Interbudgetary relations

methodological aspect

assessing the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers

D. Yu. Zavyalov,

Candidate of Legal Sciences, Deputy Chairman - Head of the Department of Interbudgetary Relations of the Committee on Budgetary and Financial Policy and Treasury

Administration of the Volgograd region

Interbudgetary transfers constitute a significant amount of expenditures of state budgets of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation: federal and regional levels. Thus, at the end of 2007, the share of interbudgetary transfers in federal budget expenditures was about 32%, in regional budgets - about 26% of budget expenditures; such high figures were also observed in 2004, 2005 and 2006. 1

Providing lower levels of the budget system with ample opportunities to independently exercise their own spending powers (issues of local importance) allows us to consider interbudgetary transfers as one of the main directions for increasing the efficiency of using budget funds. To solve this problem, appropriate tools are needed: a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the calculation and provision of interbudgetary transfers and a special methodology for assessing this form of budget expenditures.

The need to develop a special methodology for assessing the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers is evidenced by the significant differences between interbudgetary transfers and other forms of spending budget funds, differences both in economic and legal terms.

In economic terms, the provision of interbudgetary transfers is not an expenditure

1 Calculations were made according to data posted on the official website of the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation www. roskazna. ru.

We eat in the traditional sense, i.e. it is not a final waste of money. Providing an interbudgetary transfer from the federal budget to the budget of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation and further downward does not lead to a decrease in the volume of centralized finances, which occurs as a result of financing through other forms of spending budget funds (in settlements with suppliers of goods and services for state and municipal needs or the provision of social benefits certain categories of citizens).

In legal terms, the peculiarity of interbudgetary transfers is manifested in the way they are regulated. Thus, the provision of interbudgetary transfers is regulated by public law norms, while the implementation of other forms of budget expenditures is regulated by civil law norms.

The features of interbudgetary transfers are so significant that they lead to the use of special methods for their planning, financing, and efficiency assessment.

Little attention is unfairly paid to assessing the effectiveness of intergovernmental transfers. If performance becomes the subject of attention quite often, as evidenced by the speeches of the country's top officials, the requirements imposed by the Federation on programs for reforming regional and municipal finances, normative legal acts, regulations,

that provide subsidies to the budgets of public legal entities, the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers is not considered or not considered at all - the effectiveness of budget expenditures is identified with the effectiveness of their provision. In part, this identification is directly facilitated by the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, which, in our opinion, is not justified.

so, in accordance with Art. 34 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by Federal Law No. 64-FZ of April 26, 2007), the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of budgetary funds is understood as the expenditure of budgetary funds that meets one of the following conditions: achieving specified results using the least amount of funds or achieving the best result with using the amount of funds determined by the budget. It follows from this that the concepts of “effectiveness” and “efficiency” are not distinguished by the Budget Code of the Russian Federation. on the one hand, this is justified, for example, social effect and social result are almost identical concepts. At the same time, efficiency, unlike effectiveness, involves taking into account the costs incurred to achieve the result.

The Budget Code of the Russian Federation for interbudgetary transfers nevertheless describes certain results, the achievement of which should be aimed at providing one or another form of interbudgetary transfer. Provision in accordance with Art. 131, 137, 138 and 142.1. The Bank of the Russian Federation of subsidies from financial support funds assumes the achievement of such a result as financial support for the own spending powers of the budgets of public legal entities of subsidy recipients. The name of the subsidy - “to equalize budgetary security” or “to equalize the level of budgetary security” characterizes more the method of calculating the subsidy than the social or economic result. At the same time, unfortunately, the federal legislator provides the opportunity to freely interpret that there is an equalization of budgetary security or the level of budgetary security. It should be noted that within the framework of the Federal Law of October 6, 2003 No. 131-FZ “On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation,” equalization of the level of budgetary security was understood as equalization of the financial capabilities of local governments to resolve issues of local importance. After further amendments were made, this provision was removed from the text of the law. based on the definition

tions of the level of budgetary security (budgetary security) given in Art. 131, 138 and 142.1 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, equalizing the level of budgetary security is equalizing per capita income taking into account objective factors that determine differences in the cost of budget services, but this is a description of the technology for calculating subsidies, rather than the socio-economic effect (result).

A similar situation arises with respect to other subsidies, for example, subsidies to ensure budget balance. If ensuring budget balance (again, what should be understood by achieving balance - achieving a balance of income and expenditure obligations?) is the socio-economic effect (result) of providing this subsidy, then does this mean that the subsidy is not aimed at equalizing the level of budget security? to achieve a balance in the budget of public legal education.

the social effect (result) of providing a subsidy is supposed, but is still replaced by a description of the procedures (methodology) for calculating subsidies.

