Remember the Soviet meme “Keep your money in a savings bank!”? With a characteristic satirical film addition: “If you have them, of course!”? Of course you remember. Remember also that among the strategic key objects that any armed uprising had to seize, Lenin always named banks. He considered the greatest mistake of the Paris Commune to be that it did not take over the banks. The Bolsheviks were not going to make such a mistake.

The first confiscations of deposits from the population began by the Soviet government in the first days of its existence. Thus, at the beginning of November 1917, the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee issued an order that sharply limited the issuance of cash. These were still local initiatives. On December 14 (27), 1917, the Bolsheviks captured National Bank and issued a decree according to which banking was henceforth declared a state monopoly. Savings banks in Russia have previously been a state monopoly. By the way, they were used mainly by the poor. It is clear that due to hyperinflation and the “needs of the revolution” they could no longer use their labor contributions made before the revolution; they were not compensated for them.

Another thing is that since 1921 the Bolsheviks again returned to the money economy and familiar forms financial institutions(leaving this matter in the hands of the state). But the population trusted them little, preferring to keep their savings in valuable valuables: gold objects, antiques, foreign currency. There were still a lot of royal gold chervonets circulating among the people, which the state recognized by establishing a floating (of course, unequal) rate of exchange for Soviet banknotes. Starting industrialization, the Soviet government was in dire need of money. And it resorted to forced purchases and even confiscation of valuables from the population.

Holders foreign currency were brought before a criminal court. When these means were exhausted, they found another one. In July 1930, Torgsin stores were opened for trade with foreigners. In 1931 they decided to allow their citizens there. There they could “pledge” (actually sell without a real opportunity to redeem) for next to nothing in the form of “hard Soviet banknotes” (apparently, then the bitterly ironic expression “wooden ruble” appeared) royal gold coins and gold objects. In conditions of general poverty and inflation caused by Stalin's policies“Big Leap”, people even carried wedding rings there. No moneylender in the history of the world has ever squeezed gold from ordinary people with such manic and persistent greed as the “state of workers and peasants” did. But for the state it was “effective management.” Between 1931 and 1936, Torgsin produced 222 tons of pure gold. This was enough to pay for the import of industrial equipment for a dozen of the largest giants of the new Soviet industry.

The first post-war monetary reform was carried out from December 16 to 29, 1947. Its preparation was kept secret from the population, although formally - “so that speculators would not find out about it.” Allegedly, during the war, speculators became greatly enriched by trading on the black market, so confiscation of funds was necessary. This was partly true, but the main reason was, of course, another withdrawal of money from the population in favor of the state.

A new ruble was exchanged for 10 old ones, but when recalculating salaries, one new ruble was counted as one old one. This was a means of confiscating the free cash accumulated by the “speculators”. It was believed that the right Soviet people kept money in savings banks, but even there the terms of exchange were unequal. Deposits up to 3 thousand rubles were recalculated one to one, but deposits from 3 to 10 thousand were reduced by one third, and deposits over 10 thousand rubles - by two thirds. Thus, the most large deposits were confiscated by the state.

The monetary reform of 1961 looked like a simple denomination: ten old rubles were exchanged for one new one, in cash or in deposits, and all prices were recalculated 10:1 in the same way. But it also contained a trick. The official gold content in the ruble and the official ruble/dollar exchange rate rose only 4.44 times. There was no free conversion of the ruble at that time, and this did not affect the mass of the population. But this now had a small effect when setting retail Soviet prices for imported goods (of which, by the way, there were still few at that time).

The last confiscation monetary reform, which some consider “the last coffin driven into the lid of the USSR,” was carried out by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers headed by V. Pavlov on January 23-25, 1991. The new head of the then all-Union government believed that with such a measure it would be possible to reduce the amount of money supply in the hands of the population (of course, first of all, among “speculators”) and thus solve the problem of deficit, which people were especially dissatisfied with at that time. The reform was prepared as a military operation against the population: announced suddenly. People had the opportunity to exchange old ones only for three days large bills 50- and 100-ruble samples for new ones. The volume of exchange per person was limited to 1000 rubles. Because of this, incredible tension arose in the country; the economic effect was zero. The deposits were not touched.

Well, what belongs to history modern Russia- this is the largest scale confiscation in the history of our country by the state of deposits from its citizens. It was carried out under the guise of hyperinflation. However, that's another story.

34 kilograms of gold, diamonds totaling 100 carats and significant amounts in rubles and dollars were seized in 1963 by USSR KGB officers from a group of currency speculators in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. However, neither such a group nor the size of the seizure was anything unusual. In a country where the state constantly confiscated money from citizens, there was always a demand for valuables that allowed them to save money for a rainy day. And therefore there was the whole system meeting this demand, which fell under the most severe articles of the Criminal Code.

EVGENY ZHIRNOV

From treasure to warehouse

It has so happened since ancient times that officials always try to fill the treasury by emptying the pockets of ordinary people, and ordinary people always resist these seizures with all their might. This process intensified with particular force after the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia. They immediately defaulted on external loans, and therefore lost access to foreign loans. So they simply had no other way to replenish the treasury, other than confiscating valuables from citizens and various non-Soviet organizations.

Any Soviet-era sources about the era of the revolution and the Civil War - from newspaper articles to solid historical studies - proudly talk about how successfully the confiscation of gold and jewelry from non-proletarian sections of the population was carried out. There are also stories about the difficulties with which, overcoming dangers, the Bolshevik heroes delivered the confiscated valuables to Moscow.

True, documents from the same time say that a considerable number of police officers and the Cheka appropriated confiscated valuables. So at times they had to be shot by entire departments. Judging by the documents, a similar case - the execution of an entire criminal investigation department, whose employees were engaged in robbery under the guise of confiscations, took place in the first half of the 1920s in Odessa. And employees of the Transcaucasian Cheka recalled that the young security officer Beria always kept valuables confiscated from the enemies of the revolution in his safe, which he successfully used for both operational and personal needs. There was nothing strange about this. After all, law enforcement and punitive agencies, like all other citizens of the Land of the Soviets, were simply trying to save up for a rainy day, which in those years and for every person could come at any minute.

The Bolshevik leaders were no different from other citizens. For example, on July 27, 1935, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR G. G. Yagoda reported to Stalin about the opening of the safe of the first head of the Soviet state - Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Ya. M. Sverdlov, who died in 1919:

“In the inventory warehouses of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin, the fireproof cabinet of the late Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov was kept locked. The keys to the cabinet were lost.

We opened the cabinet, and it turned out:

As the class struggle intensified, seizures became increasingly rare, and what was seized became less and less worthwhile.

