Let’s imagine for a moment that sanctions have been lifted and banks in European countries, where government bonds now bring negative returns, are transferring part of their funds to Russian securities or lending to Russian enterprises. The consequence will be a sharp rise in the ruble - probably to a level of about 50-52 rubles. for a dollar. The competitiveness of Russian goods will decrease, the profits of exporters will decrease (the ruble costs that have increased over the past two years cannot be reversed, and ruble revenue will fall). But something else is more dangerous: if we take into account that oil and gas (read dollar) revenues of the federal budget amount to up to 40%, then a strengthening of the ruble by 20% will “cut off” at least 8% of revenues (up to 1 trillion rubles). The balances of the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund, which amounted to $32.2 and $72.7 billion as of September 1, will depreciate in rubles in the same proportion - from 6.8 to 5.4 trillion rubles. Given the increased deficit, both funds will be exhausted in the second half of 2017, and balancing the budget will be almost impossible due to the fall in the ruble price of oil below 2,400 rubles. per barrel, which did not happen even in January 2016 at local lows in oil prices.

Domestic banks, which have recently been lending to commercial projects at 16-20% per annum, will have competitors in the form of Western financial institutions offering rates 3-4 times lower. It is unlikely that this will sharply increase investment activity (ruble demand on the domestic market will remain depressed, including due to further cuts in budget expenditures, so few will risk investing in business expansion), but will significantly reduce the profits of the banking sector (and the taxes charged taxes on it), calling into question the survival of many Russian financial institutions.

Agriculture

Over the past two years, the agricultural sector has shown steady growth (by 3.0% in 2015 and by 2.6% compared to the same period last year in the first half of 2016). To a large extent, manufacturers are just getting used to the relatively preferential conditions caused by the embargo and are investing heavily in the development of production. The lifting of “counter-sanctions,” which will undoubtedly happen if the Europeans take the first step, could result in losses and lost profits for thousands of agricultural enterprises, especially since producers in Central Europe, which suffered the most, are ready to quickly return to the Russian market. You can be sure that the process of import substitution, as well as the market growth in agriculture, will stop. At the same time, a compensatory reduction in prices is unlikely to happen - European producers will be able to sell their goods at more expensive prices, since the differences in quality between cheese and “cheese products” are too striking.

Oil production and defense industry

An essential element of the sanctions was a ban on the supply of high-tech products to Russia, in two directions. On the one hand, the blow was dealt to the technologies for extracting “difficult” oil and gas in the Arctic and on the shelf, on the other hand, to the military and space industries, where dependence on imported components remains very high.

But even here, lifting sanctions will do little good. In recent years, Russian oil companies have relied on increasing the recovery rate at old fields and have succeeded: in 2016, oil production is expected to be 540-543 million tons versus 534.1 million tons in 2015 and 526.7 million tons in 2014 . Returning to high latitude mining plans would be counterproductive. The cost of oil there exceeds $70 per barrel, for gas - $100 per thousand cubic meters. m, which makes production completely unprofitable under current conditions. Sanctions in such a situation are more likely to fix the status quo (and are more likely to save from yet another senseless investment, rather than cause significant harm).

Our defense industry is responding to sanctions by trying to establish the production of missing components at domestic enterprises, and partly due to this, industrial production is still declining very moderately.

Get out of the swamp

Of course, you can find areas where the lifting of sanctions will have an obviously positive effect, for example, the stock market, which will respond to such a step with explosive growth. However, even here one can wonder whether this will lead to another “bubble” and whether it will provoke an increase in prices for assets and real estate, which, again, will ultimately be passed on to consumers.

It seems to me that Russian economists underestimate the fact that the imposition of sanctions, without greatly exacerbating the economic downturn, limited competition in financial markets and artificially depreciated the ruble, which allowed the government to cope relatively successfully with budgetary challenges. Russia's status as a “financial pariah” is a critical element of the “new normal” that is often talked about in the Kremlin, the government and the Bank of Russia. Not to mention the fact that it is in full accordance with the authorities’ policy towards import-substituting industrialization.

