The restructuring of the entire life of the country on a military basis began from the first days of the war; on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed, designed to exercise the highest strategic leadership of the Armed Forces.

On June 29, 1941, a Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions, which clearly spoke of the danger looming over our country and outlined a number of priority tasks for restructuring the economy on a war footing. In order to mobilize all the forces and resources of the country to fight the Nazi aggressor, it was necessary to create other government bodies. This form of organization of power in military conditions was found in the person of the State Defense Committee, created on June 30, 1941 under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. It also included V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov and others. All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee: all citizens, party and Soviet, Komsomol and military authorities were obliged to unquestioningly carry out the decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee. In order to further concentrate power, the State Defense Committee of the USSR in the fall of 1941 established local emergency authorities - city defense committees - in more than 60 cities along the front line. They were headed by the first secretaries of regional or city party committees. City defense committees quickly supervised the mobilization of the population and material resources for the construction of defensive lines, the creation of a people's militia, and organized the repurposing of local enterprises for the production of weapons and military equipment.

Speaking about the State Defense Committee, it should be emphasized that a similar form of organization of power already existed in the Soviet state. A kind of prototype of the State Defense Committee was the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense created during the Civil War and foreign intervention.

However, emergency authorities during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War differed significantly. The main feature of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was that it did not replace party, government and military bodies. Fundamental issues of conducting an armed war were considered at the same time at the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, at meetings of the Council of People's Commissars.

During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, much less party congresses, were held; all cardinal issues were resolved by the State Defense Committee (GKO).

Operational issues, as a rule, were considered solely by its chairman or individual members. A characteristic feature of the work of the State Defense Committee was the fact that even the most important problems of state life and military development were often resolved by means of a survey. This approach often led to subjectivity, but in the current situation it turned out to be inevitable. It is known that during the war, Stalin occupied a number of important party, state and military posts. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, and headed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In the emergency conditions of war, the result of strict centralization was the prompt and specific solution of practical issues. Every day they arose in dozens, hundreds, requiring coordination and clarification. The scale of the activities of the State Defense Committee can be judged by the fact that during its existence (from June 30, 1941 to September 4, 1945) it adopted about 10 thousand resolutions and decisions. About 2/3 of them related in one way or another to the economy and organization of military production.

The resolutions and orders of the State Defense Committee had the force of wartime law and were subject to unquestioning implementation. The State Defense Committee directly supervised the creation of the military economy, its development, the strengthening of the Armed Forces, and coordinated the needs of the active armies and navy with the capabilities of industry. This contributed to the most complete and expedient use of the military industry in the interests of victory. To quickly resolve issues, special committees and commissions were formed under the State Defense Committee.

The formation of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters made corresponding changes to the practice of work of party and Soviet bodies that had developed in peaceful conditions. From the subordination of the Council of People's Commissars, everything that was directly related to the conduct of the war was allocated: the military economy, and above all military production, strengthening and supplying the Armed Forces and, finally, the leadership of military operations. The People's Commissariats of Defense, the Navy, the People's Commissariats of the Defense Industry and many other departments and departments that were directly related to the conduct of the war came under the jurisdiction of the State Defense Committee and Headquarters. Under these conditions, the Council of People's Commissars focused its attention on those sectors that were not directly related to military production, in particular on the management of agricultural production.

An emergency form of party leadership was also introduced in the Armed Forces. It became the Institute of Military Commissars. Simultaneously with the creation of the institution of military commissars, the Party Central Committee reorganized the army and navy bodies of political propaganda into political departments, which supervised both organizational-party and political-mass work. With the beginning of the war, the importance of military councils among the troops increased. In the first six months, 10 military councils of the fronts and about 30 military councils of the armies were created. They included a large number of experienced workers, major party and government figures.

From the first days of the war, another emergency institution was expanded - the institution of party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as party organizers of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics, regional committees, regional committees at the most important enterprises. Party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were appointed to all military factories and defense industry enterprises, and party organizers of the Central Committee of parties of the union republics, regional committees, and regional committees were appointed to smaller ones. Party organizers were also secretaries of factory party organizations and maintained their direct connection with the Party Central Committee and local organizations. This system of emergency bodies of the party leadership of the economy was supplemented by the political departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms created in November 1941. Thanks to all these measures, the national economy of our country was able to overcome the difficulties of military restructuring and, in general, provided the front with everything necessary. At the same time, the parallel existence of people's commissariats, local Soviet bodies and party structures for managing the national economy sometimes led to mistakes and incompetent decisions.