1. Gold coins of royal minting in the amount of one hundred eight thousand five hundred twenty-five (108,525) rubles.

2. Gold items, many of which are set with precious stones—seven hundred and five (705) items.”

In addition, blank passports and completed passports were found in the safe, with the help of which a prominent Bolshevik planned to hide with his family members in the event of a victory of the counter-revolution.

The heightened personal interest of the country's leaders in private gold and foreign exchange reserves forced security officers and police officers to search for treasures hidden by the overthrown classes. Moreover, some families and houses were monitored for years after the revolution, and at times close supervision brought very significant results. For example, in 1925, the chairman of the OGPU F.E. Dzerzhinsky reported to the Politburo about the discovery of a treasure in the mansion of the richest nobles of the Russian Empire - the Yusupov princes:

“On April 7 of this year, we were informed from the Military History Museum (the former mansion of the Yusupov princes) that a cache was discovered under the stairs of the lobby, in which some shiny objects were visible through a hole an inch and a half in size made in the wall. We have been interested in this house for a long time (back in 1923), through intelligence we discovered 2 safes of the British Embassy there, and the commandant of the house, an old employee of the Yusupovs, is now in exile for concealment, then our representative was immediately sent to V. In the cache there were various antique silver things (cups, bowls, etc.) folded on the floor and several locked chests, with the exception of one iron chest, dilapidated from a long stay in a damp room. Not knowing the contents of the boxes, late in the evening everything discovered with an inventory of unlocked things was delivered. in the OGPU, a commission compiled with the participation of representatives of the museum department of the Main Science, made an inventory of everything, and in one of the boxes there were precious stones and jewelry made from them. There has been no assessment of what was found, but according to a rough estimate by an expert, the value is approximately several million rubles.”

The list of valuables found is quite impressive:

"One necklace with 10 faceted emeralds, strewn with diamonds. Weight 19 gold. 6 dollars. 2. One necklace with 12 emeralds (bas-reliefs), showered with diamonds. Weight 17 gold. 80 dollars... One necklace of 11 large diamonds. Weight 16 gold 72 dollars One brooch with one large brown diamond with 3 medium and small diamonds. One brooch with one pearl and 4 large and small diamonds. One pendant with one colored (yellow) stone and small diamonds. diamond and small ones. Total weight 15 gold. 84 dollars. One platinum decoration for the corsage with one large diamond, small diamonds and small rubies... One platinum necklace with large and small diamonds and one platinum tiara with one large and small diamonds. weight 78 gold 24 dollars. One necklace with 58 large diamonds and one necklace (in the form of pendants) with small and large diamonds..."

Of course, such a find could not but please the country's leaders. The only problem was, as Dzerzhinsky wrote in the same report, that “in recent years, cases of confiscation have become very rare.” Therefore, it was necessary to find other ways of relatively fair confiscation of valuables from the population.

Borrowing tricks

One of the new methods of cleansing the egg capsules of Soviet citizens was the almost continuous food difficulties and the method proposed by the state to resolve them by purchasing products for currency and valuables. In 1930, stores for trading with foreigners appeared in the country - "Torgsin", where the following year citizens of the USSR with valuables began to shop. At first, for those of them who received transfers from relatives abroad, they came up with special Torgsinov coupons - TOTS, for which the State Bank exchanged transferred dollars, francs and pounds. And soon, in almost all regions, buying points appeared at Torgsin stores or stalls, where valuables stored for a rainy day were exchanged for TOTS.

Reports from the field spoke about the correctness of the chosen tactics. From Kyiv, for example, they telegraphed that there were queues at the buying points of the city almost around the clock, and asked to allocate additional quantity appraisers and receivers. However, the problem was not the number of workers, but the fact that there was a catastrophic shortage of TOTs throughout the country. Goznak simply did not have time to print the required number of coupons, and in many places buyers wrote receipts instead.

But, despite this, Torgsin continued to expand its activities. In 1933, traveling trade was organized, when auto shops with buyers and goods reached the most remote places where the population could have at least some valuables left. In Yakutia, for example, there were only six permanent buying points, and in Turkmenistan there were eight. In the Moscow region alone there were 68 Torgsin points, and in total there were more than one and a half thousand of them throughout the country. The state received enormous benefits, because in Torgsinov's outlets the vast majority of the most necessary products (cereals, butter, sugar) were sold at twice or three times the price than when exported. At the same time, overhead costs were minimal. One of the Torgsin documents noted with satisfaction that in Poland for one dollar you can buy 1300-1800 grams of butter, and in the USSR - 250-400.

In the 1930s, Soviet people became convinced that signing up for a winning loan would invariably lead them to financial loss.

Trade was not reduced even in 1933, when the flow of gold items and coins decreased noticeably. Torgsin purchasing points began to accept gold sand and nuggets, as well as silver of any standard. But in 1935, the population finally ran out of supplies of even silverware, which was very common before the revolution. And in 1936, Torgsin ceased to exist.

At the same time, the problem of saving for old age and a rainy day has not disappeared anywhere, and those citizens of the USSR who earned more living wage, began to think about them more and more often. After all, the penny pensions that existed at that time were not enough even for the meager food. The state proposed storing money in savings banks. However, situations often arose when significant funds collected by individual residents of the USSR were recognized as unearned income and were confiscated into state income. Such a case, for example, took place in 1927, when almost everything was taken away from a family that had been collecting medicinal herbs for many years and delivering them to state procurement centers at state prices, declaring that a Soviet person could not have so much.

An alternative would be winning government loans. However, here too there were many problems, since the state did not stop its tricks. For example, when at the beginning of 1937, food problems once again worsened in many parts of the country and hungry people rushed to sell their food, the People's Commissariat of Finance announced the early repurchase of bonds of previously issued loans. True, for only a third of the nominal value.

As a result, everyone who had savings and wanted to save them again remembered gold. The most liquid types of gold products were in greatest demand - tsarist minted chervonets and ingots. At worst - golden sand. Well, since they were not available for free sale, demand caused an increase in supply. And following this, the country’s leadership began to regularly demand an end to the theft of gold from mines, as well as a tougher fight against gold smuggling on the borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China. In the Soviet Central Asian republics, as evidenced by the reports of the NKVD, unique centers and transshipment bases for gold trade were even formed, where immigrants from China who settled in the USSR were engaged in illegal operations. They were finally eliminated only after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the subsequent mass deportation of Chinese citizens to their homeland.

However, the black market for gold did not disappear after that. Coins, bars and gold items began to be brought in significant quantities from defeated Germany and other countries where Soviet troops were stationed.

