On Currency Regulation and Currency Control” was adopted, according to which restrictions on cross-border capital movement were lifted, which ultimately became the official proclamation of the full convertibility of the ruble.

Witte's monetary reform

The monetary reform of 1897, which is called the Witte reform, was the locomotive that pulled Russian industry, thereby accelerating the modernization of the state.

The need for monetary reform in Russia was dictated by the development of industry. It was necessary to ensure the stability of the Russian ruble. This would help attract foreign investment, which was needed by the industry due to the lack of domestic capital. The monetary reform, initiated by Witte, was considered quite successful, although it had some drawbacks.

Prerequisites for reform

Russian capitalism in the last quarter of the 19th and early 20th centuries. entered the imperialist stage, which corresponded to world trends. In the 90s of the XIX century. In the Russian economy, monopolistic associations—cartels and syndicates—become relevant, and joint-stock commercial banks emerge. But for sustainable economic development, a stable currency was needed, which would prevent the depreciation of monetary capital. An attempt to strengthen the credit ruble by removing “extra” paper money from circulation was defeated. And by the end of the 19th century. The need for a transition to a gold currency became increasingly clear.

The first on this path was Great Britain, which introduced a gold coin standard in 1816. Then Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, France, Holland, Italy, Greece and Belgium switched to gold monetary circulation.

Russia was part of the world market, so there was a need to create the same monetary system as in other European countries. The ruble was a fully convertible currency, but the sale of foreign currency for rubles and the unlimited export of credit rubles abroad impeded the development of foreign trade and reduced budget revenues. This prevented the flow of foreign capital into the country, as future profits in gold currency became uncertain and investments became risky. Thus, the main reason for the monetary reform of 1895-97. the government became interested in developing Russia's foreign economic relations.

Nikolaev ruble after Witte's monetary reform

What does the expression "gold standard" mean?

This is a monetary system where gold is recognized and used as the only monetary commodity and the universal equivalent of values. This standard is not subject to inflation. In the event of a decline in economic activity, gold coins went out of circulation and ended up in the hands of the population, and when the need for money expanded, gold was put into circulation again. Gold money retained its nominal value. This simplified payments for foreign economic transactions and contributed to the development of world trade.

Five rubles in gold. Obverse

Five rubles in gold. Reverse

How did society react to the new monetary system?

Differently. The nobility and landowners were especially opposed. If this was good for the new commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of Russia and foreign partners, then the instability of money made it possible for the domestic bourgeoisie to increase income, in particular, from the export of grain

Preparation for reform

A huge amount of work has been done to prepare the reform since the 80s of the 19th century. Minister of Finance N.Kh. Bunge and his successor I.A. Vyshnegradsky. The purpose of the preparation is to replace the inflationary circulation of irredeemable paper banknotes with a gold standard system. It was necessary not only to return to metal circulation instead of paper money, but also to change the basis of the monetary and monetary system: move from the silver standard to the gold one.

It was necessary to achieve a positive balance of payments and accumulation of gold reserves (by increasing exports, limiting imports, pursuing a protectionist policy, and concluding external loans). Eliminate the budget deficit. Stabilize the exchange rate.

Purposeful economic and financial policies led to the fact that on January 1, 1897, Russia's gold reserves reached 814 million rubles.

Having taken office as Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte stopped practicing under I.A. Vyshnegradsky speculative exchange game on the credit ruble. The State Bank, using its own and treasury gold and foreign exchange reserves, fully satisfied the demand for foreign currency. His predecessors in this post were financial scientists N.Kh. Bunge and I.A. Vyshnegradsky made attempts to streamline the monetary system, the main flaw of which was the excess of the credit and paper supply, the devaluation of the ruble and its extreme instability.

As a result, the scale of speculation was reduced. Stabilization of the market exchange rate of the credit ruble in 1893-1895. created the prerequisites for carrying out monetary reform: fixing the exchange rate based on the exchange of the credit ruble for gold according to the actual ratio between them.

The prerequisites for carrying out monetary reform were: gold reserves, a stabilized exchange rate, a trade surplus, a balanced budget, non-interference by the Tsar and the State Council in the work of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank.

Nicholas II

On May 8, 1895, Nicholas II approved a law according to which all legal transactions could be concluded in Russian gold currency and payment for such transactions could be made in gold coins or credit notes at the gold rate on the day of payment.

But the gold coin very slowly became a priority means of payment. The State Bank even took the next step: on September 27, 1895, it announced that it would buy and accept gold coins at a price not lower than 7 rubles. 40 kopecks for a half-imperial, and in 1896 the purchase rate was set at 7 rubles. 50 kopecks These decisions led to the stabilization of the ratio between the gold and credit rubles in the ratio 1:1.5. In January 1897, it was decided to introduce metal circulation based on gold in the Russian Empire. On January 3, 1897, Nicholas II signed the law “On the minting and release of gold coins into circulation.”

New monetary system

On January 3 (15), 1897, Russia switched to the gold standard. Gold coins of 5 and 10 rubles, as well as imperials (15 rubles) and half-imperials (7.5 rubles) were minted and put into circulation. The new type of credit notes were freely exchanged for gold.

However, many preferred paper money: it was easier to store.