Another form of interbudgetary transfers is a subsidy provided for in Art. 132, 139, 142.2, 142.3 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, is aimed at co-financing the own expenditure obligations of public legal entities - recipients of subsidies, as well as equalizing the provision of public legal entities in order to implement their own expenditure obligations. In the first case, again, a technical goal is indicated - the participation of public law education in financing the costs of public law education at a different level. In the second case, the purpose of the subsidy is similar to the purpose of grants. There is no description of the social effect (result) in both cases.

subventions are a form of interbudgetary transfers provided for in Art. 133 and 140 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, provided for financial support of expenditure obligations transferred to a public legal entity, but in this case, the purpose of their provision is reduced to a technical component, the social and economic result is not defined.

The Budget Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 132.1, 139.1 and 142.4) provides for the possibility of providing “other” interbudgetary transfers, the socio-economic effect (result) of the provision of which is not determined at all. interbudgetary transfers also include the provision of

finance and credit

budget loans to the budgets of public legal entities, the purpose of which must be determined by the lender independently, which also does not allow us to formulate, based on the norms of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, the socio-economic effect of providing this form of interbudgetary transfer.

Thus, the existing norms of the current budget legislation are not enough to determine the economic and (or) social effect (result) of calculating and providing interbudgetary transfers.

In our opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between the provision of an interbudgetary transfer and the expenditure of funds received in the form of interbudgetary transfers. If the expenditure of funds received by the budget of a public legal education of a lower level from the budget of a higher level is linked to the provision of a final state or municipal service, then the provision of an interbudgetary transfer in itself is not the provision of a budget service or a social payment. The provision of a budget transfer cannot be considered as the provision of a final budget service, and therefore the result at which the provision of an interbudgetary transfer is aimed is difficult to formulate.

A paradoxical situation is emerging - up to one third of state budget expenditures (what is interbudgetary transfers in the federal and on average in regional budgets) do not have a clearly formulated result (effect) towards which they should be oriented. At the same time, the intended purpose of an interbudgetary transfer is an indication for its further use by the recipient budget and cannot be considered as a socio-economic result or effect.

However, despite the fact that the provision of an interbudgetary transfer is not the provision of a final budget service, assessment of its effectiveness (effectiveness) is still possible. Moreover, methods for assessing the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers should differ depending on the form of its provision.

We will systematize the existing forms of interbudgetary transfers based on their qualifying characteristics.

Interbudgetary transfers can be divided into two groups: the first - gratuitous and non-repayable (subsidies, subventions and subsidies),

the second - provided on the terms of repayment and payment (budget loans to the budgets of public legal entities).

The qualifying features of the subsidy are as follows:

They have no intended use;

The opposite of subsidies are subventions,

the qualifying features of which can be formulated as follows:

Have a specific purpose for further use;

Used by the recipient to perform the powers delegated to him.

Currently, the Budget Code of the Russian Federation does not provide for the possibility of providing subventions from the budget of a municipal district to the budget of a settlement, and vice versa. However, the existence of subventions is directly provided for in Federal Law No. 131-F3, which is a way of financially ensuring transferred powers to resolve issues of local importance. In accordance with Art. 142 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, financial support for transferred powers to resolve issues of local importance is provided through such a form as “other interbudgetary transfers”, which in its economic and legal nature corresponds to a subvention.

a subsidy as a form of interbudgetary transfer combines the features of both subsidies and subventions:

Provided both from a higher budget level to a lower budget, and vice versa;

Have a intended purpose of use;

Used by the recipient to fulfill his own spending powers.

As one of the features of subsidies, one can single out such a property as “co-financing” of the recipient’s budget expenses by another level of the budget system. However, in our opinion, this feature is optional. Thus, the provision of not all subsidies is associated with the allocation of funds from the recipient’s budget for similar expenses. for example, transfer of “negative transfer” - subsidies

from the budget of a municipal entity to the budget of a subject of the Russian Federation provides for the subsequent distribution of a “negative transfer” through the corresponding regional fund for financial support of the subject or a compensation fund. At the same time, the formation of a financial support fund from the region’s own funds is not at all mandatory. Providing subsidies to the budget can also be considered as “co-financing” by a higher level of the budget system of the recipient budget’s own expenditure obligations, but without indicating a specific expenditure obligation. The listed circumstances allow us to conclude that the attribute “co-financing” is optional.

“Other” forms of interbudgetary transfers, depending on the composition of participants and the conditions for their calculation and provision, can, by their economic essence, be classified as grants, subventions or subsidies. “Other interbudgetary transfers” should be considered not as a form, but as a way of reflecting an interbudgetary transfer in the report.

Compensatory and repayable interbudgetary transfers - budget loans have the following characteristics:

Provided from a higher level to a lower budget level;

May or may not have a intended purpose;

Used by the recipient to fulfill his own spending powers.

Of all the forms of gratuitous and irrevocable transfers, budget loans to the budgets of public legal entities have more in common with subsidies.

