On January 22, 1991, the last Soviet monetary reform, which received the name "Pavlovskaya" in honor of its creator, the Minister of Finance, and later the Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov. It was a confiscatory monetary reform, which aimed to get rid of the "extra" money supply that was in cash circulation, and at least partially solve the problem of shortages in the USSR commodity market. The formal reason for the reform was declared to be the fight against counterfeit rubles allegedly imported into the USSR from abroad.

On January 22, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Decree "On the termination of acceptance for payment of banknotes of the State Bank of the USSR in denominations of 50 and 100 rubles of the 1961 model and the restriction of the issuance of cash from citizens' deposits." The signing of the Decree was announced in the Vremya program, when almost all financial institutions and shops were already closed.

After the completion of the exchange of big money, Pavlov appeared in the press with accusations against Western banks of coordinated activities to disrupt money circulation in the USSR.

As a result of the reforms, the government's plans were only partially realized: the confiscation procedure made it possible to withdraw 14 billion cash rubles from circulation (approximately 10.5% of the total mass, or slightly less than 17.1% of the 81.5 billion planned for withdrawal).

On April 2, 1991, prices for foodstuffs, transport, public Utilities.

In December 1991, experts from the Kommersant newspaper summed up the results of the entire 1991 and found that, taking into account the Pavlovian reform, prices increased 7.8 times over the year. At the same time, the greatest contribution to the price race was made by no means by market factors, but by various kinds of force majeure circumstances, such as the exchange of banknotes and official statements about upcoming cataclysms in monetary circulation.

There was a drop in the living standards of the population. By the end of 1991, the Soviet economy was in a catastrophic situation. The fall in production accelerated. The national income compared to 1990 has decreased by 20%. deficit state budget, i.e., the excess of public spending over income, amounted, according to various estimates, from 20% to 30% of gross domestic product (GDP). The growth of the money supply in the country threatened to lose state control over the financial system and hyperinflation, i.e. inflation over 50% per month, which could paralyze the entire economy.

The main consequence of the reform was the loss of public confidence in the actions of the government. Many politicians and historians believe that the political and financial reforms carried out in the USSR in 1991 finally undermined the confidence of the citizens of the USSR in the union leadership and had a significant impact on subsequent events (the August putsch, the Belovezhskaya agreement).

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

On January 22, 1991, the President of the USSR Gorbachev issued a decree according to which the old banknotes of the 1961 model with a face value of 50 and 100 rubles should be withdrawn from circulation. Money that had lost its power could be exchanged, but with significant restrictions. Only three days were allotted for this (from January 23 to 25). At the same time, only 1,000 rubles per person could be exchanged (the rest of the money could theoretically be exchanged only by contacting special commissions that operated until March 1991).

In addition, the restrictions affected the possibility of withdrawing money from savings books, where many Soviet citizens kept their savings. It was allowed to withdraw no more than 500 rubles per month.

The idea of ​​carrying out this monetary reform belonged to Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, who at that time held the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR. Six days before the signing of the scandalous decree, he was appointed to a new post - the Prime Minister of the USSR. That is why the reform was soon nicknamed Pavlovskaya.

Reading 9 min. Views 1.7k. Posted on January 28, 2017

Confiscation currency reform in the USSR in 1991

January 22, 1991 began the last Soviet monetary reform, called "Pavlovskaya" in honor of its creator, the Minister of Finance, and later Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov.

A similar confiscation reform was carried out by India two months ago - banknotes of maximum denominations - 500 and 1000 rupees (which was approximately the same amount in rubles, the rupee exchange rate was close to the ruble) were withdrawn from circulation.

On the eve of the anniversary of the Pavlovian reform, 01/21/2017, the Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation Anton Siluanov assessed the Indian experience very positively:
“We probably still need to think about reducing cash payments. Many countries are following this (path - ed.) - especially look now, in India, a large-scale attack has gone to cash settlements. This is very correct, because it is an element of whitewashing the economy. Due to this tool, it would be possible to collect more taxes and make our economy more transparent,” Siluanov said, speaking at the congress of the United Russia party.

On the eve of the publication of the M2 volume on 01/01/2017, against the backdrop of ongoing attacks by international enemies on the ruble, the reader is invited to nostalgic and remember how it was. Go.

The official reason for the financial reform was the fight against counterfeit banknotes "thrown by enemies from abroad", as well as the unearned income of citizens. So it was easier to explain the idea from the point of view of the usual Soviet ideology of those years. Unofficially, everyone understood perfectly well that it was necessary to get rid of the excess money supply printed at the end of the 1980s in order to fulfill social guarantees that had accumulated in the hands of the population and dispersed the shortage of consumer goods.

The main driver of the reform was the 53-year-old Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov, who called himself a supporter of "state capitalism."

The minister insisted that the exchange be carried out as soon as possible, so that the money savings stored by citizens not in the bank, but “in a jar” either did not have time or could not be returned in full. The Ministry of Finance had no doubt that the vast majority of the population had nothing to save from meager salaries - only "dishonest people" are capable of keeping stash in large denominations under their pillows.