If sanctions are lifted, Russia will begin to restore its position only as a market for European goods and financial services, but not as a powerful industrial center oriented to the global market. European enterprises are unlikely to come to us with direct investment, since with the growth of the ruble caused by the lifting of sanctions, comparative costs will again be too high, and household incomes (largely supported by the budget, the hole in which is expanding) will continue to fall.

The ruble, despite the ongoing economic crisis, does not want to decline against major world currencies. The lifting of sanctions would be the best signal for its growth, which would have disastrous consequences for public finances and seriously hamper industrial recovery.

Therefore, I once again urge you to think about whether we understand well what we are striving for now? After all, if a person finds himself in a swamp and wants to get out of it, the greatest danger comes from vain movements, the result of which is an increasingly deeper descent into the quagmire. We need not try to climb out onto the same “bump” that we fell off at the beginning of the crisis, but look for a way to the shore.

Sanctions - and here Russian politicians turned out to be right, and Western ones were unforgivably wrong - did not “tear the Russian economy to shreds.” And, as you know, “what doesn’t kill us makes us stronger.” Therefore, it seems to me that today it is more correct to look for new sources of growth, instead of waiting for the restoration of the old ones. Especially if such a restoration can have such unpredictable consequences...

The United States imposed new sanctions on Russia, Europe extended old sanctions. Horrible. Not really. All the sanctions that have been imposed so far against individual Russian individuals and organizations are all unpleasant, of course, but not fatal. These are all flowers. The berries in the area of ​​sanctions lie on two levels – (1) a ban on the purchase of Russian oil and petroleum products, and (2) a ban on investments in Russian government bonds.

The first cure for “dizziness from success” was experienced by Iran. His resources lasted only three years, after which he began to beg for mercy. If you look at the graph “Dynamics of Iran’s GDP and oil prices”, it becomes clear why. The drop in GDP as a result of the oil embargo amounted to 25% with almost unchanged oil prices. The well-being of the ordinary Iranian people fell accordingly. We must also take into account that at that time (2011-2015) the price of oil was at a very high level, above $100 per barrel. Now oil is hovering around $50, and the Russian economy is having a very difficult time withstanding this price level. If an embargo is introduced against the Russian Federation now, it is unlikely that the Russian authorities will hold out for three years.

Fortunately for the Russian authorities, today there are not even rumors that somewhere in high offices in the West the possibility of introducing an embargo on the purchase of Russian oil is being discussed. But there were rumors about the possible use of a second medicine. The bill on new anti-Russian measures, recently adopted by the US Senate, contains instructions to work out a ban on investments in Russian government bonds.

If this ban is implemented, the ruble will repeat the scenario of December 2014, only on an even larger scale. Because since 2014, the share of foreign money in Russian debt securities, government federal loan bonds (OFZ) and corporate bonds has increased. In 2014, according to the Central Bank, the share of non-residents in OFZs was about 25%, and now the regulator is talking about 31%. And, according to some estimates, we can talk about 40%, or even more.

To put this into perspective, I will say that over the past year and a half, non-residents have purchased federal loan bonds worth 734 billion rubles, providing 84% of the amount that the Ministry of Finance raised on the market to cover the budget deficit. In total, foreigners own the debts of the Russian government in the amount of 1.8 trillion rubles. According to some analysts, in medium- and long-term issues that are traded on the stock exchange, non-residents own up to 70% of all securities.

The Central Bank is to blame for this state of affairs, and only it. It was he who created favorable conditions for foreign speculators to carry out carry trade operations. Foreigners took out a loan in dollars or euros in their homeland at 1-2-3% per annum, brought the currency to our country, converted it into rubles, and invested it in bonds at 10-11-12% per annum. The difference in interest rates is the profit of foreign speculators.