The convertibility of the ruble strengthened credit and contributed to the influx of foreign investment and the economic development of the country. The initiator and conductor of the monetary reform of 1897 was S. Yu Witte, Minister of Finance of Russia in 1892-1903.

The study of their experience, sober calculation, unyielding will, professional competence, knowledge of the mechanisms of power gave S.Yu. Witte had the opportunity to develop a reform project and gain the support of Emperor Nicholas II. The reform was prepared in an atmosphere of secrecy, since it was assumed that it would not be supported by broad sections of society, especially court circles and the landed nobility: stabilizing the steering wheel met the objectives of industrial development, but led to a fall in prices for agricultural products.

The Ministry of Finance and its head were subjected to sharp indignation, attacks, and accusations of wanting to impoverish the country. Critical articles, angry feuilletons, pamphlets and cartoons appeared in the press.

Caricature of Witte

The majority of members of the State Council opposed the reform, which forced Witte to transfer it to the discretion of the Finance Committee, where he had many associates. Under the chairmanship of Emperor Nicholas II, the decision to adopt the monetary reform was made at an expanded meeting of the Finance Committee.

Significance of the Currency Reform of 1897

It stabilized the ruble exchange rate and streamlined monetary circulation, created a solid base for domestic entrepreneurship, and strengthened Russia’s position in the international market.

Sergei Yulievich Witte (1849-1915)

S.Yu. Witte. Lithograph by A. Munster

Statesman. He held the positions of Minister of Railways (1892), Minister of Finance (1892-1903), Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (1903-1906), Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1905-1906). Member of the State Council. Count (since 1905). Actual Privy Councilor.

Origin - from the Baltic Germans. Mother is from the Russian princely family of the Dolgorukovs.

He graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Novorossiysk University (Odessa) in 1870, receiving a Candidate of Sciences in Physics and Mathematics.

He abandoned his scientific career and went to work in the office of the Odessa governor, then was engaged in the commercial activities of operating railways and then remains constantly in this field, becoming in 1892 the Minister of Railways, and at the end of this year - the Minister of Finance. He held this post for 11 years. He accelerated the lengthy construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, considering it an important stage in the country's economic progress.

Witte's undoubted merit is his implementation of monetary reform. As a result, Russia received a stable currency backed by gold for the period until 1914. This contributed to increased investment activity and an increase in the influx of foreign capital.

He opposed the strengthening of the privileged position of the nobility, believing that Russia's prospects were connected with the development of industry.

With his participation, labor legislation was developed.

With his active participation, government reforms were carried out, including the creation of the State Duma, the transformation of the State Council, the introduction of electoral legislation and the editing of the Basic State Laws of the Russian Empire.

Contributed to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Developed a reform program, implemented by P. A. Stolypin.

He was a supporter of the accelerated development of industry and the development of capitalism. Carried out a reform of industrial taxation.

He promoted the introduction of a state “wine monopoly” on alcohol.

He concluded a peace treaty with Japan, according to which half of Sakhalin Island passed to Japan.

Showed extraordinary diplomatic abilities (Treaty of Union with China, conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty with Japan, trade agreement with Germany).

He was buried at the Lazarevskoye cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra.

CONTENT

Introduction

Historical and economic excursion

Specifics of national currency convertibility

Regulation of the foreign exchange market in Russia

Free convertibility of the ruble - myth or reality?

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION.

We often come across a simplified understanding of currency convertibility, when it comes down to the exchange of a monetary unit of one country for a monetary unit of another or the purchase and sale of currencies. With this interpretation of the concept of currency convertibility, its economic essence is completely ignored, and the whole problem appears as a kind of technical problem. A simplified approach to a problem, in turn, gives rise to the illusion of the relative ease of solving it.

So what is the convertibility of a national currency, what is its economic meaning? The concept of convertibility could be defined as such a state and nature of the economic and monetary-financial system of a country in which holders of funds in the national currency are provided with freedom to carry out certain transactions not only within the country, but also abroad. Under the conditions of the national currency convertibility regime, any legal entities or individuals (both domestic and foreign) that have funds in the national currency of a given country must have the unconditional right to freely spend them at their discretion to purchase goods and services or use them for investment purposes within country or abroad with the greatest benefit for yourself.

A mandatory and indispensable condition for the convertibility of the national currency is the presence in the country of economic and legal conditions for the manifestation of economic independence of the owner of the money. Currency convertibility is possible only in a market economy, in which participants in economic exchange act independently at their own peril and risk. At the same time, the market economy must be sufficiently balanced, competitive and open, without trade and payment restrictions. As world practice shows, not every country, even with a market economy, can afford to introduce convertibility of its own currency. The transition of commodity producers and consumers from a primary focus on the domestic market and internal production conditions to an alternative choice between the domestic and foreign markets, when the domestic economy appears as part of the world economy, and the world economy as a natural continuation of the domestic economy, is impossible without the free convertibility of the national currency. Only such a regime can ensure the full implementation of the well-known market principle of “sell on the most expensive markets and buy on the cheapest”, will allow the most rational use of funds for investment on an international scale, and also benefit from the international division of labor. Currency convertibility, directly linking the domestic market with the world market, makes it possible to quickly respond to changes in the international economic environment, which has a positive impact on the economic development of the country. In an economy that is beginning to be influenced by the world market, there is a process of adaptation and alignment of national production conditions with global ones in all respects - costs, prices, quality, technical level of products, etc. The national economy is undergoing structural changes; its export industries, in order to increase their competitiveness, are beginning to specialize in the production of those goods that can be produced cheaper, faster and of better quality than in other countries. Guidelines are emerging for choosing the most promising areas for the development of foreign economic relations. Ultimately, the optimal structure of domestic production and foreign trade is achieved, and the country's material, labor and financial resources are rationally used.