An important part of perestroika was the redistribution of party forces from rear organizations to the military, as a result of which a significant number of communists switched to military work. Prominent party workers with extensive experience in organizational and mass political work were sent to lead military work in the active army. As a result, in the initial period of the war, more than 500 secretaries of the Central Committee of parties of the union republics, regional and regional committees, city committees, and district committees were sent to the army and navy. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, about 14 thousand senior personnel were mobilized into the Armed Forces.

One of the main tasks that had to be solved from the first days of the war was the fastest transfer of the national economy, the entire economy of the country, onto a war footing. The main line of this restructuring was determined in the Directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 29, 1941. Specific measures to restructure the national economy began to be implemented from the first days of the war. On the second day of the war, a mobilization plan for the production of ammunition and cartridges was introduced. And on June 30, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the mobilization national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941. However, events at the front developed so unsuccessfully for us that this plan was not fulfilled. Taking into account the current situation, on July 4, 1941, a decision was made to urgently develop a new plan for the development of military production. The commission, headed by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky, was tasked with developing "a military-economic plan for ensuring the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises located on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals." In two weeks, this commission developed a new plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

For the speedy deployment of a production base in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, it was considered necessary to transfer the industrial enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, the People's Commissariat of Armaments, the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry, etc. to these areas.

Members of the Politburo, who were at the same time members of the State Defense Committee, exercised general management of the main branches of the military economy. The production of weapons and ammunition was dealt with by N.A. Voznesensky, aircraft and aircraft engines - G.M. Malenkov, tanks - V.M. Molotov, food, fuel and clothing - A.I. Mikoyan and others. The industrial people's commissariats were headed by: A. I. Shakhurin - aviation industry, B. L. Vannikov - ammunition, I. F. Tevosyan - ferrous metallurgy, A. I. Efremov - machine tool industry, V. V. Vakhrushev - coal, I. I. Sedin - oil .

The main link in the transition of the national economy to a war footing was the restructuring of industry. The transfer of industry to a military footing meant a radical restructuring of the entire process of social production, a change in its direction and proportions. Almost all mechanical engineering was transferred to a war footing. In November 1941, the People's Commissariat of General Engineering was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons. In addition to the People's Commissariats of the aviation industry, shipbuilding, weapons and ammunition created before the war, two People's Commissariats were formed at the beginning of the war - for the tank and mortar industries. Thanks to this, all decisive branches of the military industry received specialized centralized control. The production of rocket launchers began, which existed before the war only in prototypes. Their production was organized at the Moscow Kompressor plant. The first missile combat installation was given the name "Katyusha" by front-line soldiers.

At the beginning of the war, a change was made in the distribution of food resources. Significant food supplies were lost during the hostilities. The available resources were directed primarily to supply the Red Army and provide for the population of industrial areas. A card system was introduced in the country.

Military restructuring required a centralized redistribution of the country's labor resources. If at the beginning of 1941 there were more than 31 million workers and employees in the country, then by the end of 1941 their number had decreased to 18.5 million people. In order to provide personnel for the military industry and related industries, it was necessary to rationally distribute the remaining labor resources and involve new layers of the population in production. For these purposes, already on June 30, 1941, the Committee for the Distribution of Labor was formed under the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time, mandatory overtime was introduced and vacations were cancelled. This made it possible to increase production capacity utilization by approximately a third without increasing the number of workers and employees. In July 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR granted the right to the union and autonomous republics, executive committees of regional and regional Soviets, if necessary, to transfer workers and employees to work at other enterprises, regardless of their departmental affiliation and territorial location. This allowed local authorities to more quickly maneuver personnel in the interests of strengthening defense industries.

Thanks to this, by the second half of 1941 it was possible to do a lot of work on the redistribution of personnel. As a result, by January 1942, more than 120 thousand additional people were sent to the defense industry.

At the same time, the process of training workers through the system of labor reserves was actively carried out. In just two years, about 1,100 thousand people were trained through this system to work in industry.

For the same purposes, in February 1942, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population to work in production and construction during wartime” was adopted, which provided for appropriate mobilization. In the very first days of the war, a decision was made to reorganize the work of scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, subordinating their activities to the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the state. During perestroika, the Academy of Sciences solved three interrelated tasks: 1) development of scientific problems of defense significance; 2) scientific assistance to industry in improving and mastering production and 3) mobilizing the country’s raw materials resources, replacing scarce materials with local raw materials, organizing scientific research on the most pressing issues for wartime.

Thus, the redistribution of the country's material, financial and labor resources carried out from the very beginning of the war played a decisive role in the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing. The change in national economic proportions and the transfer of all forces and means to serving the front laid a solid foundation for the creation of a coherent economy in war conditions. During the restructuring of the national economy, the eastern industrial base became the main center of the military economy of the USSR, which was significantly expanded and strengthened at the beginning of the war.