Now imagine that all this foreign money at the same time, or almost simultaneously, will burst into one small, narrow door called the Russian foreign exchange market. At the current exchange rate, 1.8 trillion rubles is 30.5 billion dollars. It would seem not very much. However, our Central Bank does not have even such small money. They were no longer there in November 2014 (see the article “The Central Bank actually has no gold and foreign exchange reserves to support the ruble”). They don't exist now. After all, despite the fact that since the first half of 2015, the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves have been gradually growing (see the chart “Gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Federation”), they still have not reached the level of November 2014.

In 2014, in just three months, from September to December, the dollar almost doubled in price - from 38 rubles per dollar on September 18 to 68 rubles per dollar on December 18. And this is the official rate of the Central Bank. On the stock exchange in December, the dollar was worth 80 rubles at its peak.

Now, when foreign speculators rush to comply with the sanctions prohibiting them from owning Russian government bonds, the dollar exchange rate may well also double. A little more or a little less – it doesn’t matter. At its lowest this year, it was close to 55 rubles per dollar. Multiply by two and get 110 rubles per dollar. Fork – from 100 to 120. These numbers are surprisingly reminiscent of Stepan Demura’s forecast – 97, 125 (see the article “About the dollar exchange rate, the RGBI index, fear and greed, oil and the budget, gold, euro-dollar parity, Trump, market dynamics and news background, default"). The lower limit of the range is also indicated by the estimated dollar exchange rate, obtained by dividing the money supply by gold and foreign exchange reserves. Currently it is at the level of 97 (see chart “Calculated dollar rate”).

"Coincidence? I don’t think so" (c)

The World Bank announced that restrictive measures against Russia will be lifted in 2018. The lifting of sanctions in 2017 is allowed only in one of the scenarios. A decrease in inflation in Russia, according to the World Bank, is expected only in a year

The World Bank (WB) predicts the lifting of sanctions against Russia in 2018, TASS reports. The World Bank assumes that economic sanctions against Russia will remain in effect until 2018. Only in one of the scenarios—the so-called basic alternative—it is assumed that economic sanctions will be lifted in 2017. Such estimates are contained in the World Bank report on the Russian economy.

In addition, according to the World Bank, average inflation in the Russian Federation in 2016 will be 7.6%, in 2017 - 4.8%. The Bank of Russia may lower the key rate no earlier than the second half of 2016. Russian banks will be vulnerable until the end of 2017, despite recapitalization and regulatory easing.

Igor Lomakin discussed the World Bank forecast with Chief Economist of PF "Capital" Evgeniy Nadorshin:

Just in December, the World Bank predicts a decline in the Russian economy by 0.7%. Very little time passes, and the figure changes dramatically. What happened?

Evgeniy Nadorshin: I think this is not news. Over the past few months, we have regularly seen this not only from international institutions, which are very inert in assessing the adequate current reality, but also from other analysts. That is, it really came as a surprise to many that 2016 will be, if not as bad as 2015, then comparable to it. Therefore, yes, that is, back in December last year the World Bank had certain illusions, in fact, the Central Bank also had a more optimistic forecast at first. In this sense, there was no big difference between them, in terms of the direction of the revision, it’s just that the Central Bank published its figures a little earlier, the World Bank a little later, but the essence is the same: there were more optimistic expectations for 2016. Actually, the very beginning of 2016 very clearly showed that there was no chance of their implementation, not even close, so we had to shift the degree of optimism in 2017 and 2018, which is what happened, and in 2016 we had to state an unpleasant fact. Unfortunately, a rather deep recession is indeed continuing in Russia, and, apparently, it may continue for most of this 2016, in which we live. This, in fact, is an obvious fact, already confirmed by two months of data. Data from the third month are starting to arrive, which have not yet changed in any way for the better, and in some places even indicate deterioration, such as sentiment in industry, which quite clearly makes the current World Bank forecast now quite adequate to reality.

We have been living under sanctions for two years now, and the World Bank, in its base scenario, names the year the sanctions will be lifted as 2018. There was time to estimate how much these sanctions still negatively affect our economy. What can you say about 2018? If the restrictive measures are lifted, will it really suddenly go away and we will feel better?