Based on the analysis of the listed qualifying criteria, for each form of interbudgetary transfer it is possible to formulate a list of socio-economic effects (results) that the interbudgetary transfer is aimed at achieving.

Socio-economic effects (results), in turn, can be analyzed both for effectiveness - whether the desired is achieved or not, and for efficiency - whether the costs of achieving the desired are justified. Interbudgetary transfers are one of the forms of budget expenditures, and if efficiency, i.e. the ratio of results to costs, is low, then, perhaps, in terms of priority, the provision of this interbudgetary transfer will be inferior to another form of interbudgetary transfers or even to another form of budgetary transfers.

expenses of public legal education providing interbudgetary transfer.

For subsidies, in our opinion, the socio-economic effect (result) is the onset of the following consequences:

Providing public authorities (local self-government bodies) with the opportunity to provide residents with additional budgetary services or budgetary services of higher quality, the priority of which is the highest in the relevant public legal entity;

Stimulating state authorities and local governments to make decisions aimed at mobilizing the territory’s own revenue potential and increasing the efficiency of using budget funds. The calculation and provision of subsidies will be effective only if, as a result, the level of consumer satisfaction as a whole increases from the complex of budget services provided to him: It is not significant whether this was achieved through the provision of subsidies or the actions of state authorities and local governments to mobilize additional own income, finding additional funds by optimizing your own expenses.

The calculation and provision of subsidies should be considered effective when consumer satisfaction with the totality of budget services increases at a faster rate than the growth of the costs of the higher-level budget for the provision of subsidies to the lower level of the budget system. This rule applies to all types of subsidies, regardless of the methods of their distribution.

The socio-economic effects that subsidies should be aimed at achieving can be formulated as follows:

Providing government bodies (local self-government bodies) with the opportunity to provide residents of the relevant public legal entities with certain additional budget services most in demand by residents or, again, improve the quality and volume of the most in-demand budget services;

Encourage public authorities (local governments) to provide certain budget services.

finance and credit

Unlike grants, the effectiveness of subsidies can be measured against each or all three indicators:

Increase in budget expenditures of the recipient of subsidies for the provision of subsidized services assigned to his own powers;

Increasing the volume of subsidized budget services provided to the population;

Increasing the level of satisfaction of recipients from the consumption of subsidized budget services.

The effectiveness of a subsidy, like a subsidy, can be determined by the ratio of the change in results to the change in the costs of providing the subsidy. Thus, measuring the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers can be carried out through such an indicator as the elasticity of interbudgetary transfers.

Grants and subsidies have a common qualifying feature - the provision of funds to the recipient budget for the execution of its own spending powers; accordingly, the socio-economic effect for grants and subsidies should be uniform. But, since subsidies and subsidies differ in the target component, accordingly, there is a difference in socio-economic effects. Please note that the vector of movement of the interbudgetary transfer (from a higher budget to a lower budget or vice versa) does not affect the characteristics of socio-economic effects.

The provision of subventions, in contrast to grants and subsidies, is aimed at achieving one single socio-economic effect - to encourage state authorities and local governments of a public legal entity - the recipient of the subvention to ensure the most economical provision of budget services or even a reduction in social payments, if the delegated authority consists of providing social support measures. Moreover, the economical provision of budget services can be achieved both by reducing the cost of budget services (due to optimization of management and reducing unnecessary expenses) and by reducing the quality of provision of budget services to an acceptable level. For example, the priority of the same budget service in public legal entities may well be different. Due to this

in regions or municipalities where the budget service provided within the framework of the delegated authority is a lower priority, then the costs of its provision, all other things being equal, will be less. As for the provision of social support measures to certain categories of citizens, the delegation of this authority to a lower level is justified if, as a result of delegation, the number of payments is reduced or, at least, the growth of their number is restrained.

Such calculation and provision of a subvention should be recognized as effective, as a result of which the subject to whom the authority is delegated is able to fulfill it. The provision of a subvention will be effective if, as a result of the delegation of authority, the costs of the country's budget system for its implementation are reduced, but at the same time there is no decrease in the level of satisfaction of the consumer of budget services, otherwise we can talk about the ineffectiveness of the subvention.

Budget loans as a form of interbudgetary transfers do not generate socio-economic effects other than the above effects. A budget loan has the characteristics of grants and subsidies, and accordingly the effects are similar.

Consumer satisfaction can be measured both by conducting sociological surveys, research, and by analyzing statistical and network indicators, which has recently been reflected in the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, regulatory legal acts of the regions on assessing the effectiveness of the work of governing bodies of lower levels of the budget system.

One of the controversial issues is the choice of the most optimal (or effective) interbudgetary transfer, encouraging territories to increase the efficiency of their own budget expenditures. Grants and subsidies are considered as alternatives, and preference is given to the latter form, since it is subsidies that make it possible to ensure the targeted use of budget funds and the introduction of results-oriented budgeting elements.