January 10, 1991, at a meeting of the Supreme Council, Valentin Pavlov denied rumors about the upcoming reform.

There is no preparation for the reform, - he assured from a high rostrum. - Firstly, monetary reform is only part of a set of measures aimed at improving economic situation, and its isolated implementation without solving other problems will lead to nothing. Secondly, the implementation of the reform will cost the state about 5 billion rubles. Thirdly, the existing capacities for issuing banknotes make it possible to accumulate the required amount of new money within three years.

Journalists from business publications pointed out to the prime minister the sealed piles of banknotes that they managed to capture in photos in various banks, referred to unnamed sources in financial sector. But "once lied" Pavlov was echoed by the then chairman of the board of the State Bank of the USSR Viktor Gerashchenko, who at all angles denied rumors about the upcoming reform.

And yet, a significant part of the Soviet people, who lived "from advance to pay", these rumors did not bother. Until January 20, 1991, many of them, contrary to previous practice, were not paid salaries mainly in large denominations. Three days later, it was difficult to regard it otherwise as a mockery.

Then all this lies were explained by the "high secrecy of the operation."

The presidential decree was read at 21.00 in the evening edition of the Vremya program, when almost all financial institutions and shops were already closed.

Under the terms of the reform, the exchange of seized banknotes was accompanied by severe restrictions: citizens could exchange 50- and 100-ruble banknotes for new ones only for three days - from January 23 to 25. It was possible to change money after the specified period only by decision of special commissions. It was possible to exchange only in cash the amount of not more than 1,000 rubles per person (88,500 rubles in the prices of January 2017, average salary in January 1991 in the RSFSR - 308 Soviet rubles, in 2016 the average salary in Russia was about 36-37 thousand rubles), and pensioners were allowed to change only 200 rubles. (17,700 rubles in the prices of January 2017) - the possibility of exchanging the rest of the banknotes was considered in special commissions until the end of March 1991, which considered each case not met within the allotted time separately (business trip, expedition, state of health, etc.). It was necessary to prove where the person got the amount of more than 1 thousand rubles. The district executive committee commissions, which were entrusted with receiving and verifying such applications from citizens, were physically unable to cope with the heavy workload. They did not even "launch" clear criteria for determining the illegality of the accumulated.
At the same time, deposits in the Savings Bank were frozen. Only 500 rubles could be received from the deposit. the new ones, in addition, established the procedure for paying for goods and services by bank transfer without limiting the amount (I suggest that witnesses of the era remember in the comments what could be paid in 1991 by bank transfer and in what order). Since citizens could have deposits in several savings banks, including in different cities, on the last pages of the civil passport, employees of the savings banks made notes on the amounts withdrawn from deposits. Deposits were charged 40 percent per annum, but the money could be received in cash only in the next year.

Since the exchange of money was carried out in a very short time, long queues immediately lined up at the savings banks. The exchange was also carried out at the place of work of citizens and at the post office.

The reform hit thousands of people who kept rubles both “in stockings” and in Sberbank. The fortunes of 15-30 thousand, accumulated for decades, collapsed.

After the completion of the exchange of big money, Pavlov appeared in the press with accusations against Western banks of coordinated activities to disrupt money circulation in the USSR.

Due to the sharp depreciation of the Soviet ruble, the deposits were unfrozen ahead of schedule: by Decree of the President of the USSR of 03/22/1991. Compensation of these deposits has not yet been completed and will continue in 2017-2019.

On April 2, 1991, state-regulated prices for foodstuffs, transport, utilities were increased by 2-4 times, significantly reduced exchange rate ruble.

In December 1991, the experts of the newspaper Kommersant summed up the results of the entire 1991 and found that, taking into account the Pavlovian reform, prices increased 7.8 times over the year. At the same time, the greatest contribution to the price race was made by no means by market factors, but by various kinds of force majeure circumstances, such as the exchange of banknotes and official statements about upcoming cataclysms in monetary circulation.

Confiscation currency reform in Russia in 1993

Although the reform was of a confiscation nature, that is, the state limited the number of old banknotes exchanged for new ones, people managed to forget about it. Which is understandable: by the time of the 1993 reform, there was not much to take from the population.

In fact, the reform of 1993 is the birth Russian ruble, which on July 26 stood out from the currency area of ​​the former Soviet republics. Accumulations in the Soviet ruble were withdrawn, all banknotes with the Soviet ruble became invalid - the Soviet ruble ceased to exist (accepted for payment) and appeared new currency- Russian ruble.

The formal basis for the start of the reform was a telegram dated July 24 signed by the then head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko.

The telegram said that from 0000 hours on July 26, the circulation of banknotes of the 1961-1992 model was stopped throughout the country. And all "old" Soviet rubles are subject to exchange until August 7th. With restrictions: initially it was prescribed that by registration it was possible to change no more than 35 thousand rubles (about 35 dollars) per person. After the operation, a stamp was put in the passport so that people would not try to exercise the right twice. Panic broke out in the country. Therefore, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree, according to which the amount increased to 100 thousand rubles, and the reform period - until the end of August 1993.