Evgeniy Nadorshin: No. The fact is that sanctions primarily limited capital inflows into Russia, primarily the inflows of borrowed capital that companies used for their development. If companies do not have development plans, as they do now, the vast majority of large companies have something on paper, but in fact, most of them do not implement anything. Those who are frank write about it directly, those who are not very frank, they draw it on paper, in fact they do nothing special, and there are no more frank ones among the number of state-owned companies, this is also, in general, not news, those who follow for news, they can quite calmly compare. The bottom line is this: there is nothing to take money for. If you don't have development plans, why do you need money? Because many large players feel quite stable financially. They won’t particularly feel the need to re-borrow when financial markets open in a year. That is, someone will re-borrow, it will become easier for someone, but there will be nothing to let go and shoot from. The fact is that the Russian economy suffers from completely different problems than from the inaccessibility of foreign financing now. In 2015 this was still a problem, in 2014 in some places it was very acute, and sharply so, in 2016 - that’s it, for us it is, if you like, this expression has become fashionable, a new reality. The new reality is that, in principle, we have enough of our own resources, we just don’t know where to use them, we don’t see any prospects for investing in our own economy - this is how you can describe the business strategy of a very large number of Russian businesses on average. Therefore, we have an outflow of capital and falling investment in Russia, and this has nothing to do with the need to pay off external debt or the inability to attract a new one.

In its turn, economist for Russia and the CIS at the investment company Renaissance Capital Oleg Kuzmin considers the inflation forecast of less than 6% optimistic: “In general, based on the results of the whole year, of course, it is very difficult to expect positive growth rates at current oil prices. However, we can expect some signs of a revival in economic activity later in the year. They will not help us significantly improve our performance for the whole year, but at least then we will be able to see some economic recovery, recovery growth already in 2017. At the beginning of the year, inflation fell more markedly than would have been expected a few months ago. We believe that our current forecast that inflation will be 7.7% by the end of the year is already becoming very pessimistic, and we believe that inflation may fall below 7% by the end of this year. But figures of less than 6%, in our opinion, still look somewhat optimistic. In 2017, we can expect a further decline in inflation, perhaps closer to the level of 5%, but the Bank of Russia’s goal is 4%, and it is not yet particularly clear how it can be achieved in the next one and a half to two years.”

MOSCOW, December 4 – RIA Novosti. The introduction of US sanctions against Russian government debt, according to the most pessimistic estimates of analysts, could collapse the national currency to 69 rubles per dollar before the presidential elections, but such a devaluation as in 2014 will not occur.

US President Donald Trump in August signed a law expanding a number of sectoral sanctions against the Russian economy. The document assumes that within six months (180 days) after its adoption, the US Congress will meet to discuss the possibility of expanding restrictive measures on Russia’s national debt.

The Central Bank will effectively respond to such a “challenge” and stop its impact on the country’s currency and debt markets, according to analysts interviewed by RIA Novosti.

“The Bank of Russia has repeatedly stated that it is preparing for such a development of events. In this case, all other things being equal, the dollar exchange rate may add about 2-3 rubles, after which the Russian currency will begin to recover,” believes Bogdan Zvarich from Freedom Finance Investment Company ".

The current official exchange rate of the Bank of Russia ruble against the US currency is 58.52 per dollar.

Two options

According to experts, two options for sanctions regarding government debt are possible. “The first is a ban on the ownership of all Russian government debt, both traded and new, and this is the most stringent option. The second option is a ban on the purchase of new issues of government debt,” notes Vladimir Tikhomirov from BCS Global Markets.

The likelihood of the first scenario is small, primarily because such sanctions will also punish American investors, who will have to sell Russian securities at a loss, he points out.

In the first case, the deadline for fulfilling the requirements of the sanctions will also be important, says Andrey Manko from RIA Rating. “The worst option is a period of several weeks from the date the decision comes into force; a soft option would be a period of, for example, 12 months,” Manko believes.

Currently, the volume of OFZ (federal loan bonds) in the hands of foreign investors is about 30%, but if you look only at liquid securities, it can reach 45%, Zvarich estimated.