In 1942, military production in the Urals increased by more than 6 times compared to 1940, in Western Siberia by 27 times, and in the Volga region by 9 times. In general, during the war, industrial production in these areas increased more than 3 times. This was a great military-economic victory achieved by the Soviet people during difficult war years. It laid solid foundations for the final victory over Nazi Germany.

With the outbreak of the war, in the conditions of unfavorable developments of military events, the rapid evacuation of the population, industrial enterprises, agricultural products, cultural and other state values ​​from the front-line areas to the interior of the country was the most important political, military-economic problem facing the Soviet people. The memoirs of A. I. Mikoyan, who was a member of the State Defense Committee during the war, provide interesting information on this matter: “Two days after the start of the war... the question arose about the need to manage the evacuation from the front line. We have never had the idea of ​​organizing a body with such functions before did not arise... It became clear that the evacuation was taking on a huge scale. It was impossible to evacuate everything, there was not enough time or transport, we had to literally choose on the fly what was in the interests of the state to evacuate...” (Military History Magazine. 1988. No. 3. pp. 31–38). In the complex of these problems, the fastest removal and rescue of millions of Soviet people from physical destruction was one of the top priorities.

Completing such a complex task required enormous effort. The decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 27, 1941 “On the procedure for the removal and placement of human contingents and valuable property” defined specific tasks and the order of evacuation. In addition to this, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on July 5, 1941, made a decision on the procedure for evacuation of the population in wartime and on the removal of workers and employees of evacuated enterprises. Plans were developed for the evacuation of people from the front line, indicating resettlement points, timing, order and priority of removal.

The government decision approved the “Regulations on the evacuation point for the evacuation of civilians from the front line.” Evacuation centers created locally took care of the evacuated population, kept records of arrivals, etc. Departments for evacuation of the population were created under the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics, regional executive committees and regional executive committees. By decision of the government, children's institutions, women with children and elderly people were exported first. By January 1942, 10 million people were transported into the interior of the country by rail alone (World War II. General problems. Book 1, p. 74).

Great difficulties arose with the evacuation of the population in areas caught in the war zone. These included the republics located in the Baltic states, the western regions of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, and Karelia.

At the beginning of the war, the population was also evacuated from Moscow and Leningrad. The scale of this work is evidenced by the following facts: in the fall of 1941, 1.5 million people were evacuated from Moscow alone, and from Leningrad from January 22, 1942 to April 15, 1942 - more than 55 thousand people. This was the most difficult period of evacuation. In general, during the war, including the period of the siege, about 2 million people were evacuated from Leningrad.

As a result of the successful evacuation, by the spring of 1942, up to 8 million evacuees were located in the eastern regions of the country. By this time, the main wave of evacuation had subsided.

However, this situation did not last long. In the summer of 1942, in connection with the breakthrough of Nazi troops into the North Caucasus, the problem of mass evacuation of the population again became acute. This time the evacuation was carried out mainly from the central and southern regions of the European part of the USSR. In July 1942, the evacuation of the population from the Voronezh, Voroshilovgrad, Oryol, Rostov, and Stalingrad regions and the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories began.

The Soviet government showed great concern for creating material and living conditions for the evacuated population. In the state budget for the fourth quarter of 1941, 200 billion rubles were allocated for housing construction. In wartime conditions, these were large funds. Workers and employees of evacuated enterprises were provided with a long-term loan for individual housing construction.

During the evacuees' stay in new places, the local population surrounded them with care and attention. Needy families were given benefits, clothing and shoes were provided. Many agricultural associations organized courses to train evacuees in various agricultural professions.

The fraternal friendship of the Soviet peoples was manifested during the evacuation, in the employment of the evacuated population, and in the adoption of children whose parents had died. In less than a year of war, by May 1, 1942, up to 2 thousand orphaned children were adopted by the working people of Kazakhstan alone. A public movement to help evacuated children has developed widely in Uzbekistan. Thousands of children - Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and other nationalities - were taken into Uzbek families for education. The evacuated children felt great in the families that sheltered them. They spoke not only Russian, but also learned to speak Uzbek. At large agricultural artels, orphanages were created, the maintenance of which was taken over entirely by the collective farms.

As a result of the evacuation, millions of Soviet people were saved from physical extermination by the fascist invaders.

The evacuation of the population, industrial enterprises, agricultural products and cultural assets in different economic regions took place at different times, depending on the situation at the fronts. The specific conditions of the military situation required evacuation to be carried out twice: the first time - in the summer and autumn of 1941, the second time - in the summer and autumn of 1942. The evacuation of 1941 was the most massive.