The masses could acquire the treasured Torgsinov TOTs by handing over any valuables, including native gold

Marauder's Gold

V. S. Shafir, who served as assistant military prosecutor of the Berlin garrison in 1945, told me about the sources of the appearance of such values:

"In the area of ​​the Tempelhof airfield, a small commandant's office was taken under the protection private bank. Soon a message was received that the bank had been robbed. When we arrived, the colonel, the district commandant, reported on the incident and gave us an inventory of the bank’s valuables, compiled when we were taken under guard. It turned out that the most valuable thing was missing from the opened safe - two boxes of gold Swiss watches - about five hundred in total. The commandant himself was fussing around, giving us new versions, naming the names of suspects. The motives for such behavior were not very clear, and we had suspicions about this colonel. In the midst of the investigation, we learn that our “voluntary assistant” has received leave and is leaving for the Union. This alarmed me even more. We collected data about him and established facts of squandering and appropriation of captured property. Our suspicions of his involvement in the disappearance of the gold watch grew stronger. It was pointless to conduct a search in his apartment: he was not a stupid man and probably hid his watch safely. When we learned the day of his departure, and he was flying from the airfield in his Tempelhof district, we realized that he would not leave his valuables in Berlin and we had to take it at the time of boarding the plane. They organized an ambush on the airfield. He walked up to the plane; The soldiers of the commandant's office were carrying numerous suitcases - they loaded everything, but something stopped us at that moment. Intuition suggested that he did not yet have the main burden. The plane started the engines, received the command to take off, and suddenly a Red Army soldier with a suitcase jumped out of some trench, ran to the open door and handed this luggage to the colonel. At that moment we took the commandant. There was a gold watch in the suitcase. As I remember now, the matter did not develop. Before his appointment as commandant, the colonel was the commander of a combat regiment, spent the entire war on the front line, was awarded orders many times, and the command decided not to put him on trial.”

But the real gold rush began in 1947, when rumors appeared that some changes were coming: either monetary reform, or the withdrawal of money from the population in some other form. Soon after this, Stalin and other leaders of the country began to receive reports from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs about exposed buyers and sellers of gold. Thus, the report dated February 11, 1947 stated:

All foreign tourists replenished the Soviet treasury, and some of them also made a feasible contribution to the creation of the personal gold reserves of individual Soviet citizens

“Recently, the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Moscow Region has arrested a number of large currency speculators, from whom they confiscated: gold coins of tsarist minting worth 16,335 rubles, gold items and diamonds worth 742,000 rubles, cash in Soviet signs worth 304,000 rubles, savings books with deposits worth 105,000 rubles, government bonds worth 294,000 rubles, American dollars worth 5,022 rubles, British pounds worth 120 rubles. The total weight of gold coins and gold products seized from criminals is 14.77 kg."

“The Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Leningrad Region in October-November of this year arrested 12 currency speculators, from whom a large number of gold items, precious stones and other valuables were confiscated. Among those arrested:

Slobodnik B. M., born in 1910, no specific occupation, member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), wanted by the Leningrad Regional Prosecutor's Office for theft of socialist property. During a search of Slobodnik, gold coins of royal and foreign mintage with a total weight of 3344 grams and 8 gold and platinum watches were discovered and confiscated. During the investigation, Slobodnik testified that the valuables were obtained by looting in Warsaw and Berlin.

Brailko N.N., born in 1898, no specific occupation. Brailko was detained while trying to sell a red gold bar weighing 700 grams. A search of Brailko’s apartment seized 4,632 grams of gold bullion, 1,038 grams of platinum bullion, 88.2 grams of gold in jewelry, 100 pieces of diamonds in gold jewelry, and other valuables. During interrogation, Brailko testified that the valuables belonged to her husband P.P. Brailko and after his death went to her. Brailko P.P., a former nobleman, engineer, from 1904 to 1913 worked in the fleet in positions from junior engineer to head of floating workshops. From 1914 to 1923 he worked at the radiotelegraph plant in Leningrad, occupying last years position of technical director of the plant. Subsequently he worked as technical director of the Elektroapparat plant, director of the reel plant named after. Vorovsky, Head of the Bureau capital works All-Union Association of Marine Shipbuilding. Died in 1938. The investigation into the case continues.

By letter dated November 20th. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to you about the arrest in the city. In Leningrad, a group of currency traders and plunderers of socialist property, consisting of 10 people, was headed by a resident of the mountains. Tashkent Platkov Sh. G., who, through his accomplices, bought gold in Leningrad in coins, bars, products, as well as precious stones.

In total, the following was seized from members of Platkov’s group, as well as from Slobodnik and Brailko: cash - 498,300 rubles, gold in bars, products and coins - 11 kg 312.2 grams, platinum bars - 1 kg 38 grams, gold and platinum watches - 115, diamonds - 153, as well as other valuables. total cost The valuables seized from currency speculators amount to 4,260,000 rubles at Yuvelirtorg prices.”

The last Torgsin store closed after all the precious metals were pumped out of the population, down to the last silver spoon.

Precious contraband

In subsequent years, surges of interest in precious metals arose in the same way, in anticipation of or after large withdrawals of money from the population. For example, in 1957, the Soviet leadership decided to essentially default on domestic loans.

“Now,” said the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. S. Khrushchev at a meeting in Gorky, “we have to pay off loans in the form of winnings and repayments every year large sums. This year we will have to pay about 16 billion, next year - 18 billion, and in 1967 we would have to pay 25 billion rubles, i.e. almost as much as was planned for the loan subscription this year. It turns out to be a vicious circle. It turns out that the state puts money from loans in one pocket, and from the other pocket issues the same amount of money to pay for winnings on loans. How to be? We haven’t made a decision yet; we wanted to consult with workers, collective farmers, office workers and the intelligentsia. And if they support our event, then an appropriate resolution can be adopted. The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government would consider it possible to do so. Beginning in 1958, stop issuing loans, except for the three percent, freely negotiable ones. This year, we will issue a loan not for 26 billion, as previously planned, but for 12 billion rubles... But we cannot carry out this measure, we cannot stop issuing loans, unless we simultaneously stop paying winnings and repayments on previously issued loans. Therefore, we would propose deferring loan repayments for 20-25 years. If you think this is the right thing to do, I encourage you to support it. And in 20-25 years, payments on the bonds will begin, of course, not immediately, because it is impossible to pay 260 billion rubles at once, but in installments - about 13 billion rubles annually.”

The reaction was immediate. The demand for gold, which was brought to the USSR by foreign tourists, students and guests, increased sharply. The note from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the CPSU Central Committee dated July 3, 1958 stated:

“On June 7 of this year, the police in the city of Leningrad, while trying to sell illegally imported watches, detained Finnish tourists Lehtinen Reino Antero, who was found with 30 thousand rubles by Soviet banknotes, and Helminen Mortte Olava, who had 73 Swiss ladies' wristwatches made of yellow metal. Interviewee Lehtinen said that he illegally brought 120 wristwatches with him to the city of Leningrad, of which he sold 40 to an unknown man for 30 thousand rubles. Lehtinen and Helminen also intended to sell the remaining watches. The watches and money in the amount of 30 thousand rubles seized by the police from these Finnish tourists were transferred to the Leningrad customs and confiscated."