Recognizing the validity of this position, we would like to draw attention to a number of factors that force us to be cautious about the current trend of increasing subsidy financing and the prospects

increasing the share of subsidies, including by reducing subsidies.

Firstly, providing subsidies to finance targeted expenses can lead to a reduction in the subsidy recipient’s own expenses to finance subsidized expenses (cost substitution effect) 2.

Secondly, the desire of a region (municipality) to attract additional funds in the form of subsidies on the basis of co-financing requires the mobilization of additional resources both by increasing its own income and by optimizing its own expenses, however, the mobilization of funds for co-financing can also be achieved through non-fulfillment or improper execution of one’s own spending powers - in this case, the positive socio-economic effect will be reduced to zero.

Thirdly, if an increase in the share of subsidies is ensured by reducing the share of subsidies, then this process can be characterized as hidden budgetary financing, and as a consequence - a decrease in the independence of public legal entities, which, in turn, reduces the potential effect of providing any interbudgetary transfers.

In general, in our opinion, we should assume that the elasticity of the subsidy, other things being equal, tends to zero faster than the elasticity of the subsidy. Conventionally, the relationship between the dynamics of the elasticity of subsidies and subsidies can be represented in the following graph:

This hypothesis is based, first of all, on the manifestation of the substitution effect as a result of the provision of a subsidy, which cannot happen when providing subsidies. It is also necessary to take into account that subsidies are much less mobile than subsidies. Let us explain that it is a priori assumed that a subject of the Russian Federation and (or) a municipal entity participates in receiving a subsidy on co-financing terms if the subsidy is aimed at financing priority expenses for which its own funds are insufficient, but a different situation may arise. For example, after receiving several tranches of subsidies, a certain level of consumer satisfaction with subsidized budget services is achieved, and other expenses take on greater priority, but it is impossible to redirect the remainder of the subsidies to other expenses.

The circumstances listed above cannot be ignored, and therefore increasing the role of subsidized financing is justified subject to the role of subsidized financing. Otherwise, the effectiveness of providing subsidies is very limited.

Despite the differences in qualifying criteria and socio-economic effects, a common characteristic can be identified for all forms of interbudgetary transfers - this is a way of managing public finances as an instrument of public administration. All forms of interbudgetary transfers are characterized by encouraging government bodies (local self-government) to make decisions to change the existing practice of managing their own budgets. Therefore, the criterion for the validity of the calculation and distribution of interbudgetary transfers, in our opinion, is not the satisfaction of a certain level of the territories’ need for funds, but the provision of management of the territories. effectiveness is a change in budget policy at the local level, efficiency is the degree to which changes in budget policy at a lower level of the budget system are achieved based on the allocated volumes of interbudgetary transfers.

Assessing the effectiveness of interbudgetary transfers opens up new opportunities for improving the efficiency of public finance management, and state and municipal government in general.

literature

1. Budget Code of the Russian Federation.

2. Afanasyev M.P., KrivogovI. Modernization of public finances / ed. State University - Higher School of Economics - 2nd ed. - M.: Publishing house of the State University Higher School of Economics. 2007.

3. Bezhaev O. G. Interbudgetary relations: theory and practice of reform / M.: Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Entrepreneurship - 2001.

4. Dorzhdeev A.V., Zavyalov D.Yu, Ivanova T.A. Local budgets in the Volgograd region / M.: Publishing House Finance, 2007.

5. Interbudgetary regulation and distribution of financial assistance to regions: experience, problems, ways of improvement / ed. L. V. Perekrestova, A. V. Dorzhdeeva. Volgograd: Volgograd Scientific Publishing House - 2007. Guide to the budget of the Volgograd region / Volgograd: Publishing House Publisher, 2007.

6. Regional finance: experience, strategy, prospects / under. ed. A. V. Dorzhdeeva, D. Yu. Zavyalova - M.: Finance Publishing House, 2008.

7. Guidelines for managing public finances at the regional and municipal levels / under general. ed. A. M. Lavrov in 6 volumes - M.: Publishing House LLC Publishing House "Business and Professional Literature", 2007. (Vol. 5).

8. Khristenko V. B. Interbudgetary relations and management of regional finances / M.: Publishing house “Delo” - 2002.

9. Dorzhdeev A.V., Zavyalov D.Yu. Social effects of budget reform: assessment of performance at the local level / Budget (January 2008). pp. 54 - 57.

10. Zavyalov D. Yu. Potential of interbudgetary regulation as an instrument of budgetary policy / Finance. 2008. No. 3.. P. 11 - 14.

11. Sazonov S.P., Zavyalov D.Yu. Interbudgetary regulation at the subregional level and local government reform / Finance. 2005. No. 10.