But this whole process is quite painful at times. The convertibility of the national currency puts the country in qualitatively new conditions of free multilateral trade and international competition. The economy is constantly under pressure from the world market due to fluctuations in prices, exchange rates, interest rates and other elements of the market environment caused by market forces. Therefore, the country's economy must adapt relatively quickly and flexibly to the constantly changing situation on the world market. If previously producers worked for the domestic market under the protection of trade and currency restrictions, now they may face an increase in the influx of competitive goods from abroad. In this case, it will be necessary to expand production and sales markets for their products to cover increased import costs from export revenues. Otherwise, the convertibility regime of the national currency will be under threat due to an imbalance in the country's balance of payments.

Achieving and maintaining the convertibility of its national currency by a country is a complex economic problem associated with profound qualitative changes, both in the country’s internal economy and in its economic relations with the outside world. Therefore, the introduction of a currency convertibility regime requires serious preparation and the creation of the necessary economic conditions and prerequisites. This explains the different timing of the transition of foreign countries - as they are ready - to the convertibility regime of their national currencies, as well as the different degree or form of convertibility that these currencies have. Currently, of the 156 member states of the International Monetary Fund, only about 70 of them have the status of convertible currencies. These are those countries that, according to the IMF charter (Article VIII), have undertaken to refrain from introducing trade and payment restrictions on current commercial transactions that are incompatible with the currency convertibility regime, and thereby maintain this regime for their currencies.

The main group of Western European countries - Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg - was able to do this only in February 1961. It took these countries 15 years to restore the convertibility of their currencies after the end of the Second World War. Other states reached this milestone later. For example, Japan introduced the convertibility of its currency in 1964, Denmark in 1967, Finland in 1979, Spain in 1986, Indonesia in 1988, and Turkey in 1990. Most of these countries support the convertibility of national currencies only for current commercial transactions and maintain various types of restrictions on transactions related to foreign investments and other international movements of capital. Approximately 15 countries extend the regime of free convertibility of their currencies to all types of foreign economic transactions. Among them are countries such as the USA, Germany, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others. Only recently some Western European countries have been added to them, including France and Italy, which until very recently maintained some restrictions for operations related to the movement of capital.

If we classify the forms of currency convertibility by types of foreign economic operations and the subjects of these operations, then currency convertibility is complete when it covers all types of foreign economic operations, that is, both current commercial transactions and capital flow operations, as well as all categories of domestic and foreign legal and individuals - owners of this currency. Currency convertibility is partial when it does not apply to some types of foreign economic activity and to some categories of currency holders. Currency convertibility is also divided into external and internal. With external convertibility, complete freedom to exchange funds in one or another national currency for foreign currencies is provided only to foreigners, that is, non-residents. Sometimes citizens and legal entities of this country, that is, residents, do not have such freedom. With internal convertibility, on the contrary, residents enjoy such rights, while non-residents remain subject to restrictions on carrying out certain currency transactions.

In forecasts, the timing of introducing ruble convertibility ranges from 3-4 to 15-20 years. There are many reasons cited that prevent a faster resolution of this issue. This is the lack of proper commodity coverage of the ruble, and the underdevelopment of wholesale trade, and the need to implement measures to improve the finances of the country and the economy as a whole, etc. The convertibility of the ruble is a condition for the integration of our economy into the world economy. It will provide our enterprises conducting foreign trade operations with financial independence and full self-accounting, create normal conditions for the work of joint ventures, and facilitate foreign economic relations in general. The convertibility of the ruble will make it possible to compare our economy with the Western one, our costs with the costs of other countries and, finally, “to have an objective indicator of the economic weight of the Russian Federation in the world economy. Therefore, apparently, the convertibility of the ruble is not only necessary, but also extremely necessary

The transition to ruble convertibility should be carried out in stages. If the introduction of ruble convertibility is not properly prepared, its exchange rate on the market will rapidly fall, as hundreds of billions of rubles not covered by goods accumulated in public and private circulation will spill out onto the foreign exchange market in pursuit of foreign banknotes that have a more complete commodity backing.

1. HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC EXCURSION.

In the past, in fact, until the great crisis of 1929-1933, the gold standard system prevailed. Each monetary unit had a certain gold content - one or another weight amount of gold. The balance in trade between countries was paid for by transfer of gold. It was this that acted as a global means of payment and accumulation. For example, a dollar contained 0.648 g of gold and, accordingly, was equal to 0.5 pounds. sterling. In this regard, let us recall the monetary reform of S.Yu. Witte (1897). The gold ruble became the basis of monetary circulation both within the country and in its relations with the outside world. Credit notes in hand were exchanged for gold on demand. But, at the same time, an integral element of the reform was the devaluation of the ruble. The new gold ruble weighed 66.6% of the old gold ruble and was equal to 1.5 of the old credit ruble. Before the reform, 1 ruble was nominally worth 4 francs, and after it 2.6 francs. The new ratio was more in line with the purchasing power of the currencies and also boosted Russian exports.