However, the most massive surge of interest in accumulation in precious metals arose after monetary reform 1961. And this despite the fact that in the USSR the punishment for currency transactions was tightened and their participants now faced the death penalty. On April 10, 1963, the KGB reported to the CPSU Central Committee that the flow of gold and currency smuggling into the USSR, despite all the efforts being made, was only growing:

"The State Security Committee reports that, implementing the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of May 15, 1960 on strengthening the fight against smuggling activities of foreigners, the KGB bodies for elapsed period the smuggling activities of several hundred foreigners were stopped, of which 16 were brought to criminal liability(citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic - 7, Finland - 3, Iraq - 1, Iran - 1, USA - 1, Poland - 2, Czechoslovakia - 1) and 75 were compromised and expelled from the Soviet Union; a number of smuggling channels to the Soviet Union were discovered and subsequently liquidated or taken under the control of state security agencies; in Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, Belarus, and in some Central Asian, Transcaucasian and Baltic republics, large groups of currency dealers operating on the black market were liquidated; Gold, currency and contraband goods worth over 6.5 million rubles were confiscated from criminals. Analysis of materials obtained as a result of this work shows that the black market in our country developed in the post-war period and reached largest sizes by 1959-1960. This is explained primarily by the fact that by this time the influx of foreigners into our country had increased significantly, a certain part of whom used their trips to the USSR as a means of personal enrichment, smuggled goods across the border and carried out illegal activities. currency transactions. The most active were military personnel, students and tourists from the countries of the Near and Middle East; tourists from Finland, Italy, France, West Germany; Austrian, Greek, Italian, West German sailors; embassy employees: UAR, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Argentina, Lebanon, Iraq, Italy, Israel; citizens of the Polish People's Republic who arrived in the USSR as tourists, transport employees and on private business. Of the total amount of contraband (1,756 thousand rubles in new prices) seized in 1960-1962. among those crossing the border, 73.5 percent belongs to foreigners.”

The scope of the fight against the black gold market, judging by the KGB report, was impressive:

“The KGB authorities prosecuted 651 Soviet citizens for smuggling activities and violating the rules on currency transactions. These persons, as a rule, were not engaged in socially useful work, in the past they were convicted of embezzlement, private enterprise or foreign exchange activities and had accumulated significant amounts of money through dishonest means; workers of trade and local and light industry enterprises; dentists and technicians, watchmakers, jewelers who were engaged in private practice. Among them were many morally corrupt elements, various kinds of swindlers, brokers, and gamblers."

However, despite this, among the market participants there were not only moral and ideological renegades, but also officials verified by the KGB:

"Former head of the exhibition management department of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce of the Ministry foreign trade USSR Vaisman Ya.P., while on a business trip abroad, made a number of criminal transactions with representatives of foreign companies, and with the proceeds he acquired valuables, which he tried to smuggle into the Soviet Union. Former consul of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ghulja (PRC), Shalunov was involved in criminal activities for a long time, surrounded himself with businessmen and smugglers. Using funds allocated to Soviet citizens living in China, he bought gold, pearls, diamonds and, using the right of uncontrolled passage, secretly smuggled them across the border... (Vaisman and Shalunov were convicted).”

Actually, there was nothing strange about it. As long as the state continues to seize money from citizens, illegal ways to preserve savings will also be in demand. And, accordingly, there will always be those who are ready to satisfy the emerging demand.

When discussing the story with Father Landau, someone expressed the idea: they say, a man was saving gold, “earned by his own mind and labor,” and then the Bolsheviks come and demand “to give back the little gold at a predatory rate.”

I must say that the Bolsheviks are by no means original in this:

The Great Confiscation: Owning gold was illegal in the US from 1933 to 1975

Have you heard of Roosevelt's Emergency Banking Act of April 5, 1933? On this day, the American President outlawed the ownership of gold and ordered US citizens to return coins, bars and gold certificates to the Federal Reserve Banks at a price of $20.67 per ounce by May 1, 1933. This devalued the dollar by 40%; the price of gold settled at $35.00 per ounce. In one stroke, Roosevelt increased the government's gold holdings, stabilized the monetary system, and raised wholesale prices by more than 33%. However, it also caused losses of 40% to gold owners and deprived them of the metal they had been holding to secure their financial future.

In 1933, the Great Depression led to a massive gold shortage. Demand for gold from worried Americans has reduced the Federal Reserve's supply of the metal to near minimum. mandatory reserve, thereby creating additional fears of an imminent monetary crisis. The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 was passed to "relieve the stress banking sector and for other purposes." On March 6, 1933, the President set in motion a chain of events that would destroy the international gold standard once and for all. First, he closed the country's banks and prohibited them from making payments or exporting gold coins and bullion, using emergency powers provided by the Trade with Hostile States Act passed during the First World War.

From 1933 onwards, private ownership and ownership of gold became illegal for US citizens. Any refusal to return the gold was punishable by a fine of $10 thousand and 10 years in prison. These exceptional measures were aimed at preventing people from owning gold. The solution was simple: introduce a legal ban on direct ownership of gold.

In 1934, Roosevelt announced the confiscation of gold from banks (Gold Reserve Act: in exchange for gold certificates that could not be exchanged for gold).

This law was in effect in the United States until 1975, several years after the value of the dollar ceased to be tied to the price of gold.

But that didn't stop Americans from buying and selling gold on the black market, especially in the form of nuggets that the law had forgotten about. Of course, there were also people who knew everything about gold and stored it in Swiss safes: material reserves are immovable, but the value that these material reserves represent (currency) is convertible.

Although private ownership of gold was legalized in the United States on August 15, 1974, the President still has the ability to confiscate it. The President still retains the power, under the emergency banking law, to "investigate, regulate or prohibit... the importation, exportation, storage, melting or hallmarking of gold" during state of emergency in the country.

We need to act before a crisis occurs, not after. If you wait until gold confiscation, foreign exchange regulation, or other emergency measures are introduced, it may be too late.

If you are an investor, what should you do? Convert some of your savings into the perfect crisis insurance: collectible coins. In case of a crisis, it is better to have numismatic gold than bullion.

Saved

The civil war significantly depleted the gold reserves of Russia (one of the richest countries of its time), 2/3 of the gold was spent or stolen. The young Bolshevik state, in addition to a number of conflicts, received an empty treasury.