Without dwelling in detail on the evacuation of industry, I would only like to note the following. During the war, more than 2 thousand industrial enterprises were evacuated to the eastern regions. Almost 70% of them were located in the Urals, Western Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The transfer of industry to the rear made it possible not only to preserve the main production assets, but also to gradually increase them, meeting the growing needs of the front.

The evacuation of the population, industry, food and raw materials carried out by the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, and the export of cultural values ​​to the rear contributed to the speedy restructuring of the entire national economy of the country on a war footing and the approach of victory. As the outstanding Soviet commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov noted: “It was an incomparable labor epic, without which our victory over the strongest enemy would have been absolutely impossible.”

The completion of reconstruction and the expansion of the public (socialist) sector created the conditions and necessitated a transition from annual planning in the form of target figures to long-term planning. Development of the first five year plan was carried out for several years, starting in 1925. At the XV Congress, a resolution was adopted “On directives for drawing up a five-year plan for the national economy,” and in May 1929 it was approved by the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

First Five Year Plan (1928-1932)

The plan provided for an increase in the volume of industrial production by 2.8 times with the primary development of heavy industry; overcome the backwardness of agriculture and establish its socialist reconstruction; ensure the ousting and elimination of capitalist classes and the creation of an economic basis for building a socialist society.

Blast furnaces of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works

Over the following years, a number of indicators changed upward, which made the plan practically impossible to implement, even despite the high pace of production development. Nevertheless, in January 1933, in a report at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b), it was announced that the five-year plan had been completed. Thus, the five-year plan lasted four years and three months.

On first stage of industrialization(1926-1928) about 800 large enterprises were rebuilt and reconstructed. Much attention was paid to the development of the energy base - coal and oil production, and the construction of power plants. During this period, Shterovskaya in Donbass and Zemo-Avchalskaya in Transcaucasia, Volkhov power plants came into operation; Construction of the Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk power plants began. In 1927, construction of a new railway began - Turksiba(from Central Asia to Siberia). Advantage in new construction was given to the outlying regions of the country. At the same time, a new management system is being formed. In 1932, the Supreme Economic Council was reorganized into People's Commissariat, in charge of heavy industry. Further development of the system followed the line of disaggregation of the People's Commissariats, especially intensively in 1938 - 1939. (by March 1939 there were already 34 of them).

The need to attract huge funds for industrial new buildings forced them to be “pumped” from agriculture by lowering prices for its products and selling industrial products at inflated prices. In the conditions of a decisive reduction in the private sector in industry and trade, the peasantry increasingly lost from unequal exchange. This led to a reduction in crops and the concealment of marketable grain. Thus, the pace of collectivization was inextricably linked with the pace of industrialization, since at that moment only collective farming could provide an increase in raw materials and financial revenues.

It is generally accepted that the course towards collectivization was developed by the XV Congress of the CPSU (b). However, the materials of the congress indicate that the development of all forms of cooperation was recognized as a priority task in the field of agriculture, and a gradual transition to collective cultivation of the land based on new technology (electrification). The congress did not establish deadlines or the only forms and methods of cooperation. With regard to the exploiting classes, the task was put forward to oust them using economic methods, achieving a reduction in the share of the private economic sector with its possible absolute growth.

However, in the practical implementation of these decisions, deviations from the program guidelines were made and the basic principles of cooperation were violated: voluntariness, gradualism, and material interest. Forced collectivization led not only to a sharp reduction in the number of livestock and grain harvests, but also to human casualties. As a result, during the first five-year plans there was a rationing system for supplying the population (until 1936). Nevertheless, collectivization created a social basis for the modernization of the agricultural sector, made it possible to increase labor productivity and free up labor resources for other sectors of the economy.

It should be noted that the first five-year plan was distinguished by very high growth rates of industrial production, which, although lower than planned, significantly exceeded the growth rates of production in capitalist countries. The program for the total volume of industrial production was completed by 93.7%, and for heavy industry - by 108%. However, the indicators for the most important types of industrial products in physical terms turned out to be lower than planned. The first five-year plan was a time of radical change in the structure of industrial production: the share of the first division in the gross output of the entire industry rose to 53.4% ​​against 39.5% in 1928.

Mechanical engineering and metalworking products increased fourfold. The proportions between the main sectors of the national economy have also changed. The share of industrial products in the total production of industry and agriculture rose from 51.5% in 1928 to 70.7% in 1932. 1,500 plants and factories were built. Among them are the largest: the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Gorky and Moscow Automobile Plants, and Uralmash. New industries have emerged: the production of plastics (Vladimir) and artificial rubber (Yaroslavl). New centers of industry were created in the East of the country (Kazakhstan, Siberia, Central Asia).