“A ban on the purchase of new issues of government securities is the most likely scenario, but in this case the effect on the market and the ruble will be very small - primarily because Russia can do without new issues of bonds, especially if oil prices remain close to today’s high levels ", Tikhomirov added.

There will be no special warming up of the market

If the US authorities prohibit American investors from buying Russian government bonds, other foreign investors may follow them so as not to have problems when working in the US, economists believe.

In addition, some experts fear that in order to further destabilize the ruble, the United States, through friendly banking structures, will try to increase the share of foreigners holding Russia’s debt, so that later, before the presidential elections in Russia, sales will be on a larger scale. However, other analysts do not see the point in such actions.

It is unlikely that before the possible introduction of restrictions on transactions with OFZs, there will be an order to further increase the portfolio for greater effect, since this could bring noticeable losses to investors, Manko believes.

An increase in the value of Russian bonds with deliberate purchase will stimulate their sale by other investors who will want to take advantage of the opportunity and lock in the accumulated significant profits, Zvarich argues.

“As a result, there will be compensation for demand from banking structures engaged by America, which could be used to then collapse the ruble,” an economist at Freedom Finance draws a diagram.

Prospects for the ruble

However, even without additional steps from the United States, the rapid withdrawal of foreign investors from the OFZ will significantly hit the Russian foreign exchange market, analysts say.

The ruble may react to the rapid exit of foreigners from the OFZ by falling up to 10%, that is, the rate in certain trading sessions may even be at the level of 65-66 rubles per dollar, Manko estimated. However, in the medium term, the rate is likely to return closer to current levels of 60-62 rubles, he added.

The most pessimistic assessment of the forecast for the depreciation of the ruble is given by Alexander Razuvaev from the Alpari company. He expects that the national currency will depreciate by 15% in the event of a sale of OFZ by non-residents - that is, the dollar will break through the level of 69 rubles.

“This, of course, is not the devaluation of December 2014, when the dollar jumped to 80 rubles from 50 rubles, but it’s not the most pleasant story either,” he assessed.

Actions of the Bank of Russia

"The nightmare of Russia." Political scientist on Tillerson's statements on sanctionsThe head of the State Department, Rex Tillerson, demanded that Russia implement the Minsk agreements. Political scientist Alexander Shpunt, speaking on Sputnik radio, noted that completely unfounded claims are being made against the Russian Federation, but without them, others would have appeared.

The Central Bank has a set of tools to stabilize the situation in the financial market, reminds Manko.

“Firstly, it is necessary to maintain the attractiveness of the Russian market for foreigners, so there is no need to rush to lower the key rate so that the yield on ruble government bonds remains high and attractive for purchases,” he said.

Secondly, it is important to prevent a shortage of liquidity in the market - both ruble and foreign currency, so that, if necessary, Russian banks can quickly buy OFZ from foreigners, analysts are unanimous.

Finally, the Bank of Russia can directly or through Sberbank get OFZs on the market - accumulated international reserves of $427 billion allow this to be done, Razuvaev believes.

“However, administrative measures are also possible. It is worth recalling that after the default in August 1998, for several years non-residents were subject to restrictions regarding Russian debt securities and the funds they received as part of the restructuring,” he points out.

“In Russia, there is a very popular point of view that the Ministry of Finance should introduce a moratorium on payments on sovereign debts in favor of countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia. But this, of course, is, first of all, a political decision,” the expert concludes.

In 2012, the United States published a list that in Russia is known as the “Magnitsky list.” Persons involved, according to the United States, in the death of auditor Sergei Magnitsky, were prohibited from entering the United States, and all their possible assets were frozen. The Magnitsky Act became the prototype for further individual sanctions imposed by the US, EU and other countries.

On March 17, 2014, the United States began a new round of sanctions related to the war in Ukraine. The American assets of 11 high-ranking Russian officials were frozen, and the officials themselves were banned from entering the United States. The American list included Putin's assistant Vladislav Surkov, presidential adviser Sergei Glazyev, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko. The EU supported President Obama's decision and published its list of 21 people guilty of “undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.” Among them were Deputy Speaker of the Duma Sergei Zheleznyak, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Alexander Vitko, Commander of the Western Military District Anatoly Sidorov and Commander of the Southern Military District Alexander Galkin. Currently, there are already 146 people under individual EU sanctions.