In conditions of significant differentiation in the level of budgetary provision, characteristic of different regions of the republic, the provision of financial assistance to the regions by the republican budget is a necessary measure. However, the emerging trend of growth in the volume of transfers allocated to equalize budgetary security cannot help create incentives for the development of the economic and tax potential of the regions.

4.1. Analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of the use of republican budget transfers by local executive bodies

Every year, significant funds are allocated from the republican budget in the form of transfers to local budgets and the budgets of the cities of Astana and Almaty (Appendix 8) . Thus, in the structure of the republican budget in 2007, the volume of funds allocated to local budgets in the form of transfers (subventions, targeted current transfers and development transfers) amounted to 33.2%, while the volume of budget withdrawals from local budgets to the republican budget was only 7.3 percent.

Diagram 4. Dynamics of indicators of interbudgetary financial flows,billion tenge

An analysis of the execution of local budgets over the past five years shows that their own incomes increase annually by an average of 20-25%, and the growth rate of transfers allocated from the republican budget - by an average of 50-55 percent.

Own revenues of local budgets for the reporting year amounted to 824.8 billion tenge, transfers in the amount of 494.7 billion tenge were allocated from the republican budget, subventions - 192.8 billion tenge. In 2007, 2/3 of the regions of the republic were subvention-based, with the exception of Aktobe, Atyrau and Mangistau regions, the cities of Almaty and Astana.

Diagram 5. ChangeWith the structure of the revenue side of local budgets since 2003, %

At the same time, the dynamics of changes in planned and actual indicators of the execution of local budget revenues over the past two years indicates an annual overfulfillment of the plan for revenues received by local budgets by 20-25% (by 110 billion tenge in 2006 and 172.6 billion . tenge in 2007). This fact indicates that the regions have certain reserves to increase the revenue base of local budgets, which is confirmed by the results of control activities of the Accounts Committee.

In particular, when carrying out control in the Aktobe region, a discrepancy was found between the data on the number of individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities on the basis of one-time coupons and the data of the Tax Committee for 2005 by 891 people, for 2006 – by 623 people.

There was no categorization of markets located in the region. Market administrations determined market areas arbitrarily; as a result, market technical passports did not reflect their actual size. Rates of one-time fees were established by city and district maslikhats without taking into account the category of markets, their specifics and determination of the area of ​​the trading place.

An inspection at the Aliya market in the city of Aktobe showed that sales were carried out mainly by hired workers, and no employment agreements or documents on the payment of income and social tax by tenants for hired workers were presented.

The Tax Committee of the city of Astana did not reconcile registered and deregistered taxpayers; facts of assigning several TRNs to one taxpayer were allowed. There was no interaction between desk control and audit departments. There were discrepancies in corporate income tax and VAT turnover.

According to the Accounts Committee, the steady trend of increasing transfers allocated to regions contributed to an increase in their share in local budgets from 25% in 2003 to 46% in 2007. In particular, as of January 1, 2008, in the South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl, North Kazakhstan, Kyzylorda, Akmola regions and the city of Astana, the share of transfers in the total volume of their budgets exceeded 60 percent.

At the same time, per 1 person, transfers amounted to 8.3 million tenge in 2003, in 2007 - 44.7 million tenge, or increased by more than 5 times, and own income was correspondingly 23.9 million tenge and 53.6 million tenge, or increased by 2.2 times. By region, as of January 1, 2008, transfers per capita ranged from 20.0 million tenge to 126.0 million tenge, own income - from 25.0 million tenge to 240.0 million tenge. At the same time, in accordance with the Budget Code, transfers of a general nature are allocated in order to equalize the level of budgetary provision of local budgets. However, an analysis of income security shows that there are disparities in the distribution of income per person. Thus, as of January 1, 2008, in the Zhambyl region, total income per person amounted to 52.9 million tenge, including transfers - 36.4 million tenge, own income - 16.6 million tenge, while in the Atyrau region These indicators amounted to 326.8 million tenge, 83.1 million tenge and 243.7 million tenge, respectively.

The above facts indicate that the current inter-budgetary mechanism does not contribute to equalizing the budgetary provision of the regions. The allocation of transfers to regions with high income, on the one hand, aggravates imbalances in budgetary security, and on the other hand, increases the dependence of local budgets on the execution of the republican budget.

In 2007, targeted transfers totaling 494.7 billion tenge were allocated from the republican budget to local budgets, including current transfers of 219.5 billion tenge and development transfers of 275.2 billion tenge. At the same time, targeted transfers were allocated for 76 republican budget programs, which is more than 14 percent of the total number of budget programs.

A structural analysis of targeted current transfers shows that they were mainly allocated to the “Other” functional group, including the payment of wages to civil servants, employees of government institutions who are not civil servants, and employees of state-owned enterprises - 40.8%, as well as groups “Healthcare” (18.4%), “Education” (11.6%), “Agriculture” (10.0%) (Appendix 9) .