The transition from the gold standard to modern managed navigation was the Bretton Woods system, which arose at the end of World War II (1944) and lasted until 1971.

Bretton Woods, which introduced an organizing principle into international monetary relations, was the embodiment of the global project of J.M. Keynes. The main components of Bretton Woods were:

Interdependence of fixed exchange rates and their joint regulation;

To manage the system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created, the number of whose members, initially 44 states, later increased to 169;

Each participating country was obliged to determine the gold content of its currency, establish on this basis a fixed exchange rate in relation to other currencies and maintain it (rate adjustments by national governments could not go beyond + 10% of the value of the currency);

In case of difficulties with the balance of payments that cannot be overcome through domestic sources, the IMF issues short-term loans to its members (in accordance with the country’s quota in the Fund’s resources);

Along with gold, the dollar became an international reserve. The United States emerged from the war with a relatively healthy and strong economy and had accumulated significant gold reserves. Did it turn out to be a dollar? the only currency exchangeable for gold (priced at $35 per troy ounce of gold).

Subsequent events, however, led to the crisis and collapse of Bretton Woods. The fact is that the needs of trade turnover and capital migration presented an increasing demand for green banknotes. The number of dollars operating in the world significantly exceeded the gold reserves of Fort Pox. The convertibility of the dollar into gold became increasingly doubtful and was officially suspended by President Richard Nixon in August 1971.

This action was a blow to the remnants of the gold standard and the system of fixed exchange rates. The dollar floated, its rate dropped compared to a number of currencies. The outcome of the events was the Jamaican session of the IMF (1976). She authorized a ban on the use of gold as the basis of currency parities. Part of the Fund's gold was sold at market prices, a system of floating exchange rates was adopted (although most participating countries retained their peg to the dollar), and measures were planned to strengthen the Fund's collective currency in order to turn it into the main reserve instrument.

But the collapse of Bretgon Woods did not lead to the liquidation of the IMF, although its functions changed. Along with the role of managing the market float of currencies, monitoring balances of payments, issuing loans, and organizing foreign exchange interventions, the IMF has become a center specifically dealing with the problem of debt of developing countries.

The Fund is carrying out serious work in the field of international economic comparisons, to create a methodology for calculating gross product, production volumes, foreign trade, employment and other indicators on a single monetary basis. For a long time, official exchange rates reduced to a dollar base were used for this purpose. In 1993, the IMF moved to a more rational, albeit labor-intensive, system. Now national currencies are recalculated not at their market rates, where, as is known, the influence of a variety of factors is intertwined, but at rates that take into account only the purchasing power of the currency and its dynamics. This natural exchange rate is calculated on the basis of the national value of the global basket of goods and services, i.e. a set of commonly used utilities.

2. SPECIFICITY OF NATIONAL CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY

When analyzing the state of the Russian currency, it is useful, in our opinion, not only to note the shortcomings caused by the recent past lack of market relations, but also to turn to traditions.

Russia's foreign economic relations have long been characterized by a high degree of state centralization. Even under Ivan IV, state monopolies were established on the trade in bread, hemp, rhubarb, potash, tar, and caviar; Bans have been imposed on the export of salt! and wax. Later, the state monopoly extends to | export of sables, honey, lard, mast timber. A ban on the export of silver and gold, as well as full-fledged coins, has long existed and persisted for quite a long time. In the 17th century there was a decree on mandatory surrender | treasury (sale at a forced rate) of gold and foreign currency (efimok) brought from abroad (New Trade Charter of 1667). When| Peter I, any type of trade with foreigners, including within one’s own country, had to be carried out with payment in gold or efimkas and with their obligatory delivery to the treasury.

Russian mercantilism consisted of numerous prohibitions and restrictions. The administrative ban on the export of precious metals remained until the 19th century.

The experience of “motto” politics accumulated in Russia in the 19th century deserves special attention. Its goal was to increase gold reserves and strengthen the Russian credit ruble. In the fall, when grain exports increased the exchange rate of the ruble, credit notes and Russian government bonds were released onto the world market, providing good gold and foreign exchange earnings, and also preventing a further increase in the ruble exchange rate. In the spring, when grain exports were declining, which could lead to an undesirable drop in the value of the ruble, The State Bank of Russia used part of its gold reserves to buy Russian banknotes on the world market.

Statistical information testifies to the broad monetary expansion of Russia in the global securities market.

The foreign stock market played a major role in the monetary policy of pre-October Russia. Almost half of government securities were placed abroad. It is curious that hopes for the omnipotence of state power did not appear yesterday, but were traditional for the Russian merchants. Archives of the IVII-XVIII centuries. They are full of petitions addressed to the Tsar and complaints about foreign competitors. Traders and fishermen asked to shorten the foreigners, to introduce the so-called. “statutory” prices, not allowing foreigners to buy or sell goods at low prices.

The dominance of the state monopoly and all kinds of prohibitions hampered the development of a competitive market and private entrepreneurship and thereby narrowed the fiscal capabilities of the state.

The years of perestroika were characterized, as is often the case with a weak currency, by a multiplicity of exchange rates (official, commercial, tourist, market); Directive methods of currency management continued to prevail. The official rate dropped to 64.3 rubles. per dollar, the weighted average changes in the exchange rates of the 6 leading world currencies in the “basket” were recognized as a reference point for exchange rate movements.