2. Economic versus enterprise

Initially, these were enterprises affiliated with Vladimir Putin’s “inner circle,” in particular, companies in any way connected with Gennady Timchenko or Arkady and Boris Rotenberg. Over time, restrictions were extended to other businesses. The main blow of economic sanctions fell on enterprises in the defense and raw materials sectors, as well as on Russian state-owned banks. The restrictions included Rosneft, Gazprom, Transneft, Rostec, Almaz-Antey, Sberbank, Vnesheconombank and other large industry enterprises. Their foreign assets and property were blocked, they were prohibited from supplying certain types of products and providing technologies, for example, for oil exploration and production. Russian state-owned banks have had their access to capital markets and lending severely restricted. There are 37 such legal entities on EU sanctions lists.

3. Individual and economic against Crimea

Separate sanctions affected Crimea: officials and politicians, as expected, were included in the sanctions lists, and the peninsula was deprived of new investments. In addition, a number of countries have banned the supply of certain products and services to Crimea, the VISA and MasterCard payment systems have stopped servicing Crimean banks, and cruise ships have stopped calling at Crimean ports.

In addition to the USA and the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Montenegro, Japan, Iceland, Norway, Australia, Albania and Ukraine joined the sanctions.

When can sanctions be lifted?

Official dates: The EU extended individual sanctions until September 15, 2016, economic sanctions until July 31, 2016. All American sanctions will remain in effect for another year, until March 6, 2017. Expert opinions do not agree on the forecast of the actual timing of the lifting of sanctions. The lifting of restrictions is associated with the implementation of the Minsk agreements, and with further confrontation between the United States and Russia, and with the Russian political regime. According to the most optimistic scenario, if the conditions of Minsk-2 are met, the lifting of sanctions can be expected this year.

Igor Yurgens, President of the Institute of Contemporary Development:

The lifting of sanctions depends on too many circumstances. We still cannot come to an understanding on a number of issues in the implementation of Minsk-2. As far as I am informed, the European side is not ready to expand the interpretation of the reasons for imposing sanctions and still stands on a narrow definition: “Minsk-2” is completed - sanctions are lifted. But, of course, the very interpretation of Minsk-2 differs among Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels. Moscow considers compliance with the terms of the agreement to be a ceasefire, the start of negotiations and the holding of elections in Donetsk and Lugansk according to the scenario and mechanism agreed upon between them and Ukraine. The EU believes that “Minsk-2” means the return of the above-mentioned territories under the control of Ukraine and the protection of their borders by Ukrainian troops, and only after that will it be possible to consider the issue of elections and regionalization. Apparently, the Rada now simply cannot accept a package of documents on the regionalization of Lugansk and Donetsk and providing these regions with greater rights and freedoms. It seems impossible to place hope that Poroshenko and Putin or Poroshenko and other members of the Minsk Four will somehow come to an agreement, because there are political forces that are not controlled either by Poroshenko or even by their American or German colleagues. This is what the whole story comes down to. When the regionalization of these areas occurs, as we see it, there will be a final withdrawal of Russian advisers and those people whose presence there we deny, but they are there.

A year ago, our presence was obvious, military operations were underway, so sanctions could not be lifted in any way. Now at least there are no active hostilities, there are only violations of the fire regime, which makes it possible to talk about lifting sanctions. If we agree, if at least some elections are held that suit the international community, Kiev and the separatists, then in June we could expect the EU to lift economic sanctions, and in September individual, technological and other ones.

But this process is very difficult. Russia is making some efforts, the appointment of Boris Gryzlov is absolutely clear evidence of this, but it is very difficult to predict whether all of the above will be realized or not.