The first Soviet truck of the AMO brand

Centripetal tendencies are intensifying in the national economic management system. This was reflected in the transition to exclusively sectoral management principle. The regulation of economic life expanded; administration covered the entire socio-economic structure of society. At the same time, attempts were made to introduce self-supporting relations. For this purpose, the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the reorganization of industrial management” was adopted (December 5, 1929), which stated that the transfer of factories and factories to self-financing should be carried out decisively as soon as possible. But the very understanding of cost accounting had radically changed by this time: financial and economic independence was simply reduced to comparing the income and expenses of an enterprise.

Credit reform was supposed to contribute to increasing the efficiency of social production. The Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated January 30, 1930 “On the Credit Reform” abolished the existing system of supplying goods and providing services on credit. All short-term lending was concentrated in the State Bank. A lending procedure was introduced in which enterprises received funds from banks according to plans drawn up by the trusts to which they belonged. It was assumed that opening enterprises' own bank accounts would increase their operational independence. However, the practical implementation of these measures led to the opposite result. Lending began to be carried out “to plan”, which undermined the very foundations of self-financing. The State Bank, at the buyer's expense, paid the suppliers' bills, regardless of the quality and range of products, and also reimbursed all expenses incurred by the suppliers. Tax reform also did not contribute to the development of enterprise initiatives. Instead of a plurality of taxes and tax types of withdrawal from the budget, a turnover tax and deductions from profits were established.

Second Five Year Plan (1933-1934)

The second five-year plan for the development of the national economy was approved in February 1934. The main political task of the five-year plan was the final elimination of capitalist elements, the complete destruction of the causes that give rise to the division of society into classes and the exploitation of man by man.

The material basis for solving these problems was to be the completion of the technical reconstruction of the national economy: it was necessary to create the latest technical base for all sectors of the national economy, to master new technology and new production. The main attention was paid to mechanical engineering and the creation of a powerful energy base. At this time, the country's leadership comes to the realization of overcoming the “leap” course and bringing the planned targets closer to the real possibilities of the economy. Therefore, at the 17th Party Congress it was decided to establish the average annual increase in industrial production for 1933 - 1937. in the amount of 16.5% (according to the optimal version of the first five-year plan - over 20%). One of the distinctive features of the Second Five-Year Plan was the focus on faster pace of development of group "B" compared to group "A".

In agriculture, the main thing is the completion of collectivization and the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms. It was planned to double agricultural production.

The goal was also to increase the level of consumption by two to three times based on a significant increase in income and a reduction in retail prices by 35%.

Soviet steam locomotive of the 30s

Based on the listed tasks, the volume of capital expenditures for the entire national economy was determined at 133.4 billion rubles. instead of 64.6 billion rubles. in the first five-year plan. About half of all capital expenditures aimed at new construction in heavy industry were to be invested in the eastern regions. This posed new, more complex tasks for transport, the lag of which was revealed during the first Five-Year Plan. Transport freight turnover was to be doubled.

The decisive conditions for the implementation of the plan were:

1) the development of socialist competition, primarily the Stakhanov movement;

2) growth in labor productivity (by 63% over the five-year period);

3) provision of qualified personnel (it was planned to train 5 million workers in mass professions, 850 thousand mid-level specialists and 340 thousand highly qualified specialists).

The results of the implementation of the second five-year plan showed that the plan of the five-year plan and its main tasks were fulfilled. 4,500 new industrial enterprises were built and put into operation. An increase in gross industrial output by 2.2 times and agricultural output by 1.5 times has been achieved. The plan for the production of large-scale industry was completed in four years and three months. The average annual growth rate of industrial output exceeded the target and amounted to 17.1%. However, it was not possible to achieve the planned growth rate of the second division.

The technical reconstruction of the farm was actively carried out. In 1937, more than 80% of all industrial output was obtained from new and completely reconstructed enterprises. Significantly exceeding planned targets for increasing labor productivity in various industries made it possible to reduce costs by 10.3% (in the first five-year period there was an increase in costs by 2.3%). Successes in the field of mastering new technology and increasing efficiency in the five-year plan were the result of the increased labor activity of the people, mass socialist competition, implementation of the training program. One of the biggest achievements of the second five-year plan was the construction of the Moscow metro.

There was an increase in citizens' incomes: they doubled due to an increase in wages, the abolition of the card system, and lower prices for consumer goods.