Liberalization of the foreign exchange market in the early 90s. led to a gigantic jump in prices for hard currency. Among the factors that stimulated the growth of exchange rates of the dollar and other hard currency are the following:

Feedback between forced monetary emission, money supply growth and exchange rate,

The dollar or mark plays the role of a reliable store of value; individuals and legal entities with financial assets prefer to store them in stable hard currency;

At least a third of ruble receipts on the foreign exchange market came from the former republics of the USSR;

Dollars and other hard currency are necessary for the so-called. shuttle operations for purchasing prestigious goods abroad that are not replaced by domestic production or centralized imports (cigarettes, wines, cosmetics, etc.). At the same time, our “importers” prefer products sold abroad at bargain prices and find channels for purchasing goods with the local value added tax waived. High prices on the domestic market cover the costs of the overvalued dollar exchange rate.

The stabilization or even some depreciation of the dollar since mid-1993 is largely the result of the Central Bank's foreign exchange interventions.

Unfortunately, however, the Central Bank sometimes, as they say, plays music without looking at the notes. Foreign exchange operations of the Central Bank are not indifferent to internal monetary circulation (the size of the money supply)

If banks buy foreign currency, then they not only lower the exchange rate of the domestic currency (effect No. 1), but also introduce additional monetary funds into circulation (effect No. 2), while the likely increased demand for goods causes a general increase in prices, i.e. a new wave of inflation (effect No. 3).

Large sales of foreign currency from the reserves of the State Bank - a measure aimed at stabilizing the market exchange rate of the national currency, leads to the withdrawal of part of the cash or check cash from circulation and, thus, slows down the inflation process. But here, too, secondary consequences are revealed: the anti-inflationary lever is triggered if the proceeds are not spent. In addition, this measure is generally auxiliary in nature and may accompany the economic recovery that has begun. Otherwise, the result will only be the depletion of foreign exchange resources and the further provision of domestic currency.

3. REGULATION OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET IN RUSSIA

One of the main indicators reflecting the increased instability inherent in transition economies is the exchange rate of the national currency. The problem of choosing such a course is especially important during the transition to a market economy, since it dictates the need for immediate macroeconomic stabilization. The main tasks of transition economies include limiting inflation processes. Price stabilization opens up the possibility of foreseeing medium- and long-term prospects for the economic development of the national economy.

The implementation of the stabilization program means achieving external and internal economic balance. The role of exchange rate policy in achieving macroeconomic equilibrium is especially important at the beginning of the transition period. With the right exchange rate policy, excessive money supply can be avoided and inflationary expectations can be prevented. A rational choice of exchange rate policy helps limit the population's propensity to accumulate savings in dollars and the currencies of other developed countries.

The choice of exchange rate regime in transition economies is based on a number of premises. They are formed by the economic situation in the respective state.

In our state, the movement of the ruble exchange rate and its relationship with the movement of domestic prices has acquired special significance for everyone, including Russian citizens. Already during the period of “Gorbachev's perestroika,” the expansion of economic independence of state self-supporting enterprises and their access to the foreign market required changes in the currency regime. In 1987-1989 instead of a single official ruble exchange rate, which significantly overestimated it compared to real purchasing power, a system of so-called differentiated currency coefficients was introduced; this meant a plurality of rates, and with a wide range of their values. For different product groups and even for individual goods, different rates were in effect in the form of premiums to the official rate or discounts from it. In this way, they tried to compensate for the differences between the internal price system, which developed over decades under a planned economy, and the price structure of the world market.

Subsequently, the system was simplified, differentiated coefficients were abolished, but the noted plurality remained until 1992. Since July 1992 a procedure has come into effect in which a single market rate is established based on the results of trading on the Moscow International Currency Exchange; this rate is approved by the Central Bank of Russia as official. In interbank transactions, in cash exchange offices, in stores, etc. rates are applied that may differ from the official one and from the exchange rate, but by small amounts.

But the ruble still remains a closed currency, as it was in the USSR, in the sense that it has virtually no international circulation in the form of transfers of funds through bank accounts with the participation of non-residents and in the form of cash banknotes. A change in this situation is conceivable only in relation to the relatively distant future as one of the results of genuine financial stabilization and strengthening of the economy. Now we are talking about a completely different task: to displace the dollar as a means of circulation within Russia and to make the ruble a normal national currency, even if it does not participate in international circulation.

The relative liberalization of the foreign exchange market with the internal convertibility of the ruble corresponds to the general line towards the “denationalization” of the economy and foreign economic relations, towards the integration of Russia into the world economy. The significant openness of the Russian market to imports means increased foreign competition, which may push domestic producers to become more efficient. It is also important that the Russian consumer, traditionally severely limited in access to foreign goods and services, now has a wide range of choices. Meanwhile, this opportunity represents the most important social advantage of a market economy. The “floating” exchange rate of the ruble played a certain role in its achievement; it was virtually inevitable in the conditions of inflation of the last four to five years and naturally acted as a tool for bringing domestic prices closer to world prices and eliminating the huge distortions in the price structure that existed in the Soviet economy. This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, the transformed exchange rate regime and the inherent procedure for establishing the exchange rate significantly contributed to the “dollarization” of the Russian economy, the flight of capital abroad, the influx of low-grade and inferior imported goods, etc.