The reserves sold out in just a few years (about the Empire's gold). The funds were spent on the purchase of weapons, ammunition, and on paying indemnities for the separate Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty (and, according to some sources, on bribes to foreign officials for concluding a much-needed peace for the country). Some funds went to friends from communist parties in Europe. A significant amount of gold (judging by some documents and research) was sold to the West to ensure the survival of the state in the first years after the establishment of Bolshevik power.

In some studies, the authors insist that by the end of the 1920s the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. This is perhaps a very bold statement: there were resources, albeit meager. Another thing is surprising: in the 30s, the USSR made a powerful industrial leap. Where did you manage to find funds for industrialization?

Stalin, having taken power, began to replenish his gold reserves again (in one of the articles from the early 90s, he was compared to the tsars for this, they say he followed their path). After Koba's death, the following leaders had about 2804 tons of gold at their disposal. But do not rush to praise the leader.

In 1927, the Soviet Union began an accelerated process of industrialization. Stalin hoped that income from the sale of agricultural products and raw materials abroad would be able to ensure the development of industry in the country, but hopes were not justified (the crisis significantly reduced prices for agricultural products). In 1931 - 1933, the USSR dumped on the grain market, bringing discounts to 50%. And within the country millions were starving. Resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation dated April 2, 2008 N 262-5 State Duma In memory of the victims of the famine of the 30s on the territory of the USSR: about 7 million people died, the reason for which was “collectivization and repressive measures to ensure grain procurements, which significantly aggravated the severe consequences of the crop failure of 1932 of the year. Think about it: 7 million.

Undoubtedly, many processes were forced, and the lack of broad experience in governing the country also affected.

The state's external debt has increased almost 5-fold since 1926; loans were mainly from Germany. Loans were covered by grain, oil, timber, and gold.
In 1928, they began selling the country's museum collections. 48 masterpieces by such masters as Jan van Eyck, Titian, Rembrandt, and Raphael were sold from the Hermitage. Andrew Mellon and Calouste Gulbenkian jumped at the chance and put together stunning collections.

Gold mining

Before the First World War, 60.8 tons of gold were mined in Russia in 1913. At that time the industry was in the hands of foreigners. However, wars and revolutions destroyed the gold mining industry. During the NEP, gold mining began to revive. In 1927, only 20 tons of gold were mined.

Despite the collapse of the NEP, Stalin in 1927 allowed private miners to continue their business, understanding their merits and importance for the gold mining industry (it is believed that he paid attention to the experience of the gold rush in the USA, where it was private initiative that drove the processes).

At the beginning of 1928, the Kolyma gold rush broke out. In the spring of 1928, F. R. Polikarpov ceded his rights to the Bezymyanny spring deposit to the state joint stock company Soyuzgold. After the hype of private mining, the stage of state development of Kolyma riches began.

Alexander Pavlovich Serebrovsky traveled to the USA twice and adopted the experience of American gold miners. He studied technology and equipment and recruited American engineers to work in the Soviet Union.

In 1932, in addition to civilian gold mining, which was under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, mining precious metal began to work on Dalstroy - Kolyma prisoners - almost free labor.

The amount of gold mined in the Soviet Union increased every year. In the second half of the 1930s, the USSR ranked second in gold mining, ahead of the USA and Canada. The Soviet Union was second only to South Africa.

Between 1932 and 1941 Dalstroy produced about 400 tons of gold. “Civilian” gold mining for the period 1927-1935 brought 300 tons.

Carrot and stick

Prosperous citizens became another source of gold. At the end of the 1920s, all affairs of currency traders and holders of valuables were transferred Economic management OGPU. Persuasion, deception and violence were used to confiscate valuables from citizens. During the period from 1930 to 1932, the OGPU was able to extract 15.1 million rubles, which is equal to 12 tons of gold.

However, there are not many wealthy citizens, and yet the 160 million population has small things in the form of wedding rings, gold crosses, etc. Small things, but in the grand scheme of things... The state encroached on this too.

In 1930, Torgsin stores were created - “All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners on the Territory of the USSR.” The range of these stores was impressive.

Initially, Torgsin served exclusively foreign tourists and sailors in the ports of the USSR. In 1931, the doors of Torgsin were open to all Soviet citizens. People exchanged cash, gold jewelry, precious stones, household gold and silver for money, which they then spent in torgsin stores. The network of torgsins gradually covered the entire country.

In 1933, people brought 45 tons of gold and 2 tons of silver to Torgsin. What did the people acquire for these riches? Real estate? Technology? Not at all. 80% of goods sold through Torgsin were products (flour, cereals, rice, sugar). According to Torgsin's analysis of prices in the USSR, the cost of products to its citizens was three times higher than what was sold abroad.

Over the five years of its existence, Torgsin produced 287.3 million rubles, which equals 222 tons of gold.

Stick for the rich, carrot for the poor

The OGPU and Torgsin almost completely devastated all the citizens' savings. However, the funds were used for their intended purpose and went to pay for industrial equipment of large Soviet enterprises.

Results of efforts

The country has overcome the gold and foreign exchange crisis. After victory in World War II, the USSR replenished its gold reserves through confiscations and reparations. After the end of the war, the state stopped selling gold abroad.

• After Stalin's death, Khrushchev began to spend gold reserves, mainly on the purchase of grain.
• Brezhnev spent gold to support third world countries. By the end of Brezhnev's rule, the stock had decreased by more than a thousand tons.
• Gorbachev completely squandered the treasury. The USSR reserve by 1991 was only 240 tons. At that time, the United States had accumulated more than 8,000 tons of gold. Post-Soviet Russia had to collect its gold and foreign exchange reserves from scratch.

Golden chervonets.
RSFSR, 1923. Diameter 22 mm.

As is known, the Soviet government began the first stage of monetary reform in 1922-1923,
when the so-called Sovznaki were issued. At the same time, at the end of 1922, the State Bank issued chervonets, exchangeable for gold. Since the chervonets contained gold at the level of “ten” in 1913, it was
already stable currency.
At the second stage, in February 1924, treasury notes were released into circulation.
In addition, small change silver and copper coins were minted. Thus, a single
monetary system.
In order to avoid inflationary processes, the government began to implement
"intervention" of the gold coin. The intervention policy fell into two separate moments: creating the stability of the chervonets within the country through the intervention of gold and eliminating the leakage abroad of the emitted gold.
to the gold market. The bodies of the Narkomfin (NKF) and the State Bank were entrusted with the first task, while the second lay entirely with the bodies of the OGPU.
In addition to the fight against the leakage of gold, the security officers were entrusted with the task of combating the artificial increase in its exchange rate, that is, suppressing all types of speculation within the country on this basis.