Targeted current transfers were allocated under 54 republican budget programs to 12 administrators for a total amount of 219.5 billion tenge, of which 1.9 billion tenge were not used by local executive bodies. In particular, the South Kazakhstan region has not spent 763.1 million tenge, of which for: major repairs of highways of regional and district significance - 353.8 million tenge; implementation of preventive medical examinations of certain categories of citizens - 91.8 million tenge; staffing primary health care organizations with medical personnel - 111.1 million tenge, material and technical equipment of medical healthcare organizations at the local level - 130.2 million tenge. At the same time, a comparative analysis of network indicators for healthcare in the South Kazakhstan region for 2007 and 2006 showed that, despite an increase of 3,870 thousand in the number of medical visits by residents of this region, there was a decrease in beds by 540 units and the number of patients treated by 71. 9 thousand people.

From the republican budget in 2007, there were 13 administrators for 22 budget programs in order to implement strategic objectives to provide regions with social facilities, improve housing and communal conditions, strengthen agriculture, water management, environmental protection, improve transport infrastructure, as well as implement cluster initiatives in 275.2 billion tenge were allocated in the form of transfers for development, of which 10.5 billion tenge were not spent by administrators of local budget programs.

By East Kazakhstan region 3.5 billion tenge have not been spent, including 271.9 million tenge out of 692.3 million tenge allocated for the construction of a regional hospital with 75 beds with a clinic for 100 visits in the village of Aksuat, 126.2 million tenge of 259.7 million tenge - for the construction of a tuberculosis hospital with 50 beds in the village of Akzhar, Tarbagatai district. Due to the lack of design and estimate documentation for individual facilities and failed public procurement competitions, funds intended for the modernization of the existing capacities of boiler houses and thermal power plants, the reconstruction of heating networks in the city of Semipalatinsk in the amount of 614.4 million tenge, as well as the construction of a new thermal power plant-3 have not been used the city of Semipalatinsk - in the amount of 1.9 billion tenge.

By Kyzylorda region 2.2 billion tenge have not been spent, of which, due to the lack of design estimates and untimely holding of public procurement competitions, the funds allocated for the construction of 6 secondary schools (each for 1,200 places) for a total amount of 1.7 billion tenge have not been spent; behind schedule, the funds allocated for the construction of the Zhanakorgan central district hospital for 190 beds in the amount of 74.4 million tenge, anti-tuberculosis hospitals for 100 beds in the city of Aralsk - for 191.4 million tenge and for 100 beds in the Kazalinsky district - have not been spent. by 44.7 million tenge.

By Akmola region 1.3 billion tenge have not been spent, of which construction and installation work on the construction of a secondary school for 1200 places in the village of Shortandy in the amount of 416.9 million tenge has not been completed, a secondary school for 1200 places in the city of Kokshetau - for 291.2 million tenge; due to the insolvency of contractors, contracts for the construction of a secondary school for 520 places in the city of Yesil for the amount of 260.5 million tenge and a maternity hospital building in the city of Kokshetau for 120.0 million tenge were terminated.

By South Kazakhstan region 1.0 billion tenge have not been disbursed, of which, due to the lack of funds in the cash control account of the city of Shymkent, 0.6 billion tenge have not been disbursed for the construction of a secondary school for 550 places in the Azat microdistrict and for the development and arrangement of engineering and communication infrastructure cities.

A detailed analysis of the reasons for the failure to utilize allocated transfers for development showed that serious shortcomings are allowed at all stages of the implementation of relevant projects: from planning to the use of budget funds.

Targeted transfers for development from the republican budget were allocated mainly for the development of transport infrastructure, strengthening the heat and power system, housing and communal services, including the development and arrangement of engineering and communications infrastructure, water supply systems, improvement of cities and settlements ( see Diagram 6).

Diagram 6.

Vladimir Evgenievich YUDIN, Minister of Finance of the Tula Region: The topic of efficiency assessment can be considered in relation to all areas of spending budget funds, including the provision of interbudgetary transfers. It is important both at the stage of expenditure planning - for assessing expected results, and at the stage of reporting.

Frequency, parameters, calculations

In the Tula region, interbudgetary transfers account for about a quarter of regional budget expenditures, and the largest share in them is occupied by subventions and subsidies. Since 2011, after changing the budget classification of expenditures, the majority of interbudgetary transfers are distributed among the relevant sectoral sections. In such conditions, it is especially important for the regional Ministry of Finance to have a mechanism for assessing the work of sectoral executive bodies in planning and spending interbudgetary transfers assigned to them. In the Tula region, the development of a methodology for assessing the efficiency of providing interbudgetary transfers was provided for by the long-term regional target program “Increasing the efficiency of budget expenditures in the Tula region for the period until 2013.” The corresponding procedure was developed and approved by Decree of the Government of the Tula Region dated December 19, 2012 No. 728 “On assessing the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers from the budget of the Tula Region to the budgets of municipalities.”