The Russian currency regime that emerged in 1991-1992 was largely approved by the International Monetary Fund as a component of market-type economic reforms. The IMF considered it as a step towards introducing formal convertibility of the ruble within the framework of a non-inflationary economy. As for the “floating” of the ruble, firstly, it is fully permitted by the IMF charter and policy. Secondly, a different procedure for setting the exchange rate in conditions of severe inflation would, from the point of view of the IMF, be obviously worse. The depreciation of the ruble helped support Russian exports, which could somewhat limit Russia's claims for emergency financial assistance from the IMF and other Western creditors, and this was also a positive element for them. However, the scale of Russian inflation far exceeded all calculations of the Russian Government and the IMF. The fall of the ruble was not a means of ensuring the vital export of industrial goods for Russia, but a way of enriching the owners of the raw materials industries, especially the “oil generals,” as well as government officials in charge of export quotas and licenses.

As for the issue of the exchange rate as the most important element of Russia's foreign economic policy, at a technical level, negotiations with the IMF on this issue were conducted back in 1994. In 1995 The idea of a “semi-fixed” exchange rate was implemented in the form of the introduction of a currency corridor. And the goal here was to reduce inflationary expectations to a minimum and promote macroeconomic stabilization - on the one hand; on the other hand, not to lose the recently achieved control over the situation on the foreign currency market. This measure received the approval in principle of the IMF; it is in principle consistent with its “ideology” and the practice of setting exchange rates used by a number of countries. The market reveals a specific exchange rate depending on supply and demand, which in turn depend on fundamental economic factors. The process of establishing the market rate is under the constant control of the Central Bank of Russia, using both administrative and market levers. At the same time, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation guarantees that, through market interventions (purchases and sales of foreign currency in the market), it will not allow the rate to go beyond the exchange rate corridor and thereby ensure satisfactory stability of the exchange rate.

4. FREE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE RUBLE - MYTH OR REALITY?

World experience shows: in order to make a national currency convertible, it is necessary, first of all, to make the economy of a given country competitive in the world market, and then begin to rebuild the financial and monetary system in accordance with international standards of foreign trade and monetary relations. Reformers in Russia started with the second, believing that the rapid introduction of ruble convertibility could be achieved by significantly lowering the exchange rate by fixing it at a significantly lower level. In their opinion, a lower exchange rate of the ruble, making imports more expensive, would be able to restrain its growth as much as possible and, at the same time, by increasing enterprises' export revenues, would stimulate export growth, ensuring a balanced development of foreign trade and balance of payments.

This policy led, first of all, to the artificial introduction of internal convertibility of the ruble and, as a result, to a landslide drop in its exchange rate (during the years of reforms from 1992 to the present, the ruble has depreciated 21 times!) in the absence of filling the market with domestically produced goods. The authorities did not take into account that the foreign exchange segment, like the financial market as a whole, is in an extremely unstable position, since the formation of the financial market has not been completed, and the economy is in the transition period from socialism to capitalism (and not simply, as monetarist reformers suggest, a transition from a planned economy to a market one) is in a deep, protracted socio-economic crisis: a huge budget deficit, a gigantic public debt, a crisis of non-payments, a lack of free capital, the number of unemployed (partially and completely) exceeded 10 million people in June 1996. In addition, as a result of the depreciation of the ruble from 237 rubles/dollar. at the beginning of 1992 up to 5000 rubles/dollars. in May 1995, there was a sharp and uncontrollable increase in domestic prices for imported goods. And this had an extremely negative impact on the general level of prices, which did not triple, as the reformers predicted, but several thousand times. In addition, “currency shock therapy,” as is known, led to strong social inequality and a sharp stratification of the population in terms of income. Therefore, any significant events associated with changes in the economic or political situation, for example, “Black Tuesday” in October 1994, the introduction of a currency corridor in July 1995 and the “trailing peg” of the ruble to the dollar since July 1996, a crisis interbank loans in August 1995, events in Chechnya, etc., almost automatically lead to destabilization and depreciation of the ruble.

It must be borne in mind that there are freely convertible, partially convertible and closed currencies. The Russian ruble, despite the acceptance of the obligations of the Russian Federation in June 1996 under Article VIII of the IMF Charter (we are talking about the prohibition on member countries to limit payments and transfers made by residents for current transactions, and the need to maintain the free convertibility of foreign holdings into the corresponding national currencies), essentially refers to closed currencies, except for its position in a number of CIS countries. After all, overnight it will not be able to perform the functions of internal and external reversibility. A transitional stage is required that cannot be stepped over - the ruble must first become a partially convertible currency. The main mistake of the government of the Russian Federation of all compositions, starting from January 1992, is that the convertibility of the ruble is put forward as a goal, and not a means of carrying out reforms, just as the price is not a derivative of the ruble exchange rate, but on the contrary, the ruble exchange rate reflects the ratio internal and external prices. Thus, by following the lead of the IMF, Russia, from our point of view, is dooming itself to a state where the form of reforms in the currency sphere dominates over the content. In Europe, for example, no one converted their currency to such and such a number according to IMF recommendations. After all, before converting the national currency, it is necessary, first of all, to stabilize all spheres of the economy, strengthen the economic potential of the country, and not strive, as is currently the case, to convert the Russian ruble at any cost.