20 silver kopecks.
RSFSR. 1922 Diameter 22 mm.

The gold intervention carried out by the State Bank led to nothing. It was noted that “the ongoing intervention does not achieve any positive results at all, both in the direction of achieving a decrease in demand and in the direction of lowering prices on the free market for gold to create the stability of our chervonets”1. In Transcaucasia, the market for discarded gold was not saturated, and demand only increased. The price for ten reached 15 rubles. Taking into account that it was not possible to count on the return of sold gold back to the State Bank cash desks, since it flowed abroad, and eliminating the smuggled leak was impossible, it was proposed to stop further intervention in Central Asia and Transcaucasia2. In turn, the excess
import of goods over export led to a reduction in inventories and foreign currency, which gave rise to speculation. In order to to some extent stop the leakage of currency into private hands, in 1928 the gold ruble (chervonets) ceased to be freely convertible, that is, freely exchangeable for the money of other states according to official rate. Only paper money and small change remained in circulation. The real value of the ruble was falling rapidly. During the first five-year period it decreased by more than 60 percent.
At this time, the task was set to carry out industrialization in the country. These plans also needed money. Remembering the experience of the early 1920s, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 17, 1928, in this regard, instructed the People's Commissar of Finance N.P. Bryukhanov to work within two weeks on the issue of the possible removal of silver jewelry from museums, churches and other places for the purpose of melting them down. At the same time, restrictions on the circulation of currency were introduced, and forced confiscation of currency and valuables from the population began.
On May 15, 1929, the NKF reported to the Politburo that starting from 1926-1927, bank silver coins - the ruble and 50 kopecks - began to disappear from circulation and are now almost completely absent from circulation. The next day, May 16, by decision of the Politburo, a commission was formed that considered the feasibility of confiscating silver from the population. The commission’s decision was unequivocal: to confiscate the silver coin from the population.
In response, in 1929, an even greater demand for small change from the population began to be noted. And this is despite the fact that the issue and circulation of small change silver and bronze coins were significantly increased: 30 million rubles of silver coins against 13.4 million issued in 1927/1928. The issued silver was almost never returned to the State Bank's cash desks. A particularly strong demand for silver coins was observed from July 1929.
The Economic Administration (EKU) of the OGPU in Circular No. 247 dated November 14, 1929 asked to periodically cover the state of circulation of silver and bronze coins locally, identifying exchange crises, interruptions in the supply of coins from State Bank branches, non-issuance of coins from the cash desks of financial institutions and other institutions. It was also proposed to identify whether there were purchases of changeable silver, connections between buyers with cashiers of financial institutions and other institutions, and other phenomena in this area, paying special attention to border areas3.
On July 23, 1930, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided, in order to eliminate speculative demand for silver coins, to instruct the NKF, the People's Commissariat of Justice and the OGPU to wage a decisive fight against speculators and silver buyers, taking the necessary administrative measures against those responsible. The NKF was instructed to make a corresponding reduction in departmental estimates in connection with the reduction of the all-Union budget. Taking into account the State Bank's message about the measures it had taken in connection with difficulties with small change coins, it was considered necessary to strengthen the supply of small change coins to Moscow, Leningrad and areas of large grain and raw materials procurement.
In the circular of the EKU OGPU No. 210 for 1930, based on reports coming from the field, it was noted that there was a lack of a sufficient number of small change silver coins. In this regard, rumors about the lack of silver intensified. Speculative elements, in turn, began to create a stir around this issue, turning silver change into the object of their operations by artificially lowering the rate of paper money in comparison with them. This led to frequent cases of local crises in the circulation of changeable silver, which was especially undesirable among the peasantry when government agencies carried out economic measures for grain procurement.
EKU OGPU notified local authorities that the State Bank of the USSR has completely
sufficient availability of small change, which has already been distributed and will be sent in the future in the required quantity. At the same time, it was proposed to identify persons convicted of so-called counter-revolutionary agitation, and speculators who undermine the normal money turnover. The perpetrators had to be brought to justice through a special meeting. It was proposed to pay serious attention to the intermediate links of the trade and cooperative network, where cases of delay and seizure of small change by employees were established4.
The installations for the seizure of silver were poorly carried out, in this regard, on August 12, 1930, code telegram No. 13198 was sent to the authorized representative offices of the OGPU by V.R. Menzhinsky. In it, he expressed dissatisfaction with the poor work on the seizure of silver, which, according to him, was progressing sluggishly .
Since the beginning of financial reform, 240 million silver coins have been put into circulation,
As a result of the operation, 300 thousand were seized.
Menzhinsky reminded his representatives that they had the responsibility not only to carry out searches after searches, but also to monitor the implementation of all measures to achieve a turning point in the collection of silver. The purpose of the operation was to accumulate maneuver fund in the amount of two tens of millions of rubles. Due to the fact that the operation was of a massive nature, OGPU troops, schools and the police were involved in it.
Menzhinsky did not accept any references to grain procurements, mass inspections of the fire conditions of factories, or the fight against counter-revolution. He proposed to continue operations until silver was found, reporting the results daily.
The silver hiders were punished cruelly. So, on August 18, Menzhinsky sent a telegram to Leningrad in which he informed the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU F.D. Medved that the OGPU collegium had considered the case sent to him regarding the concealment of silver. All persons who passed through it were sentenced to death.
Menzhinsky suggested that Medved carry out the sentence immediately upon receipt of the telegram.
On August 21, the OGPU collegium, following the results of an operation to confiscate silver in Moscow, sentenced the following to the highest measure of social protection:
"1. Bykov Efim Evgenievich, 68 years old, native of Moscow, cloakroom attendant at the Bolshoi Theater. Found: 810 rub. silver, a large number of scarce goods and manufactures.
2. Leontyev Gavril Filippovich, 65 years old, cloakroom attendant at the Art Theater. Found: 865 rub. silver
3. Korolev Nikolai Makarovich, born in 1878, cloakroom attendant at the Maly Theater. Found: 449 rub. 50 kopecks silver
4. Maksakov Emelyan Karpovich, 54, passenger cab driver. 500 rubles found. silver coin.
5. Romanov Ivan Vasilyevich, born in 1883, employee, served with the Kurds, 1352 rubles were found. silver
6. Rabinovich Khatskal Semyonovich, born in 1886, shinkar, 988 rubles found. silver, 10 rub. gold, $7.
7. Markov Alexander Ivanovich, born in 1889, merchant. Found: silver 400 rubles.