The frequency of the assessment is once a year at the end of the reporting financial year, since a number of resulting indicators are best observed with an annual frequency. In the first quarter of this year, the approved methodology was tested - the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers in 2012 was assessed. It represents a comprehensive assessment of the organization of the provision and results of the provision of all types of interbudgetary transfers from the regional budget, carried out both in relation to the executive authorities of the Tula region, distributing interbudgetary transfers as GRBS, and in relation to each individual type of interbudgetary transfers.

The parameters by which the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers is assessed include:

· efficiency of organizing the provision of interbudgetary transfers to the GRBS;

· the efficiency of organizing the expenditure of received interbudgetary transfers by municipal authorities;

· results of spending interbudgetary transfers.

For each form of interbudgetary transfers, the assessment was carried out taking into account the achievement of the goals of their provision:

· the purpose of subsidies to equalize budgetary security is to smooth out differences between municipalities in budgetary security, including through the provision of subsidies, to stimulate the development of tax potential;

· the purpose of subsidies is to ensure the targeted nature of a comprehensive impact on the solution of specific issues, which can partly be achieved through well-developed procedures for the distribution and provision of subsidies, subject to timely and targeted use of budget funds;

· the purpose of subventions is the high-quality implementation of transferred state powers;

· for other interbudgetary transfers - achieving the goals for which they are provided, with the optimal organization of their distribution.

Based on the results of the assessment, the following were calculated:

· a comprehensive indicator for assessing the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers (every year the value of this indicator will be compared with similar data for previous years, as a result of which it will become clear whether the situation has been improved);

· indicators of the effectiveness of providing each of the forms of interbudgetary transfers (subsidies for equalizing budgetary security, subsidies, subventions, other interbudgetary transfers);

· indicators of the performance of each of the GRBS, through which the distribution of interbudgetary transfers to local budgets is carried out (it includes information on the work of the GRBS with all forms and types of interbudgetary transfers).

Based on the calculated indicators, the following ratings were formed:

We believe that in order to improve the efficiency of the GRBS and local governments, the assessment results should be posted publicly. Then the authorities will be able to independently compare their results with the results of colleagues from other municipalities, thanks to which they will be additionally stimulated to better organize their work and to more correctly plan the resulting indicators. The information collection system itself is organized in such a way that the regional Ministry of Finance constructs GRBS ratings for relevant interbudgetary transfers. In turn, the main managers have the necessary information in order to form ratings of local governments. Now information on the results of assessing the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers is posted on the website of the Ministry of Finance of the Tula Region www.dfto.ru.

Evaluation results

The results of assessing the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers to municipalities in 2012 are shown in rice. 1. The highest efficiency is observed when providing subsidies, and the lowest when providing subventions (which is largely due to difficulties with planning and the still low prevalence of assessing the opinions of service consumers).

As for the activities of the GRBS, the highest ratings were received by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport and Roads, and the Tula Region Committee on Entrepreneurship and the Consumer Market ( rice. 2). The Ministry of Health and Social Development of the region has the lowest ratings. At the same time, it cannot be said that executive authorities that administer the provision of a larger number of types of interbudgetary transfers receive poor results due to large volumes of work and greater workload on staff. For example, through the Ministry of Construction and Housing and Communal Services of the region, 14 different types of interbudgetary transfers are distributed, but according to the ranking results it managed to take second place.

Load minimization

The assessment is carried out by specialists from the regional Ministry of Finance, which is an additional burden. Understanding this, we tried to make the data presented by GRBS as convenient as possible for processing. For this purpose, a number of tables were prepared to be filled out by the main managers, where actual data and necessary explanations would be provided for each of the assessed indicators. We also took care of the format of the summary data in advance, which made it possible, if not to completely eliminate, then at least to minimize the increase in the workload on the ministry’s specialists.

As often happens when introducing something new, after the first assessment we realized that it would be desirable to adjust a number of points in the existing methodology. For example, it turned out that the main managers who receive subsidies and subventions from the federal budget and depend on the timing of the creation of legal regulation and the transfer of funds to the regional budget were not correctly assessed. The same can be said about those GRBS that administered inter-budgetary transfers included in the budget law during the fiscal year. Therefore, the immediate plans include clarifying the provisions of the methodology so that they create more incentives for our executive authorities to increase the efficiency of spending interbudgetary transfers and take into account all the latest trends in the organization of public financial management.

After assessing the effectiveness of providing interbudgetary transfers, the Ministry of Finance of the Tula Region recommended that the State Budgetary Inspectorate pay attention to the accuracy of planning subventions and the timely approval of procedures for the provision and distribution of subsidies between municipalities. In the future, this will have a positive impact on the execution of the region’s consolidated budget.