In this regard, the strongest blow for the monetarist reformers was the flight of Russians from their national currency. Russians do not believe in the ruble, preferring to have US dollars and other hard currency. Approximately 20% of US dollars circulating outside the United States is now concentrated in Russia. The “dollarization” of the entire country (and the dollar in the Russian Federation, in fact, for the entire period of reforms performs all the functions of money) complicates the implementation of national budgetary, monetary and exchange rate policies, because the element of the money supply that is not subject to direct government control increases. It is the depreciation of the national currency that leads to an increase in the money supply necessary to service this natural material circulation of material values. Moreover, with the same volumes of created product, a much larger number of banknotes is required.

The crisis of non-payments is largely due to the disruption of the natural connection between price dynamics and the growth of the money supply. The formation of the necessary money supply is happening slower than new prices are emerging, and the high demand for dollars and hard currency in general is largely due to expectations of a new depreciation of the ruble, weak government regulation, the slow expansion of the market turnover of durable goods, and people’s lack of faith in the effectiveness of the state’s policies, which with its practical steps, it has repeatedly disavowed decisions taken to improve the socio-economic situation of Russians. An example is the monetary policy of the Bank of Russia, which has changed several times recently. At first, the Central Bank “driven” the ruble exchange rate too far down, then it began to raise it, and on July 6, 1995, it established a currency corridor, which, however, did not in any way affect the process of money circulation in the country. On the contrary, with the introduction of the currency corridor, the volume of non-payments, including from the government, increased sharply.

In terms of the volume of gold and foreign exchange reserves at the beginning of 1996, Russia approached the international criterion - approximately 25% of annual imports, reaching $13 billion. However, to create such reserves, exclusively inflationary methods were used: there was a large jump in the ruble money supply from January 1995. to January 1996 - by 49%. There is an increase in domestic debt, the size of which at the end of 1996 is expected to exceed 300 trillion. rubles against 194 trillion. in 1995. Most of the increase comes from government securities

In general, if we compare the experience of countries with developed market economies in achieving free convertibility of their national currencies with the Russian one, we will find very interesting differences.

In Russia, the so-called market exchange rate of the ruble was introduced, determined during trading on the MICEX. In other countries, the transition to the convertibility of national currencies began, as a rule, with its simultaneous devaluation and the subsequent introduction of a fixed exchange rate. In Russia, the process of transition to ruble convertibility began and continues to this day in the context of a deepening crisis in national production. In other countries, the regime of “floating”, the exchange rate of the national currency, occurred at other stages of their development, under a different state of the national economy, when the level of inflation reached insignificant levels while growth began simultaneously in all sectors of the economy. This was the case in Austria, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan.

A strong foreign currency, the US dollar, was allowed to circulate freely in Russia. In other countries, active measures were taken aimed at maximally limiting the flow of foreign currency into the national market and raising the prestige of their own currency. Even now, for example, in Denmark, Spain, Italy, Norway, Finland, Sweden, not to mention France or Germany, if you try to pay for a purchase or service in dollars, you will be politely directed to an exchange office.

In other countries, the transition to convertibility began with non-resident legal entities and individuals. In Russia, at the end of 1995, dollar savings of residents alone reached $20 billion (2/3 of the country’s money supply).

In Russia, the liberalization of foreign trade was on an unprecedented scale: economic entities of any level - from the shuttle to the superconcern - were allowed to enter foreign markets with virtually no restrictions, and payments for foreign trade transactions were made by them independently. In other countries, international payments, especially in hard currencies, were strictly controlled by the state (even conducted at the state centralized level) and only then gradually transferred to the foreign exchange market under the responsibility of non-state banks.

Payments for foreign trade transactions in Russia were made at current market rates, which created opportunities for dumping exports and covering any costs of the Russian manufacturer. In other countries, for a long time during the transition to convertibility, international payments were carried out at firm fixed rates with minimal deviations in market quotations associated with fluctuations in the demand and supply of currency.

The desired exchange rate of the Russian ruble was maintained on the MICEX by the Central Bank of Russia through currency interventions in the trading process, which formed the exchange rate (since July 1, 1996, exchange rate quotes on currency exchanges lose their significance, since the Central Bank has become an “autocrat” in this regard). And in other countries, fixed rates were first established administratively and then maintained in the foreign exchange market through interventions by central banks.

In Russia, the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves were formed through the mandatory sale of 50% of foreign exchange earnings from the export of goods and services. In other countries, replenishment of state foreign exchange reserves and maintaining demand for national currencies was ensured through the 100% mandatory sale of export foreign currency

revenues.

In Russia, the cash dollar has long been and remains virtually a parallel means of payment in the domestic market. Although payments in cash in dollars are prohibited within the country, in practice the conditions for the dollar to perform the functions of a means of payment are preserved. Suffice it to say that prices for goods and services, including tourism, and real estate on Russian television are presented in US dollars. Cash dollars began to be used in small- and medium-sized wholesale trade for settlements with business partners in the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, since prices in the currency are more stable than in rubles. In other countries, access to cash foreign currency was strictly limited and subject to strict government control.