8. Shabanov Vladimir Alekseevich - cashier of the State Bank, 53 years old. 478 rubles found. silver
9. Volko Artur Augustinovich, kulak, Duksky district, 52. Silver was discovered, 397 rubles. 50 kopecks"5.
On August 20, the Politburo instructed the OGPU to strengthen measures to combat speculators and coin hoarders, including in Soviet cooperative institutions.
At a meeting of the Politburo on August 25, it was decided to publish the following message in the newspapers: “The OGPU board examined the case of a group of people involved in speculation and concealment of silver coins, as well as gold. The most malicious concealers, who at the same time were engaged in active counter-revolutionary agitation: Maxim Abramovich Stolyarov, Fyodor Pavlovich Orlov (8 people in total), in whom large sums of various silver were found, were sentenced to death by the OGPU Collegium. The sentence has been carried out.
At the same time, the OGPU sent 438 speculators and silver coin hoarders to concentration camps for a period of 3 to 10 years from a number of regions and republics of the USSR”6.
As of September 27, 485,403 searches were carried out throughout the USSR to confiscate silver from the population; arrests - 9427; small change coins were selected - 2,307,924 rubles.
Money and jewelry were confiscated into state revenue wherever possible.
So, on September 29, 1929, at the checkpoint at the Negoreloe station, letters sewn into her coat were seized from the French citizen Inessa Choitel, who was crossing the border from Paris to Moscow that day. During the customs inspection, the Frenchwoman Choitelle, with her behavior, aroused suspicion in the controllers, in connection
With this, she was invited to a separate room to conduct a personal search. As a result of the search at
The Chuateles were found with contraband items of clothing sewn under the lining of their coats, with an approximate value of about 400 rubles. In addition, three letters were found in the same coat
in Russian without indicating addresses. Only one of the letters contained the signature of E. G. Kandyrina.
After reviewing the contents of the letters, it was established that the question in them was about the already completed illegal shipment of some valuables from the USSR abroad to Kandyrina.
It was clear from the letters that valuables remained in the USSR, buried with some “owner”, who, for their
storage Kandyrina allowed to pay 2-3 thousand rubles. One of the letters spoke about Boris, whom Kandyrina wanted to provide from the same values. One of the letters was intended for Feona Vasilievna and Ivan, who were supposed to take some silver and give it to Shuatel. These letters were sent to the Main Border Guard Directorate (GUPO).
On the day these letters were received from the border, Choitelle, who had arrived in Moscow, was summoned to the 2nd department of the GUPO OGPU.
Interrogated by Shuatel, she testified that she was bringing the letters to Maria Gavrilovna Smirnova, Kandyrina’s sister; Boris Kandyrin, the son of an emigrant; Maria Egorovna Selezneva, the former nanny of the Kandyrins; Feona Vasilyevna Efimova and Ivan Ilyich Varlamkin, former housekeeper and footman. Choitel admitted that when she went to Paris every year, she received valuables and furs from Smirnova and took them abroad to Kandyrina. She did the same in
my last trip to Paris. Choitel also indicated the addresses of all the above-mentioned persons.
Boris Kandyrin, who appeared for interrogation, stated that he served in the Red Army; about everything he knows
he will say and asked only not to deprive him of the rank of commander of the Red Army. He said that about the existence of treasures
he knew from the words of his mother, who left him in Novorossiysk and was herself evacuated abroad.
He doesn’t know exactly where it is hidden, but he heard that the diamonds are buried in a cache near Moscow at the dacha of a certain Bukin, who himself knows nothing about this treasure. The values ​​at this dacha, according to him,
Seleznev and Smirnov were buried. The silver was walled up in their basement former home. Ivan and I know the place
Feona.
The most expensive valuables belong to his aunt Smirnova, but he does not know where she keeps them. Wherein
he pointed to a certain Trushina-Krasovskaya as a person close to Smirnova, with whom the latter, perhaps,
and stores valuables.
The operation to search for valuables was divided into two parts. The first is excavations at the dacha with the help of Selezneva.
For this purpose, Kandyrin was asked to go together with OGPU employee Yakovlev to the village of Mitino
to Selezneva, show her a letter from Boris’s mother, where she asks to dig up the valuables and hand them over to Yakovlev, supposedly a representative of the French embassy, ​​who will completely freely transport these valuables to Paris. Seleznyova said that she and Smirnova dug up some of the valuables at the dacha three years ago. These valuables belonged to Smirnova, and she took them to Moscow.
On October 2, Yakovlev, Kandyrin and Selezneva came to the owner of the dacha Bukin. They explained to him the purpose of their visit. We started digging. One box was dug up quickly. In other places where there should have been six boxes,
They dug from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. without success. Excavations were continued by GUPO employees, but
Until the night there were no results. The next day, excavations continued and the remaining jars were found.
As a result of excavations, royal paper money, royal gold coins, items with precious
stones worth, according to preliminary estimates, 58-60 thousand rubles in gold terms.
On October 4, during interrogation, Selezneva spoke about the family silver walled up in the Kandyrin mansion.
The janitor Varlamkin and the former housekeeper Efimova were arrested. During interrogation they talked about the hidden
silver that was seized. Its approximate cost is 4-5 thousand rubles.
From September 30 to October 4, interrogations of Smirnova continued, which did not yield any results.
The only thing she admitted was that she sent Choitel to Paris with the Frenchwoman
to his sister several coins of royal minting, one bracelet and two rings. Smirnova denied that she had any hidden valuables.
On October 5, Smirnova’s acquaintance, Kira Stepanovna Trushina-Krasovskaya, was called in for questioning.
admitted that two of Smirnova’s chests were kept in her apartment, and buried in her woodshed
ground two iron cans. As a result of excavations in the barn, two tall iron cans were discovered at a depth of one and a half meters. One of them contained royal paper money, the other. - values
exceptionally high cost. Two chests were also seized, containing expensive items.
According to preliminary estimates, the value of the seizure in gold terms was 156,400 rubles.
In total, 220-230 thousand rubles worth of valuables were seized in this case.
In a letter dated 1931, Stalin was informed of a crime committed by OGPU employees during the period of confiscation
gold, silver and currency in the territory of the Belarusian Military District. During the interrogations of those arrested at the site of the 15th border detachment, cases of clearly abnormal, criminal relations towards the persons under investigation were recorded, bordering on torture on the part of the persons interrogating them.
Those arrested were beaten, deprived of food for two to three days, put in a cold room half-naked, they were subjected to a mock trial, beatings and other unacceptable acts were used.
I. V. Grinevich, the head of the 15th border detachment, a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) since 1918, a mechanic worker, and a former active participant in the fight against banditry in the Cheka, took part in all these criminal actions.
since 1918, as well as P. A. Nikanorov, M. Z. Mots, X. Yu. Sorits, M. I. Klimanov, A. Ya. Khilko and others.
Stalin was informed that all of the above persons had been arrested by the OGPU BVI BVI and were being tried by the OGPU collegium.