Andrey Klimov, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs:

I think that the sanctions may be lifted after some time, but then they will come up with others. Our country has been under some kind of sanctions throughout its history. And there is no need to hope that the sanctions will be lifted and heaven on earth will come. We need to work in the current situation. It is certain that Europe is tired of sanctions. In the East, these sanctions are also a hindrance for many, and in America now, amid the presidential elections, there is no time for sanctions. But no one is going to allow Russia to become a world power without a fight, this should be understood. If there were no Crimea, they would have come up with something else.

For now, EU leaders are afraid and look to Washington. But the readiness to lift sanctions is already very high; as soon as internal issues escalate, as soon as the pressure on the leadership from the electorate and business reaches a critical mass, the sanctions will be lifted immediately, all they need is a reason. At the same time, one should not expect sanctions to be lifted due to a change of president in the United States. The main desire of the United States in relation to Russia is to slow down. And the members of the European Parliament who announced sanctions against Vladimir Putin wanted only one thing - to remind of their existence. No one will apply any sanctions against the current president of a world power.

Nikolay Mironov, head of the Center for Economic and Political Reforms:

A complete lifting of anti-Russian sanctions is unlikely to happen under the current political regime. There is no way out of the political impasses he created (for example, the Crimean-Ukrainian one), and if the country’s leadership makes concessions, this will mean a complete political fiasco for it. And without these concessions, the West will not agree to the lifting of sanctions. Apparently, the situation will still have to be resolved for more than one year and even more than one decade.

What will happen when the sanctions are lifted?

Boris Shmelev, head of the Center for Russian Foreign Policy at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences:

If sanctions are lifted, Russia will have access to cheap money in Europe and will be able to obtain the necessary loans for the development of enterprises and loans for investment projects, since investments in the country's economy are sharply declining. And from this point of view, lifting sanctions would have a positive impact on the country's economy. I think that the lifting of sanctions would somewhat—I emphasize, somewhat—strengthen the ruble. Of course, there will be no return to the previous exchange rate; a dollar for 30 rubles is already history. But I think that it would have strengthened by 3, and maybe even 4 rubles.

On the other hand, we must not forget that Russia would also have to take a step forward and lift anti-sanctions and abandon bans on the supply of agricultural products to Russia. This will hurt agricultural producers, farmers, and agricultural holdings. The lifting of sanctions will have a painful impact on the Russian light industry, food and clothing.

The overall balance of pros and cons for Russia in the event of the lifting of sanctions would, of course, be positive, but it should still be taken into account that many sectors of the economy would be seriously affected. In order to keep these industries afloat and not allow them to go bankrupt, the state will have to take control. With the lifting of sanctions, a flow of cheap products that we have always received from Europe will pour into Russia, and comfortable conditions for our producers will disappear. Now Russia is pursuing a policy of protectionism and protecting its producers from foreign competitors. If the state continues such support after the lifting of sanctions, this will raise objections from the WTO. Now support for the manufacturer comes at the expense of the consumer, at the expense of you and me, because we pay the higher cost of domestic goods, and when sanctions are lifted, these costs will have to be compensated by the state, this money will have to be obtained from somewhere. And maybe this money will have to be taken from the West in the form of loans. But in general, there would, of course, be more advantages than disadvantages.

Co-chairman of the board of directors of the Third Rome group, director of the Economic Policy programs of the Carnegie Moscow Center:

I don't think anything will seriously change. There will not be and could not be an excess influx of money, a change in the exchange rate is also unlikely to happen, it depends on oil, and the cost of oil does not depend in any way on sanctions. As for the agricultural sector, we do not have such a dramatic development of the agricultural sector that it could be hindered by the lifting of sanctions. Rather, if anti-sanctions are lifted, food prices will decrease. This will be an unpleasant, but not fatal, surprise for our farmers, who are already accustomed to producing poorly and expensively. Sales volumes are also unlikely to change much, especially since people’s purchasing power is still low due to falling incomes. In such a situation, any price restrictions or curbs on inflation will cause an increase in demand, which means that there will be a place for both imported and domestic products.

Most likely, we are unlikely to seriously notice any changes from the lifting of sanctions.