In the context of the global and Kazakhstani economic crisis, the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan is becoming one of the key structural elements of socio-economic stability and the progressive development of the country in the long term. And the issue of preserving its funds and their effective use is becoming extremely urgent - this was confirmed by the words of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan yesterday (October 19): “I prohibit the use of money from the National Fund for the construction of new facilities, as well as support and subsidies for poorly performing enterprises.”

On October 20, a round table between the analytical group “Cyprus” and the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan was held in Almaty “Efficiency of using funds from the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan: ways to increase» . In Kazakhstan, it is necessary to institutionalize the activities of the National Fund, adopt a separate law “On the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan” and ensure full and transparent control over the use of its funds - this is a proposal based on my research “Targeted transfers from the National Fund of Kazakhstan: short-term concessions to the detriment of long-term development?” voiced Director of the National Bureau of Economic Research, economist Kasymkhan KAPPAROV.

Video recording of the round table:

The creation of the National Fund in Kazakhstan in 2000 followed two main goals - to save (financial resources coming from the raw materials sector) and stabilize (to reduce the dependence of the republican budget on the situation on world raw materials markets). The experience of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund was taken as a basis. The Kazakhstan Fund is also intended to finance development projects aimed at restructuring the economy so as to be less dependent on the raw materials sector.

From 2001 to 2013, total revenues to the National Fund amounted to $142.7 billion, and the amount used was $53.3 billion, or 37.3% of the total revenues. Over 13 years, the Fund's assets grew from an initial $660 million (3% of GDP) to $70 billion (30.5% of GDP). As of January 1, 2015, the assets of the National Fund amounted to $71.75 billion, and as of August - $68.77 billion (according to the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan).

Today, the Fund’s funds are used through three channels: guaranteed transfers, expenses for maintaining the Fund and targeted transfers. The latter, according to domestic economists, are subject to the greatest risk of misuse, since they are sent to solve urgent current problems, and there are no clear criteria for their use.

At the systemic level, the use of Fund funds reduces the long-term effectiveness of the government's economic policy by creating a “habit of breaking the piggy bank” to solve various current issues. The problem is relevant not only for the state, but also for commercial banks and enterprises, which, in turn, can count on government subsidies instead of increasing efficiency. The same applies to the population, who believe that they have the right to rely on state support - at the expense of the Fund - in the event of private crises. Moreover, this has already happened: examples with shareholders or sellers of the burnt pavilion of the Adem Trade House - when there were proposals for compensation for damage from the National Fund - confirm this.

Among the causes of the problem:

• limited executive experience in managing the Fund;
• the policy for the use of funds is still at the formation stage;
• initially unclear conditions for the use of funds in the form of targeted transfers led to the absence of specific criteria for the purposes for which these funds can be allocated;
• the government’s desire to be able to borrow urgently from the Fund in case of crisis situations without the need for approval from parliament and amendments to current legislation.

This leads to important potential risks and negative consequences:

• rapid pace of use of the Fund's resources: by 2020, instead of $180 billion, the Fund's assets are estimated to range from $86 billion to $133 billion (provided that funds are not allocated from the Fund in the form of targeted transfers in 2018-2019);
• directing the Fund's funds to solve problems caused by the low efficiency of the ongoing financial and economic policy. Over the history of the National Fund, two targeted transfers have been allocated: $10 billion in 2009 due to a decline in economic growth caused by lower oil prices and the closure of global capital markets, and $5.5 billion in 2014 due to a sharp increase in imports (caused by entry into the Customs union) and low foreign investment. Then the state failed to address non-performing loans in 2010-2013, despite favorable conditions (high global commodity prices and economic growth);
• the use of the Fund's funds in the long term reduces the effectiveness of the government's economic policy due to the emergence of a permanent financial source for solving various current problems. There is a risk that the government, in the event of a crisis, will assume that it will always be able to use the Fund’s funds;
• increased opportunities for corruption and misuse, as well as inflationary pressure on the economy due to the use of Fund funds.

In his study economist Kasymkhan KAPPAROV offers several solutions to increase the efficiency of using National Fund funds, including in the form of targeted transfers.

First, there is a need for a clearer definition of the purposes for which targeted transfers from the Fund can be allocated.

Secondly, for this norm to be sufficiently effective, it is necessary to enshrine the basic principles of the formation, use and control of the Fund’s activities in a separate Law “On the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan”. This law must include a complete and exhaustive list of purposes for which targeted transfers from the Fund can be allocated. Based on the provisions of this Law, each case of allocation of funds from the Fund in the form of targeted transfers must be adopted in the form of a separate law.

The third solution to improve the quality and transparency of the Fund’s work could be the institutionalization of its activities and the creation of a separate legal entity. At the same time, the practice of a mandatory annual open report and discussion in parliament of the size of the Fund’s revenues, expenditures and investment returns, as well as an annual independent external audit and publication of its results, should be introduced.

Research by Kazakh economist Kasymkhan Kapparov.