As a result of the implementation of the second five-year plan, the USSR became advanced industrial country. In 1936, the country took first place in Europe and second in the world in terms of industrial output, although in terms of per capita production it still lagged significantly behind the developed capitalist countries. The most important result of the two five-year plans is the achievement economic independence of the Soviet Union, which began to produce all types of technical weapons for the national economy on a new basis.

In the second five-year plan, the collectivization of agriculture was completed: 93% of all peasant farms were united in collective farms. Collective farms covered more than 99% of all sown areas. At the same time, the forms and methods of collectivization affected the results of agricultural production. Thus, the sown area under grain crops for the period from 1932 to 1937. increased by only 4.8%, there was a reduction in the area under industrial and fodder crops, although compared to the first five-year plan, the number of livestock increased, livestock production amounted to 90% of the 1913 level.

Construction of the first metro line

The increase in the rate of agricultural production occurred largely due to an increase in labor intensity. Thus, if in 1925 on an individual peasant farm there were 92 man-days of work per year per able-bodied person, then on collective farms per one able-bodied person in 1937 there were 185 man-days of work. Of course, when analyzing the results of agricultural development, one cannot fail to take into account the factors that contributed to the increase in labor productivity, and above all, the functioning machine and tractor stations, the number of which reached 5518 in 1937. They served 91.5% of collective farms, being the basis for the subsequent industrialization of agriculture.

Third Five Year Plan

The Third Five-Year Plan was supposed to be an important stage in solving the main economic problem of the USSR - to catch up and surpass the main capitalist countries in per capita production. The implementation of the planned program implied maintaining high rates of development of all sectors of the Soviet economy. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account the sharp change in the international situation and the growing military threat. Based on this, the five-year plan for 1938 - 1942. provided for higher rates of dynamics in mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, energy, and metallurgy.

In order to increase defense capability, new construction was planned to be carried out mainly in the eastern regions of the country in the form of backup enterprises.

In general, the implementation of the five-year plan tasks was successful. By mid-1941, industry increased production output to 86% of the plan, railway freight turnover amounted to 90%, and trade turnover reached 92%. The second half of the 1930s was marked by increasing problems in the economic sphere. Therefore, at the XVIII Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (February 1941), decisions were made to improve the situation, for which the widespread introduction of self-supporting relations was again planned.

Review questions

1. What measures to transform the socio-economic system were carried out during the October Revolution of 1917?

2. Tell us about the state of the economy of Soviet Russia during the Civil War and foreign intervention and the policy measures of “war communism”.

3. Tell us about how the restoration of the national economy was carried out during the years of the new economic policy, what its essence was and its difference from “war communism”.

4. Describe the main transformations carried out during the pre-war five-year plans, and the place of the USSR in the world economy by 1941.

5. Reveal the factors that determined the formation of a command-administrative management system in our country, show its positive aspects and disadvantages.

6. What do you see as the reasons for the narrowing of the scope of commodity-money relations and democratic principles?

Many people are interested in the Soviet period. Interesting numbers, processes, analogies, comparisons. I suggest you evaluate or simply familiarize yourself with this material. Statistics are presented in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period.

An Album Illustrating the State Organization and National Economy of the U.S.S.R.

Scientific publishing institute of pictorial statistics.

Ed. I. V. Sautin (Chief of the Central Board of National Economic Statistics) and I. P. Ivanitsky.

Compilers: V. M. Podgornova, V. S. Iuniev, G. N. Serebrenikov

USSR

Isostatic album illustrating the state structure and national economy of the USSR.

Scientific Publishing Institute of Visual Statistics.

Ed. I.V. Sautin (Head of the Central Directorate of National Economic Accounting of the USSR State Planning Committee) and I.P. Ivanitsky (SNS).

Compiled by: V. M. Podgornova (senior), V. S. Yunyev (senior), G. N. Serebrennikov (senior).

Production of large-scale industry(in billion rubles in invariable prices of 1926/27)

Products of large industry(in billion rubles in 1926/27 prices)

	Capacity of sum total of electrical power stations (in millions of kW) Total capacity of power plants (million kW)	Production of electrical energy (in billion of kWHr) Electricity production (billion kWh)
Note: The amount of electrical energy produced by all the electrical station at Russia in 1913 is less than the production of the single Dnieper hydraulic power station in 1937. Note: the entire amount of electricity produced in Russia in 1913 is less than the electricity produced by the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station alone in 1937.

	Output of coal (in million tons) Coal production (million tons)

(in million tons)

(in million tons)

Economics construction in the USSR

Economic construction in the USSR

	Years
Deposits (in billion tons) Proven reserves (geological) (in billion tons)
Iron ore
Manganese ore
Oil industry Oil industry
Extraction of petroleum (in million tons) Oil production (million tons)
Gross output of petroleum refiners (in million rubles 1926/27)) Oil industry products (million rubles 1926/27)
Machine building Mechanical engineering
Production of machine building industry (in million rubles in prices of 1926/27) Gross output of mechanical engineering (in 1926/27 prices)
Percentage of production of machine building industry in production of the whole of large-scale industry The share of mechanical engineering in the products of all large industry
Production of metal-cutting machines (in thousands) Production of metal-cutting machines (thousand pieces)
Transport machine building Transport engineering
Railway engines (as stimulated in cinventional types “E” and “SU” Production of steam locomotives (translated into conventional “E” and “SU”
Freight-cars (in biaxial calculation) Freight wagons (in two-axle terms)
Agricultural machinery Agricultural engineering
Production of agricultural machine building mills (tractors inclusive) in million rubles (in prices of 1926/27) Gross output of agricultural machinery (including tractors) (million rubles in 1926/27 prices)
Chemical industry Chemical industry
Production of chemical industry (in million rubles; in prices of 1926/27) Products of the chemical industry (in million rubles, in 1926/27 prices)
Output of industry producing consumer’ goods (in million rubles in prices of 1926/27) Products of industry producing consumer goods (in million rubles, in 1926/27 prices)
Wool industry
Cotton industry
Linen industry
Knitted goods industry Knitwear
Garment industry
Boot and shoe industry Shoe industry
Granulated sugar (thousand tons) Granulated sugar (thousand tons)
Confectionery (thousand tons) Confectionery products (thousand tons)
Cigarettes (in billions) Cigarettes (billion pieces)
Canned goods (in million cans of 400 g. each) Canned food (millions of conventional cans of 400 g each)
Consumption of mechanical and electrical energy per hour of one worker’s labor (in percentage of 1913) Growth in the power supply and electrical supply of labor in industry per working hour (as a percentage compared to 1913)
Electrical energy Electrical energy
Mechanical and electrical energy Mechanical and electrical energy
Mechanization of production processes, % Mechanization of production processes, %
Fishing industry
Extracting of peat Peat extraction
Coal mining (holing) Coal mining (cutting)
Oil production
Increase in production norm for worker (data 1913 taken as a unit) Growth in labor productivity per worker (data for 1913 taken per unit)
The whole industry All industry
Extraction of coal Coal mining
Cast iron smelting Iron smelting
Petroleum extraction Oil production
Sugar production
	Percentage of production of mills, constructed before revolution to whole production (in 1936). Share of production from factories built before the revolution to total production (in 1936)		Percentage of production of mills, newly constructed by the soviets in relation to whole production (in 1936). Share of production from factories built by the Soviet government to total production (in 1936)
The whole industry Throughout the industrial
Output of producer goods Production of tools and means of production
Output of consumer goods Production of consumer goods
Electric station Power plants
Iron and steel industry Ferrous metallurgy
Machine building Mechanical engineering
Chemical industry Chemical industry
Meat industry
Canned good industry Canning industry
Agriculture Agriculture
Farm machinery (rubles to one hectare of sowing area; in prices 1926/27) Cost of agricultural machinery and implements per hectare of sown area; in 1926/27 prices)			In collective farms On collective farms	On state farms
Sown areas (in million hectares) Cultivated area (million hectares)
Cereals
Fuck garden crops and potatous Vegetable melons
Industrial crops
Feed
Harvest yield (in million tons) Harvest (million tons)
Yield of cereals Cereals
Sugar beet
Raw cotton
Percentage of import of cotton in consumption Share of imports in raw cotton consumption
Railway transport Railway transport
Freight railway turnover (million tons) Freight turnover (million tons)
Passenger turnover railway (in million passengers) Passenger turnover (millions of passengers)
Length of railway network (thousand kilometers) Length of the railway network (thousand km)
Economic independence of the U.S.S.R. (Share of imports and home production in the total consumption) Economic independence of the USSR (Share of imports and domestic production in total consumption)
		Int. call	Import Import	Home production Int. call
Mechanical engineering
Superphosphate
Aluminum
Cars
Bicycles
Welfare and culture Material level, life and culture
The working day in large-scale industry (hours) Working day in industry (hour)
The state housing fund of cites Housing stock
Built under tsarism Built before the Revolution
Built under Soviet power Built under Soviet rule
Medical attendance Medical service
Number of physicians Number of doctors
Number of beds
Beds for childbirth cases in hospitals and in maternity homes (thousands) Maternity beds in hospitals and maternity hospitals (thousands)
Number of institutions for the care of women and infants Number of antenatal clinics
Number of visit in the item (thousands) Number of visits to them (in thousands)
The number of beds in permanent crèches Number of places in permanent nurseries
Number of students (in millions) Number of students (millions)
Elementary education (1-4 classes) Primary school (grades 1-4)
Secondary general education Secondary school (grades 5-10)
Secondary special education Secondary special school, technical schools
Higher education Higher education
Courses and schools for training workers and for tuition of specialist by correspondence Worker training courses and schools and distance learning
Schools and courses for elementary instruction of adults Literacy courses and schools
Network of museums
Seal
Number of newspapers Number of newspapers>
Circulation (million copies) Single circulation (million copies)
Books (million copies) Books (million copies)
Output of printed publications in languages ​​of people of the U.S.S.R., exclusive of the Russian Number of publications in national languages ​​of the USSR, excluding Russian
Newspapers Newspapers
Books (titles)
Copies of books (in millions) Circulation (millions of copies)

Position of the U.S.S.R USSR position
	in Europe in Europe		In the World In the world
Gross output of industry Gross industrial output
Machine building Mechanical engineering
Agricultural machinery Agricultural engineering
Tractors	Manufacturer not creatures.		Manufacturer not creatures.
Harvest combines Harvesters	Manufacturer not creatures.		Manufacturer not creatures.
Trucks	Manufacturer not creatures.		Manufacturer not creatures.
Iron ore
Superphosphate
Beet sugar
Electrical energy Electricity

Translation of histograms and graphs into tabular form: passerby.

Note: information on the state structure of the USSR is omitted, as well as those statistical data in which there were no references to the pre-revolutionary period. Cartographic and some other source materials are also not provided.

Material presented passerby.

] Responsible for the release of L.A. Umansky.
(Moscow: Publishing House "Finance and Statistics", 1987. - USSR State Committee on Statistics)
Scan, OCR, processing, Htm format: Efremov, 2012; Scan, processing, Djv format: ???, provided by: Mikhail, 2013

• SUMMARY:
  Preface (3).
  MAIN INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR FOR 70 YEARS OF SOVIET AUTHORITY
  The scale of creation (5).
  Renewal of the world (28).
  Creating the foundations of a new society (32).
  Implementation of Lenin's plan for building socialism (33).
  Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (43).
  Restoration and further development of the national economy (47).
  Development of the national economy in 1961-1985. (49).
  Course - acceleration (52).
  1986 - Perestroika in action (56).
  INTENSIFICATION OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION
  Science and technological progress (60).
  The material and technical base of the national economy, its technical re-equipment and reconstruction (100).
  Efficiency of use of labor resources (107).
  Resource saving (112).
  Improving management and economic mechanisms (115).
  DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIAL PRODUCTION
  Gross social product and national income (122).
  Industry (125).
  Fuel and energy complex (161).
  Metallurgical complex (164).
  Mechanical engineering complex (166).
  Chemical-forest complex (176).
  Construction industry (184).
  Production of consumer goods (186).
  Agro-industrial complex (200).
  Plant growing (222).
  Livestock (253).
  Food industry (268).
  Capital investments and supplies of material resources (274).
  Forestry (285).
  Agroindustrial complex enterprises (287).
  Personnel in the agro-industrial complex (300).
  Labor productivity in the agro-industrial complex (311).
  Capital construction (316).
  Transport and communications (340).
  Rail transport (343).
  Maritime transport (348).
  River transport (350).
  Main pipeline transport (353).
  Road transport (354).
  Urban passenger electric transport (363).
  Air transport (368).
  Communication (370).
  SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE
  Population and labor resources (373).
  Use of national income (430).
  Wages and income of the population (431).
  Providing the population with goods and services (449).
  Housing provision (508).
  Public education and culture (523).
  Health protection (585).
  NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
  Earth (607).
  Subsoil (608).
  Forest protection (610).
  Rational use and protection of water resources (612).
  Air pool (614).
  Environmental protection in the area of ​​Lake Baikal (616).
  Costs of environmental protection measures and commissioning of capacities (618).
  FINANCE AND CREDIT (620).
  FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE USSR
  Foreign trade of the USSR (640).
  Cooperation of member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (648).
  Economic and technical assistance to the USSR (650).
  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
  Development of the USSR and other socialist countries in comparison with capitalist countries (653).
  Territory and population of countries of the world 699 Brief methodological explanations of individual statistical indicators given in the yearbook (711).

Publisher's abstract: The anniversary statistical yearbook contains the most important data on the economic and social development of the USSR during the years of Soviet power, characterizing the population, the development of sectors of the national economy, science and technology, and the growth of the people's well-being. Some data characterizing the development of other socialist countries are published. A number of indicators are compared with those of capitalist countries.
For economists, statisticians, scientists, party and economic workers, propagandists.