Thus, neither the currency corridor, nor the new currency regulation, nor Russia’s accession to Article VIII of the IMF Charter interfere with the circulation of foreign currency on our territory. General "dollarization" destroys the ruble as the national currency of an economically independent state. Therefore, the ultimate goal of Russia’s monetary policy should be to transform the ruble into the only legal tender throughout the country. Only then will it be possible to set the goal of free convertibility of the ruble. The primary prerequisite for this is achieving economic stability.

CONCLUSION.

Understanding the conditionality of forecasts, especially in the field of currency relations, we will still try to look into the future of the ruble.

Firstly, the growth rate of the ruble money supply remains the rate-setting factor. If preferential lending to enterprises continues, this will cause additional money emission. But even if the increase in the money supply weakens, one cannot expect an automatic reduction in inflation, since an increase in Russia's gross product is not expected in the near future. Therefore, the inflationary impact on the market exchange rate of the ruble will continue.

Secondly, it is possible, for a number of reasons, objective and institutional, that the demand for foreign currency will decrease, which will allow us to continue the path towards currency stabilization.

Remaining within the framework of cautious optimism, we can, in our opinion, discern in the medium term the likelihood of a slowdown in the growth of the dollar in ruble terms. What would be undesirable would be a discrepancy between the regulated ruble exchange rate (artificially inflated) and the cheaper ruble on the black market.

The problem for Russia of our children has become the flight of capital abroad, well known to many countries of the Third World. Estimates of the capital that emigrated from Russia per goal vary: from 2.5 billion rubles. up to 10-15 billion rubles. As a percentage of total foreign exchange earnings, this ranges from 5 to 25). Leakage channels are varied; quite common is the desire to leave export income (or part of it) in the accounts of foreign banks. Such transactions involve preliminary agreements to reduce the prices shown in the documents, etc.

The experience of developing countries shows that the use of government prohibitions and sanctions is, as a rule, ineffective. The only true way, no matter how trivial it may sound, is to create a favorable investment climate within the country, attracting capital through privatization, corporatization and other measures.

The formation of the domestic stock market and some other opportunities led to the fact that capital flight from Russia in mid-1993 decreased somewhat. Liberalization of the activities of foreign banks on the territory of the Russian Federation could help consolidate this trend. The Law on Banks and Banking Activities (June 1993) allows foreign banks to deal directly with rubles and Russian residents. Among those interested from far abroad are those familiar to us from the history of Russia - the French “Lyon Credit”, “General Society” and some others.

The above, of course, does not imply a complete abandonment of export regulation or the mandatory sale of part of the proceeds to the state. But rates should be differentiated by industry and, possibly, by region of the country. Taking into account the level of world energy prices and the scale of its exports from Russia (at least 50 times the total export earnings), this item of our export will remain, in the medium term, the main source of foreign exchange earnings, i.e. Russia will continue to play the role of a donor in the energy sector of the world community in the future.

In the early 90s. We often discussed the problem of ruble convertibility and outlined fairly close dates for its introduction. The convertibility of a currency implies its free exchange into foreign currency. After October, the ruble ceased to be convertible. World practice indicates the existence of an inverse relationship between the degree of foreign exchange restrictions and the convertibility of the national currency. But we still cannot do without state regulation of foreign exchange transactions and foreign exchange restrictions: the economy is uncompetitive, market relations distortly reflect foreign exchange exchange, and we have not yet learned how to adjust the exchange rate indirectly. We have limited internal convertibility; hard currency can be bought and sold for rubles on the stock exchange, in banks, and money changers. But you cannot export rubles abroad; there is no official ruble quotation on Western currency markets. All of the above delays the possibility of free and full convertibility of the ruble, although if events develop favorably, more developed forms of ruble convertibility will arise.

Maybe it would make sense to break the chain of dependence of the State Bank of Russia on power structures - parliament and government? This is, of course, not easy, especially taking into account our traditions and bureaucratic consolidation. But having gained independence and caring only about the needs of Russia’s monetary circulation, the Central Bank could be restructured on the model of the American Federal Reserve System, maybe even store its gold and foreign exchange reserves abroad, as many Western central banks do.

It would be easier for an independent Central Bank to attract foreign loans and deposits with interest in convertible currency. Over time, the traditional chervonets could become convertible, convertible into the dollar and ECU (and, consequently, through cross-transactions into other currencies). Such actions would stimulate confidence in the Russian currency and the influx of foreign investment.

REFERENCES

“Currency Portfolio”, Moscow, “Mysl”, 1996
Balabanov I.T. “Foreign exchange market and foreign exchange transactions”

Moscow, 1997

Bunkina A.N., “Money, banks, currency”, Moscow,

Economics, 1996

“New Time”, Moscow, N 3, 1997

“Science and Life”, Moscow, N 1, 1996

“Securities Market”, Moscow, N 3, 1996

“Money and Credit”, Moscow, 5, 1998

“Economic Issues”, Moscow, N 4, 1998

"Finance", Moscow, N 8, 1997

"Financial Business", Moscow, NN 2.7, 1997

Mottos were usually called foreign currency payment instruments intended for international payments. In this context, Russia’s policy was carried out in the form of currency interventions that are still widespread today.

Don State Technical University

Department of Economics
Course work
On economic theory on the topic:

“The problem of providing

convertibility of the ruble"

Completed by a student

gr. EU-II-62

Pisarevskaya E. E.

Rostov-on-Don 1999