Stalin’s resolution: “Isn’t it very strict?” predetermined the fate of the above persons in the direction of mitigation of punishment. Four, including Grinevich, were expelled from the party, the rest received a severe reprimand.
OGPU Circular No. 404 of September 20, 1931 proposed to cover the entire territory served by authorized representative offices. At the same time, the circular indicated the inadmissibility of seizure
gold and silver household items - wedding rings, gold watches, earrings, rings,
crosses, chains for them, silver spoons, forks, knives, cigarette cases, seized by individual authorized representatives during previous operations. Such valuables could be confiscated only in cases
when this was clearly in the nature of storage for the purpose of concealment or speculation.
Considering that the OGPU authorities continued to confiscate valuable things from the population, a year later in Circular No. 572
dated September 19, 1932, the ECU once again clarified that the seizure of gold and silver household items
household goods should be produced only in cases where their quantity is marketable and represents a currency value or their storage is clearly speculative in nature.
Upon voluntary surrender of currency and valuables, it was proposed that those arrested be released from custody. Persons who persistently evade handing over currency, if there is strong investigative evidence in the ECO, were proposed to be prosecuted under Article 59, paragraph 12, of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, sending the cases to a special meeting at the OGPU board.
Attention was drawn to the inadmissibility of transferring seized currency, gold and valuables to local customs or GUPO. Under the personal responsibility of the heads of the EKO PP, it was proposed to send currency and valuables every five days through field communication exclusively to the financial department of the OGPU according to the inventory with a mandatory copy of the EKU OGPU8.
On March 11, 1932, the results of the massive currency operation carried out in December-February were summed up. A number of authorities arrested a large number of people, which is why the investigative processing was carried out hastily and people who had currency were released, although they subsequently had it. There were general searches, which, as a rule, did not produce results. This was explained by the fact that the currency, as a rule, was stored in the ground, firewood, and walls.
It was proposed to stop the massive operation and begin a systematic “pumping of currency.” For this purpose, it was proposed to create a special group in the authorized representative offices of the OGPU and in individual regional
departments and sectors. It was proposed to include “former” persons in the category of persons planned for development as currency holders.
It was proposed to pay attention to suburban and dacha areas where those evicted often lived
from their permanent place of residence, former Nepmen.
It was even proposed to develop an archive to identify currency holders deported to camps and places of exile,
and request these persons to confiscate their currency.
Considering that a number of persons fled from their place of permanent residence, it was proposed to take
their active search activities. Particular attention had to be paid to identifying foreign
deposits and inheritances.
Postal telegram No. 125/EKU dated February 5, 1932 indicated that in the process of conducting foreign exchange
operations, cases were observed when the OGPU authorities confiscated currency from persons who received it through official means
on transfers from abroad or who had it in Torgsin’s current account. Arrests were sometimes made
visitors to Torgsin stores, from whom small amounts of currency were seized and also confiscated
products and manufactured goods purchased in Torgsin.
It has been pointed out that such measures terrorize small currency holders and cause significant outflows
foreign currency receipts in Torgsin. The ECU of the OGPU proposed not only to prevent such actions themselves,
but also to suppress such actions of the police and criminal investigation department9.
In Circular No. 203 dated February 26, 1932, the ECU pointed out the increasing cases of seizures of foreign currency from private transfer recipients.
Local bodies of the OGPU began to arrest persons to whom they received messages from
credit institutions valuable packages with foreign currency sent to the USSR through foreign banks.
Receipts for receiving currency through transfers were taken from these people, after which they were released, and the currency was confiscated free of charge. In this regard, foreign banks began to receive complaints about the actions of the OGPU, which gratuitously took away currency transferred through Soviet banks. As a result of such withdrawals, the influx of foreign currency from abroad was significantly reduced.
Taking this into account, the OGPU ECU began to select transfers only in cases where there was specific information about criminal speculation in currency at inflated prices, and to arrest these persons only red-handed at the time of the transaction.
On January 7, 1931, the OGPU reported to Stalin that in 1930 10,172,289 rubles were handed over to the State Bank and Soyuzzoloto.
23 kopecks in gold rubles, of which:
“a) Full-fledged foreign currency in banknotes - 5,890,377 rubles. 72 kopecks
b) Gold in coins and bars - 3,888,576 rubles. 04 k.
c) Various silver (products, scrap, ingots, coins) - 393,235 rubles. 47 kopecks.”11, August 5, 1931 Politburo
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) instructed the OGPU to check the availability of currency and gold funds in the regional and republican OGPU and
send all their cash to the State Bank within 10 days.
On May 4, 1932, the OGPU once again reported to Stalin that the OGPU cash desk as of May 1 of this year had: foreign currency - 750,000 rubles; gold in coins and bars - 1,650,000 rubles; only 2,400,000 rubles. Yagoda asked for instructions to hand over currency and valuables to the State Bank, and emphasized that this amount, together with those previously handed over to the State Bank, would be equal to 15,132,403 rubles. Stalin was delighted: “We must say thank you to the security officers.” Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich agreed with him."
Politburo of the Central Committee on May 16, 1932 after the operation to confiscate currency and valuables from the population
instructs a commission consisting of Rudzutak, Grinko and Arkus to consider the feasibility
further withdrawal of silver from the population. It was decided to stop confiscating valuables and currency from the population,
while deciding not to object to the export of silver from the USSR in bullion.
Government policy in this matter was extremely inconsistent, the consequences of confiscations are very
greatly affected the solvency of the country's population.
Despite the fact that the OGPU authorities took serious steps to combat the smuggling of currency and
values, this work cannot be considered sufficiently effective. Low border security density,
lack of necessary engineering equipment were not allowed to properly close the tracks
illegal import and export of currency valuables and gold. IN to a greater extent this applied to the sea coast, sections of the border of the Far East, Siberia, Turkestan, Transcaucasia, the north and northwest.
Carrying out decisions of party and legislative authorities, state security organs are under
the leadership of Menzhinsky and Yagoda were forced to rob their own population...

Notes:
1. Central Asia of the FSB of Russia. F. 2. Op. 5. Por. 381. L. 248-249.
2. Ibid. L. 247-249.
3. Ibid. F. 66. Op. 1. Time 261. L. 244.
4. Ibid. Por. 208. L. 365.
5. Ibid. F. 2. Op. 8. Time 633. L.1-10.
6. Ibid. L. 94.
7. Ibid. L. 138-144.
8. Ibid. F. 66. Op. 1. Time 232. L.277-278.
9. Ibid. Por. 254.
10. APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 62.
11. Ibid. D. 171. L. 35.

Text by O. Mozokhin, Ph.D.