Initially, the exchange limit was set at 35,000 rubles (at that time - about $35, in January 2017 prices - $58, or 12,500 rubles in January 2017 prices). Citizens of Russia (according to the registration in the passport) could exchange the indicated amounts within two weeks, from July 26 to August 7, at the institutions of the Savings Bank of Russia, which was stamped in the passport. Amounts exceeding 35,000 rubles were to be credited to time deposits for a period of 6 months.

Panic broke out in the country. On July 26, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1107 was issued, increasing the amount of banknotes of the 1961-1992 sample accepted for exchange to 100 thousand rubles. (about 100 US dollars in equivalent, in January 2017 prices - 167 dollars, or 35,724 rubles in January 2017 prices) per person, and the reform period is until the end of August 1993. Banknotes of 10,000 rubles of the 1992 sample were exchanged without limiting the amount. The exchange period was extended until the end of August, during this period it was allowed to use banknotes of 1, 3, 5 and 10 rubles in circulation. On July 27, a Central Bank telegram was issued containing similar provisions.

Subsequently, the exchange was extended until the end of the year, but an explanation was given that from October 1, the exchange of banknotes is possible only upon presentation of documents confirming the impossibility of exchange at an earlier date. The period of use in circulation of banknotes of 1, 3, 5 and 10 rubles, initially extended until the end of August, was also later extended until December 31, 1993.

Many people did not physically have time to exchange their cash savings, and this money was gone.

Coins in rubles and kopecks formally remained legal tender until the 1998 currency reform.

By the time of the 1993 reform, the average salary in the country had risen to 53,000 rubles. A kilogram of meat, for example, cost more than 2,000 rubles.

Officially, the reform was carried out with two goals - to neutralize inflation, which turned into "hyper" after price liberalization in 1992, and also to stop the flow of money from the former Soviet republics, which began to switch to their currencies.

By the summer of 1993, rumors were spreading across the country that a new money exchange was being prepared. Perhaps people understood that such problems with inflation could not last forever. But the conversations were going on, and very confident. The authorities added fuel to the fire, regularly denying these rumors, but the people were only more firmly convinced that banknote changes were coming.

The people were worried and tried in some way to save at least the small funds that they had. They did not want to carry it to the bank, remembering 1991. Credit organizations lured by high rates, but the people no longer believed and preferred the cash form of storage. Approximately 10% of income, that is, the money remaining from current consumption, people exchanged for currency. In 1993, the cost of foreign banknotes exceeded the savings on deposits and securities by about 35%.

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On January 22, 1991, the last Soviet monetary reform began, which received the name "Pavlovskaya" in honor of its founder, Minister of Finance, and later Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov. It was a confiscatory monetary reform, which aimed to get rid of the "extra" money supply that was in cash circulation, and at least partially solve the problem of shortages in the USSR commodity market. The formal reason for the reform was declared to be the fight against counterfeit rubles allegedly imported into the USSR from abroad.

On January 22, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Decree "On the termination of acceptance for payment of banknotes of the State Bank of the USSR in denominations of 50 and 100 rubles of the 1961 model and the restriction of the issuance of cash from citizens' deposits." The signing of the Decree was announced in the Vremya program, when almost all financial institutions and shops were already closed.

After the completion of the exchange of big money, Pavlov appeared in the press with accusations against Western banks of coordinated activities to disrupt money circulation in the USSR.

As a result of the reforms, the government's plans were only partially realized: the confiscation procedure made it possible to withdraw 14 billion cash rubles from circulation (approximately 10.5% of the total mass, or slightly less than 17.1% of the 81.5 billion planned for withdrawal).

On April 2, 1991, prices for foodstuffs, transport, and utilities were increased by 2-4 times.

In December 1991, experts from the Kommersant newspaper summed up the results of the entire 1991 and found that, taking into account the Pavlovian reform, prices increased 7.8 times over the year. At the same time, the greatest contribution to the price race was made by no means by market factors, but by various kinds of force majeure circumstances, such as the exchange of banknotes and official statements about upcoming cataclysms in monetary circulation.

There was a drop in the living standards of the population. By the end of 1991, the Soviet economy was in a catastrophic situation. The fall in production accelerated. The national income compared to 1990 has decreased by 20%. The state budget deficit, i.e., the excess of government spending over income, was, according to various estimates, from 20% to 30% of gross domestic product (GDP). The growth of the money supply in the country threatened to lose state control over the financial system and hyperinflation, i.e. inflation over 50% per month, which could paralyze the entire economy.

The main consequence of the reform was the loss of public confidence in the actions of the government. Many politicians and historians believe that the political and financial reforms carried out in the USSR in 1991 finally undermined the confidence of the citizens of the USSR in the union leadership and had a significant impact on subsequent events (the August putsch, the Belovezhskaya agreement).

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources