Edition: History of Russia: XX century. A guide for applicants to universities

§ 2. Russian economy in 1992–2002.

Reforms of E. T. Gaidar

The economy of post-perestroika Russia and the constitutional structure of the country had to come into line with the new political system, which implied a transition to a market economy, demonopolization and privatization of enterprises, the creation of a class of private entrepreneurs and owners, and strengthening the power of the president. At the V Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation (October 1991), Boris Yeltsin came up with a program of radical economic reforms, providing for the liberalization of prices and wages, freedom of trade and privatization. Given the current difficult economic situation, deputies generally approved the program and even gave the president additional powers to implement it. The economic reform program, developed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian government E. T. Gaidar, provided for the liberalization of prices, and then the privatization of the public sector of the economy. The threefold increase in prices expected in 1992 (in 1991, compared to 1990, prices increased 2.6 times) was planned to be compensated by 70% with social benefits, an increase in wages, pensions, and scholarships. After a year of implementation of the reform, society should have felt the first positive results.

On January 2, 1992, Russia took the first step towards a market economy: pricing was no longer regulated, trade became free. According to E. Gaidar’s plan, this was supposed to return money to the role of a spontaneous regulator of prices and production, and lead to the destruction of the monopoly of intermediaries in the trading network. However, underestimation of the monopolization of production, as well as the government’s self-removal from control over price formation, led to their uncontrollable surge at the beginning of the year. In January 1992, prices increased by 1000–1200%, and by the end of the year they increased no less than 26 times. At the same time, wages increased in 1992 only 12 times. The reform did not provide for the indexation of savings deposits of the population, which led to their immediate depreciation. The government's hopes for large-scale foreign exchange assistance from the West did not materialize either. Under these conditions, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government was unable to fulfill the promised social guarantees when carrying out reforms. The main positive result at the initial stage of reform was the rapid filling of stores with goods, the elimination of product shortages and queues.

In February 1992, the government published a memorandum on economic policy for 1992. The main goal was to stabilize the financial system, create a deficit-free budget by ending subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and industries, and reducing social payments to the population. It was assumed that the stabilization of Russia's finances would lead to an increase in foreign and domestic investment in the Russian economy. The document also noted the advisability of freely setting energy prices and bringing them to world levels by the end of 1993. The release of prices with their stabilization in subsequent months and the saturation of the market created the preconditions for the second stage of reforms - the privatization of the public sector of the economy. The proposed reform program received the support of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin.

The reduction in government subsidies to enterprises in the winter and spring of 1992 (to reduce the level of inflation, according to E. Gaidar’s plan) met with resistance from the directors’ corps. Although industrial products became much more expensive, most enterprises, including the oil and gas industries, turned out to be unprofitable after price liberalization. This was explained both by an increase in tariffs for the transportation of goods and energy, as well as by a drop in consumer demand and a targeted reduction in government orders. The problem of mutual non-payments has worsened. By June 1, 1992, their amount reached about 2 trillion rubles. Directors of enterprises insisted on receiving a preferential government loan with further coverage of debts on mutual settlements. This point of view was supported by the Supreme Council and the Central Bank of Russia. On June 28, 1992, the Central Bank provided such a loan to enterprises. New financial resources not backed by goods and services entered circulation, increasing inflation. The collapse of industry was prevented through loans and a new round of hyperinflation. The average growth rate of the money supply in the second half of 1992 increased from 11.4 to 28% per month.

The government of E. Gaidar (he has been acting prime minister since June 1992) saw a way out of this situation in replacing government subsidies and loans with foreign investments, as well as investments from private individuals. Thus, the key issue became the privatization of the public sector. According to the scheme developed by the Russian State Property Committee headed by A. Chubais, two main options for privatization were outlined. The first of them provided for preferential acquisition by employees of about 50% of the shares of their enterprise. The second option is the acquisition by enterprise employees of a controlling stake of 51% under more stringent conditions. But in both cases, a significant part of the shares was concentrated among the directors. The remaining shares were put on open sale to Russian citizens in exchange for special privatization checks.

On August 19, 1992, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin issued a decree “On the introduction of a system of privatization checks in the Russian Federation.” On October 1, 1992, the issuance of vouchers (privatization checks) to the population at a nominal value of 10 thousand rubles began (voucher privatization).

In 1992, 24 thousand enterprises, 160 thousand farms, and 15% of the retail network were transferred to private ownership. As a result, 40 million nominal shareholders appeared in the country, while most of the enterprises came under the control of financial groups that bought vouchers from the population. Privatization completed its task halfway: by creating a layer of owners, it turned out to be economically ineffective and did not produce the expected growth in investment. Criticism of the government intensified, which was unable to stop the decline in production and the impoverishment of the population (about 44% of Russian residents were below the subsistence level). The decline in production in the country during the first nine months of reforms amounted to about 20%. At the end of 1992, in terms of national income, Russia was at the level of 1976, in terms of consumption structure - at the level of the 1960s. All this contributed to the development of a social crisis and led to a decline in the popularity of Gaidar’s government.

In such conditions, the president decided to change the composition of the government, which since December 1993 was headed by V.S. Chernomyrdin. The first period of Russian economic reforms, called the “Gaidar reforms,” has officially ended.

Economic development of Russia in 1993–1996.

In 1993, the government moved away from previous ideas about the role of state intervention in the economy, no longer absolutizing the free market. The new course in the economy was determined by V. S. Chernomyrdin, a representative of the oil and gas complex. During these years, the government took more into account the interests of Russian industry, especially export industries that replenish the budget with foreign currency. It was announced that the goals of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1993 were financial stabilization, reducing inflation to 5% per month, and supporting domestic producers.

On February 8, 1993, the “Civil Union” was registered in Russia - a centrist movement associated with industrial circles and created by A. Volsky. One of his program points was the requirement for the state to take measures aimed at supporting its industries. The Chernomyrdin government tried to establish contacts with such organizations, demonstrating its readiness to return to partial state orders. At the same time, it had to take into account the much more radical (liberal-market at that time) views of the Russian President and resist pressure from parliament, which advocated a full return to the system of state procurement and state lending. The political confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government in 1993 narrowed the government's initiative and hindered its effective work.

Despite a number of measures taken, production continued to decline. The only positive results of the year include a significant reduction in inflation rates. Compared to 1992, it decreased by 2.8 times. Meanwhile, these results should not be exaggerated: over the year prices have increased almost 10 times. The Chernomyrdin government also failed to stop the continuing decline in industry. The production level in 1993 was 59.8% of the 1990 level. 7.8 million people were unemployed (10.4% of the country's active population), and unemployment figures continued to increase.

Following the results of the parliamentary elections in December 1993, in which pro-government and pro-presidential movements gained only about 1/3 of the votes, the President somewhat adjusted the economic policy of the Chernomyrdin government. In 1994–1997 Some sectors of the domestic, primarily mining, industry felt state support.

Compared to the first years of reforms, due to increased state regulation of economic processes, the rate of inflation decreased slightly, and the rate of decline in production also decreased. In 1994, the dynamics of price growth compared to 1993 decreased by 3.1 times. However, financial stabilization was never achieved, as shown by the scandalous cessation of the activities of MMM JSC, Chara, Russian House of Selenga, Tibet, Vlastelina and other financial pyramids that skillfully used rampant inflation for fraudulent purposes; “Black Tuesday” on October 11, 1994, when the dollar exchange rate increased by almost a third during the day - from 3081 to 3926 rubles.

Government economic policy in 1995–1996 was focused on export industries. Russia's trade surplus in 1996 amounted to about 40 billion rubles. Economically prosperous areas specializing in export industries (gas, oil, metal) began to appear in the country. The country's largest financial and industrial groups (FIC) were formed on the basis of fuel and industrial enterprises. Among them are Interros (ONEXIM Bank, Norilsk Nickel, Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Plant), Lukoil (7 oil producing enterprises, 23 oil refineries, 3 financial and investment companies), etc.

Most regions of Russia, not connected with the oil and gas complex, production and export of raw materials, still remained in a deep economic crisis. The decline in industrial production in the country as a whole was about 4% per year. The reduction in production volumes compared to the Soviet period reached 60–65% at the end of 1996, which was higher than during the Great Patriotic War. It was not possible to create a stable financial system in the country; salaries for public sector employees were delayed for up to two years.

Economic development of Russia in 1997–2000.

On March 6, 1997, in the annual message to the Federal Assembly of President B. N. Yeltsin, the beginning of a new stage of liberal socio-economic reforms was announced. Among the priority areas of the renewed government, which soon included B. Nemtsov and A. Chubais as deputy prime ministers, were the development of a program to reduce the budget deficit and pension reform, the elimination of wage arrears by December 31, 1997, and the fight against corruption.

However, the work of the new government was reduced mainly to regulating financial and tax flows within the country. Among the most important decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers are the sequestration of the 1997 budget in the social part, Russia’s entry into the Paris Club of creditor countries, the placement of new Eurobond loans and State short-term obligations, and a new stage of privatization, primarily of the fuel and raw materials industry. Attraction of additional financial resources ($6 billion in foreign loans versus $2 billion in 1996), the cessation of financing of the military campaign in Chechnya, proceeds from privatization, and the policy of austerity social austerity made it possible, according to official data, to achieve an increase in gross domestic product in Russia by 1% per year. the first half of 1997. It should be noted that there was rapid growth in production in light industry, amounting to more than 9%. This was the first real success in the modern history of the Russian economy during the entire post-perestroika period. It should, however, be noted that the increase was achieved through the massive attraction of investments and loans, which meant an increase in government obligations to external and internal creditors.

Inflationary processes remained a serious problem. In August, preparations began for the implementation of monetary reform. It began with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 5 “On changes in the face value of Russian banknotes and the scale of prices.” Since January 1, 1998, the Russian ruble was denominated 1000 times. This measure contributed to the strengthening of the national currency and the stabilization of economic processes.

The rating of the Chernomyrdin-Chubais government began to grow. Considering the most important task to ensure the continuity of the transfer of state power, Boris Yeltsin decided to use the situation to prepare for future presidential elections. On March 23, 1998, Chernomyrdin and Chubais were dismissed. They were replaced by the young reformer S. Kiriyenko.

For the new prime minister, the pressure of internal and external debt on the country's economy became increasingly obvious. Costs for its maintenance amounted to 13% of all federal expenditures in 1996, 24% in 1997, and 30% in 1998. The new government tried to implement tougher economic policies, including higher tax rates and trade duties. This approach led initially to an increase in prices (by 10%), and then to the deepest financial collapse in the modern history of Russia. The day of August 17, 1998 actually marked the financial bankruptcy of Russia: the depreciation of the national currency and, as a consequence, the inability of the state to pay external and internal debts. The government and the Central Bank of Russia announced the devaluation of the ruble and the beginning of a review of state debt obligations, including a moratorium on payments on loans received from non-residents of Russia (for a period of 90 days). The financial crisis entered the stage of uncontrolled price increases, which more than quadrupled in a short time. The situation of the overwhelming majority of the country's population, including the middle strata of society, has deteriorated again. Under these conditions, the resignation of the Kiriyenko government became inevitable.

According to the Russian State Statistics Committee, the number of the country's population with incomes below the subsistence level reached 33 million people in August.

On September 11, the Russian government was headed by E.M. Primakov, setting a course for stabilizing the economy. Active support for domestic industry and agriculture was announced. Income tax rates for citizens have been increased, with a simultaneous reduction in the taxation of industrial investments and VAT. The weakening of the tax burden on the “real economy” (Primakov’s figurative expression, meaning manufacturing industries), along with a reduction in imports to Russia (caused by the fall of the national currency), contributed to the revival of domestic industry. This government policy received parliamentary support.

Measures were also taken to strengthen the national currency. Thus, stricter control was introduced over the activities of exporters - they had to sell 75% of foreign exchange earnings on exchanges. Stricter customs regulations were introduced. Along with the rise in world oil prices, this contributed to the payment of external debts and the attraction of funds into the country’s economy.

For the first time, there has been a real reduction in government spending on apparatus. During the first half of 1999, Russia's economic situation stabilized. However, the approaching presidential elections dictated their terms, and Primakov's government resigned. The next two cabinets of ministers (S. Stepashin and V. Putin) were mainly concerned with political tasks, postponing serious economic transformations until the issue of power was finally resolved.

On March 19, economist Yegor Gaidar, one of the main ideologists and leaders of economic reforms in Russia in the early 1990s, would have turned 60 years old.

Public opinion polls with enviable consistency place the politician in the category of the main national anti-heroes, although over the years the degree of this dislike has weakened, reports t

If in 2002, according to statistics from VTsIOM, 55% of Russians considered Gaidar’s reforms destructive, then in 2010 a similar epithet was applied to them by 23% (although another 15% believed that there was no need for them at all).

At the same time, the number of those who fully approve of the actions of the Yeltsin-Gaidar government has increased: from 2% in 2002 to 7% in 2010. The numbers still teeter on the edge of statistical error.

But, apparently, the supreme leaders of Russia belong to this category of the population. Thus, current President Vladimir Putin, after Gaidar’s death, called him “a true citizen,” “a patriot,” “a strong-willed man,” who, having led the process of transformation, “showed the best professional and personal qualities.”

The Russian service of the BBC decided to summarize some common statements about the merits of the politician, accompanying them with, if possible, laconic arguments and counterarguments. Theses for the debate that will inevitably unfold around the name of Yegor Gaidar for a long time to come.

Gaidar destroyed the economy, the country was plunged into disaster

The transformational decline that occurred in Russia in the post-reform years was indeed enormous and, according to some estimates, unprecedented for the state in the absence of wars, epidemics and natural disasters:

The shadow economy grew from 10-15% of GDP under Brezhnev (the most generous estimates) to 50% of GDP in the mid-1990s
Income inequality has increased: the so-called Gini coefficient increased from 26% in 1986 to 40% in 2000
In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, crime doubled
Mortality in 1990-1994 increased by 60%
The share of R&D spending fell from 3.5% of GDP to about 1%
The aggregate index of industrial production in Russia reached the level of the early 1990s only in 2008

("Russian Economy. Oxford Collection"; other sources).

However, it would be too incorrect to attribute all the consequences of this transformational decline to the policies of Yegor Gaidar:

Firstly, he joined the government only in November 1991, when the process of transformation in the country was already in full swing
Secondly, it is difficult to blame Yegor Gaidar for the formation of structural imbalances in the Soviet economy: in particular, for the accumulation of a gigantic “money overhang” (money not backed by goods), which forced the Soviet government under the chairmanship of Valentin Pavlova to begin monetary reform
Thirdly, it is unlikely that Gaidar is to blame for the fact that prices for the main Soviet export resource - oil - have been falling since 1980, creating a budget deficit: first due to overproduction of the resource, and in 1991 - due to the end of the Gulf War "

Gaidar saved the country from mass famine

This point of view is as popular among Yegor Gaidar's associates as it is unpopular among his opponents.

In the book “Forks in the Contemporary History of Russia,” Gaidar himself wrote about the situation that had developed by the time he came to the government as follows: “The country was still bankrupt, foreign exchange reserves were close to zero. According to optimistic forecasts, grain reserves were sufficient until approximately February-March 1992..."

“The choice of accelerated price liberalization and accelerated lifting of trade restrictions prevented a catastrophic scenario on the country’s food market in the spring of 1992,” he noted.

Opponents of this point of view argue that there was no food disaster:

Firstly, the USSR had strategic reserves of grain, which economist Andrei Illarionov estimates at 48 million tons, which was enough to feed the people for a year in the absence of a new harvest.
Secondly, even the dying system of food distribution, according to the politician Grigory Yavlinsky, “did not raise fears that everything was about to perish,” because a new system was gradually replacing it: yes, “it was chaotic, strange, perverted, shadowy.” ", but quite functional
Thirdly, Gaidar, speaking about the depletion of grain reserves by March 1992, everywhere refers to a document that indicates the corresponding danger in March 1991 - that is, a year earlier than the described potential disaster

The policies of the Gaidar government led to the fact that the savings of Russians depreciated

“...By the politician’s self-confidently grinning face today, embarrassment is not visible: how, by ruining savings deposits, he threw tens of millions of his compatriots into poverty (destroying the basis of the very “middle class” that he swore to create),” he wrote about Yegor in 1998 Gaidar Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quite comprehensively reflecting the opinion of the majority of Russians about the achievements of Gaidar’s reforms.

This opinion is refuted by a number of researchers on the following grounds:

The first steps towards freezing the population's deposits in the Savings Bank were taken by the Soviet government as part of the monetary reform of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov on January 22, 1991, according to which USSR citizens were prohibited from withdrawing more than 500 rubles per person per month
Yes, after a few months the ban was lifted, but at the same time in April they raised official prices by 65-70%. Next year's inflation of 2508.8% was still a long way off, but the purchasing power of money began to decline rapidly
In fact, there was no money in the Savings Bank, because all 369 billion rubles accumulated by Soviet citizens were withdrawn by the government of Nikolai Ryzhkov in 1990 to finance the budget deficit.

There are also counterarguments:

• The Soviet authorities confiscated the money, but only as borrowed funds, which were supposed to be returned. The problem is that the annual rate on these credit resources was at the level of 5% (that’s how much the government paid Sberbank for using the money), and neither Pavlov’s government nor the new Russian authorities, including Gaidar’s team, agreed to a radical increase in the rate
• As a result, the real rate on household savings was, according to some estimates, minus 60.8% in 1991, and minus 94.4% in 1992. Thus, in 1991, citizens’ savings depreciated by almost 61%, and the following year the remaining amount devalued by another 94.4%.

It was impossible to simply take and release prices, as Gaidar did

On January 2, 1992, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government exempted prices from regulation, which had previously been set by the state for decades of Soviet power. This process is called price liberalization.

Until now, a unified approach to this reform has not been formed in Russian public and academic discourse.

• Managed to eliminate the commodity shortage
• The country was saved from imminent famine (“Anyone who remembers the absolute emptiness of the shelves in the fall of 1991 and the real threat of famine in large cities understands why price liberalization was then accepted without much discussion,” wrote one of Yegor Gaidar’s associates, now the rector of the Academy of Civil Service under President Vladimir Mau)
• The internal convertibility of the ruble was ensured (that is, they prevented the transition to barter, when money is worthless and it is easier for people to exchange goods)

Opponents of reform in this form point to the following circumstances:

• The huge accumulated “money overhang”, that is, the lack of security of money in goods, with one-stage liberalization should have led to an increase in inflation - and so it happened
• It was impossible to let prices go in a situation where the entire economy of the country is state-owned, as a result of which huge monopolies begin to dictate prices (liberalization occurs not of prices, but of monopolies)
• In the absence of restraining mechanisms, price liberalization led “not to the creation of market competition mechanisms, but to the establishment of control over the market by organized criminal groups, extracting excess profits by inflating prices,” wrote economist Sergei Glazyev

Gaidar's government laid the foundations for future economic growth in Russia

Giving comprehensive, more accurate assessments of Yegor Gaidar's legacy is a task for future times. For now, without going to any of the extremes, we can only state that he really laid the foundations for the financial and economic structure of modern Russia, whatever this structure may be.

• In addition to price liberalization, the creation of a financial market, and privatization, Gaidar also participated in the development of the Tax Code, Budget Code, and legislation on the Stabilization Fund of Russia
• Many associates and simply supporters of Gaidar occupy key positions in the state and academic hierarchies (head of the Ministry of Economy Alexey Ulyukaev, rector of RANEPA Vladimir Mau)
• The rise in energy prices during the time of Vladimir Putin affected the economic institutions that had already been created by that time and were functioning

At the same time, it was in the 90s, according to some economists, that the structure of the Russian economy finally came to the resource type.

The post-reform years became “a period of rapid deindustrialization of the Russian economy and its transfer to a resource-based basis, and the rise in world fuel prices since 1999 appears to have strengthened this trend,” wrote Vladimir Popov, chief researcher at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In 2004, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in his article “The Crisis of Liberalism in Russia,” came to the same conclusion: it was then that Russia became firmly dependent on raw materials (however, it was not specifically about Gaidar, but about liberal rule in general).

Subtotal

These thesis notes to the debate about Yegor Gaidar can be summed up in the words of the French moral philosopher La Rochefoucauld, who back in the 17th century said: “Philosophy triumphs over the sorrows of the past and future, but the sorrows of the present triumph over philosophy.”

As long as the 1990s are alive and “bleeding” in the consciousness of the majority of the Russian population, no dry academic discussions about Gaidar’s legacy will overpower this powerful emotional field. And academic discussions, as the above discussions partially show, do not yet seem to be completely cleared of emotions.

November 6, 1991. This date can be considered the starting point of economic reforms in Russia. The authorities have set themselves the task of ridding the country of its communist past as quickly as possible. It was impossible to do this without radical changes in the economy, which had existed for many years as a planned economy.

Gaidar's reforms served as a lever that created a free market in Russia. The government of that period liberalized retail prices, reorganized the tax system, and created a new foreign trade system. All these drastic changes were soon called “shock therapy.”

Price liberalization

On October 28, 1991, a few days before the appointment of Yegor Gaidar as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Policy, Russian President Boris Yeltsin delivered a keynote speech at the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. The head of state announced the need. It was this that was the most important feature of a classical market economy. The president's initiative was accepted by the congress delegates almost unanimously.

The start of Gaidar's economic reform had to be carried out as quickly as possible. It was planned that liberalization would be announced on December 1. This was opposed by the union republics, which still had a single ruble zone with Russia. Gaidar's reforms were remembered by his compatriots by the name of this economist for a reason. Although the new bills were defended before parliament by Boris Yeltsin, who used his presidential powers, the development of all projects lay on the shoulders of Yegor Timurovich and his team.

The actual beginning of Gaidar's economic reform came on January 2, 1992, when the presidential decree “On measures to liberalize prices” was adopted. The changes made themselves felt instantly. The state stopped regulating 80% of wholesale prices and 90% of retail prices. The federal government temporarily retained control only over socially significant consumer goods: milk, bread, etc. This clause was not adopted in vain. Gaidar's economic reform was carried out in conditions of social turbulence, when the population was left empty-handed after the crisis of the planned system and the collapse of the Soviet system.

Gaidar program

In preparing its program, the government proceeded from the point of view that Russia does not have any “special path”, and it needs to adopt all the main features of Western market economies. Until the end of 1991, it was still unclear what agenda the Russian authorities would choose. Various politicians and economists proposed their projects: Yavlinsky, Shatalin, Saburov, Abalkin, etc.

In the end, Gaidar’s program “won” after all. It was not only economic. The reforms were supposed to, through the construction of market relations, form a new national statehood in the country, the place of which was empty after the collapse of communism. Yegor Gaidar outlined his ideas in the documents “Russia’s Immediate Economic Prospects” and “Russia’s Strategy in the Transition Period.” According to these projects, reforms were carried out on the basis of the principles of privatization, liberalization and financial stabilization.

Gaidar's team identified three main problems that the young state inherited from the Soviet Union. These were inflationary, payment and systemic crises. The last of these was that government authorities had lost their own ability to regulate the flow of resources.

It was planned first of all to restructure and significantly increase the overall level, as the Rakovsky government did in Poland at one time. Gaidar believed that in this case, inflation would persist in the country for about six months at first. However, this project had to be abandoned. Calculations have shown the authorities that the country simply cannot withstand another six months of crisis. Therefore, it was decided to begin radical liberalization immediately. Time has shown that neither one nor the other path promised anything good for the economy.

Economic collapse

Price liberalization led to many negative consequences that were inevitable given such an accelerated pace of change in the economy. The new order in the market ran counter to monetary policy - already in the summer of 1992, domestic enterprises lost their working capital. In the spring, the Central Bank began to issue a large number of loans to industry, farmers, former Soviet republics, etc. This was done in order to cover the budget deficit. However, at the same time there was a colossal jump in inflation. In 1992, it reached a level of 2,500%.

The collapse occurred for several reasons. First of all, the disaster erupted due to the fact that, before prices were liberalized, a replacement of money was not carried out, which would have rid the country of outdated Soviet rubles. The new currency appeared only in 1993, when Gaidar’s economic reform was already completed and he himself left the Government.

Hyperinflation has left a significant part of the Russian population without a livelihood. In the mid-90s, the share of low-income citizens was 45%. Soviet deposits of the population in Sberbank depreciated, having lost their purchasing power. The government blamed the crisis on the Supreme Council, which forced it to issue additional currency.

The issuance of additional money supply began to be practiced in the last Soviet years, when the state used it to finance internal expenses. When Gaidar's reforms began, this system completely collapsed. The former paid Russian enterprises with the same rubles, which only further escalated the crisis. In the summer of 1992, as a countermeasure, special non-cash systems were created, with the help of which payments began to be made with the rest of the CIS countries.

Parliament versus the Government

Gaidar's radical economic reforms were harshly criticized by people's deputies from the very beginning. As you know, on April 6 they opened their VI Congress. By this time, the government had received a fairly united opposition, which was based on agricultural and industrial lobbyists who were dissatisfied with the reduction in government funding.

At one of its meetings, the congress adopted a resolution in which the main complaints against the Government's policy were formulated. The reforms of E. T. Gaidar were cited as the cause of a number of economic problems: a fall in the standard of living of the population, the destruction of previous economic ties, a production decline, a lack of money, etc. In general, the inability of the Government to keep the situation in the country under control was noted. The deputies believed that Gaidar's reforms were carried out without regard to the opinion of society and business owners. In the resolution, the congress delegates proposed that the president change the economic course, taking into account all their proposals and reservations.

In response to the attack by the deputies, the Government, together with Gaidar, handed over to Boris Yeltsin a statement of resignation. In the attached report, the ministers criticized the congress's proposals, noting that if the government follows this course, government costs will rise to over a trillion rubles, and inflation will reach a threshold of 400% per month.

The resignation was not accepted, but Yeltsin still made concessions to the deputies. He introduced new people into the Government - the so-called “red directors”, who lobbied for the interests of the owners of large enterprises who received their positions in the Soviet years. In this cohort were Georgy Khizhu and Vladimir Chernomyrdin.

This was followed by attempts to stabilize the financial situation. To achieve this, the Government reduced government spending and also introduced new taxes. In May 1992, inflation decreased slightly. Another requirement of the Supreme Council was fulfilled - monetary policy was significantly softened. The Government also allocated 600 billion rubles to pay off debts to miners and other striking workers of large enterprises

In July, there were changes in the leadership of the Central Bank. The new head, Viktor Gerashchenko, who had already held this position in the Soviet Union, opposed E. Gaidar’s reform, which involved cutting costs. In the second half of 1992, the volume of Central Bank lending increased threefold. By October, the budget deficit had decreased by 4% of GDP compared to August figures.

Beginning of privatization

In June 1992, Yegor Gaidar became Chairman of the Government. That same summer, privatization began in Russia. The reformers wanted to implement it as quickly as possible. The Government believed that Russia needed the emergence of a class of owners that would become the pillar and support of the state’s economic policy. The privatization of enterprises took place in conditions when plants and factories actually went bankrupt. Enterprises were sold for next to nothing. Purchases took on an avalanche-like character. Due to numerous holes in the legislation, transactions were carried out with violations and abuses.

When the reforms of E. T. Gaidar had already ended, in the mid-90s, loans-for-shares auctions were held in Russia, at which the largest and most important enterprises in the country passed into the hands of new owners at greatly reduced prices. As a result of these deals, a new class of oligarchs emerged, creating an even wider social gap between rich and poor.

Supporters of the Gaidar government's reform and privatization believed that it was necessary to abandon the old Soviet system of national economy with excessive monopolization and centralization as quickly as possible. The accelerated pace of sales led to numerous excesses and mistakes. According to sociological surveys, about 80% of the Russian population considers the results of privatization illegitimate.

Vouchers

For mass privatization, a voucher was introduced - a privatization check, which was intended to be exchanged for assets in state-owned enterprises. It was transferred into private hands. It was planned that with the help of this instrument municipal enterprises would become private property.

In total, approximately 146 million vouchers were printed. Citizens who received a check could use the paper to subscribe for shares in an entire enterprise or to participate in an auction. The paper could also be sold. Residents of the country could not participate in privatization directly. They needed to corporatize their businesses or transfer the vouchers to check investment funds (CHIFs). In total, more than 600 such organizations were created.

Practice has shown that privatization checks have in fact become objects of speculation. Many owners of these securities sold them to merchants with a dubious reputation or invested in private equity funds, hoping to receive significant dividends. As a result of this practice, the real value of the securities fell rapidly. In such conditions, the population began to strive to get rid of vouchers as quickly as possible. Basically, they ended up in the hands of shadow traders, speculators, officials and the administration of the enterprises themselves.

Because of its haste, privatization (the name of Gaidar’s economic reform) took place under conditions of price liberalization, when the value of the voucher fund became tens of times less than the real value of enterprises. According to estimates, speculators were able to buy 500 of the largest factories and factories for $7 billion. However, in reality they were valued at $200 billion. This was the so-called “wild capitalism”, which allowed 10% of the population to establish control over the national property. The main income came from the export of gas, oil and non-ferrous metals. Enterprises with new owners not only did not return profits to the Russian economy. They did not even go to repay the rapidly growing external debt of the state.

Agrarian policy

In 1992, the beginning of Gaidar's reforms was also marked by changes in the village. New forms of farming began to play an important role in the agricultural economy. Closed and open joint-stock companies, cooperatives, and limited liability partnerships appeared. In total, they accounted for about 2/3 of the agricultural sector of the economy. The crisis hit all these new farms hard. There was a shortage of agricultural equipment, cars, mineral fertilizers, etc.

The government adopted a program to eliminate the remnants of the Soviet system - state farms and collective farms. In March 1992, there were approximately 60 thousand individual farming enterprises in Russia. By autumn their number increased fivefold. However, due to a lack of technology, they still could not provide the country with enough harvest. The regression led to the fact that by the mid-90s, production fell by 70% compared to the last Soviet season. The farmer was unable to feed Russia, and all because of a significant increase in prices for reagents, equipment, etc.

Defense-industrial complex

In 1992, the state sharply reduced arms purchases. During the Soviet era, the military-industrial complex became too bloated. The lion's share of the budget was spent on it. In the conditions of the economic crisis, the state simply could not provide work for most of the enterprises, which led to their bankruptcy and sale to third parties.

The problem with research and development work (R&D) has become especially acute. The procedure for financing this complex was destroyed, which is why highly qualified teams disbanded and were left without work. It was then that the so-called “brain drain” began - the emigration of scientists, engineers, designers, etc. They left en masse for Western countries in search of a better life while their enterprises stood idle.

The government, while reforming the defense industry, made several serious mistakes: it did not begin restructuring or transferring factories to reserve. Some experts note that the government did the wrong thing when it lifted restrictions on the import of consumer goods, which left enterprises without a niche in the market.

Gaidar's resignation

In December 1992, Yegor Gaidar resigned from the post of Chairman of the Government. His departure became a compromise in the relations between the Supreme Council and the President of Russia. It was assumed that the agreement would allow a painless referendum on a new constitution. However, the deputies refused to fulfill their obligations, which led to a conflict between the Government and the President. It ended with the October events, when Moscow experienced several days of street fighting.

In that crisis autumn, Gaidar once again returned to the Government and became the first deputy chairman there, as well as the Minister of Economy. He finally left senior leadership positions on January 20, 1994. By this time, all the main economic reforms of E. Gaidar had already been carried out, and the country lived in a new economic reality.

Positive results of reforms

Back in December 1992, on the eve of his first resignation, he summed up the results of his work. The Head of Government at the VII Congress of People's Deputies emphasized the main successes of the government. The tax system was reorganized, privatization and agrarian reform began (reorganization of state and collective farms), the fuel and energy complex was restructured, oil companies were created, and costs for the purchase of ammunition and military equipment were reduced.

Minister of Economy and Gaidar’s colleague Andrei Nechaev also named other important steps of the Government during the crisis period. In addition to the price liberalization already described above, the state allowed free trade and settled external debts by opening credit lines in the West. The Gaidar reform of 1992 reduced the budget deficit. Important tax innovations included the introduction of taxes on oil production. The planned economic system is a thing of the past. The state began to resort to government orders. In the field of investment, the relationship between government and private entrepreneurs has become key. Trade with the former Soviet republics was built in a new way - it switched to world prices and market principles.

E. T. Gaidar, whose economic reforms led to the restructuring of all financial relations, advocated the establishment of commercial principles in the export of weapons for the army. An important innovation was the adoption of the bankruptcy law. With the advent of a market economy, the first investment companies were created, as well as exchanges, which could not exist in the USSR.

"Shock therapy"

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself at a crossroads unlike any in human history. A huge state with 70 years of life under communism and a planned economy behind it needed to move to a civilized market model. In 1991-1992 No country in the world has ever conducted such a forced experiment on itself. Two years before Russia, similar transformations began in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but they had not yet given a visible result and existed only in the form of sketches.

The essence of Gaidar’s reforms was that the Government had to literally operate blindly, at its own peril and risk, on the sick economy of its country. True, some things were nevertheless adopted from former comrades in the socialist camp. For example, in Russia temporary jobs were created by analogy with the Decree on Free Trade in Poland. These measures allowed the street stalls to be filled. True, these changes also had their costs. Such trade took on strange forms - new kiosks appeared chaotically and without any regulation.

The economic reform of the government of E. Gaidar (the transition from a socialist economy to a market economy) began too late. In fact, time was lost back in the late 80s, when the first serious signs of a crisis appeared. The Soviet commodity economy was in agony due to falling oil prices, which led to queues in stores and a card system even before the Gaidar reform began. The name “shock therapy” was given to the changes deservedly - the system had to be changed in emergency conditions.

Shock therapy, but it cuts to the quick.

Evgeny Khankin,
(Russian prose writer)

In 1992, radical market reforms began in the country, which later became known as “shock therapy.” This name stuck because they had an extremely painful impact on the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of Russians.

A group of young specialists led by the dedicated economist-theorist E.T. took upon themselves all responsibility for implementing the reforms. Gaidar. This was a group of “ultra-liberals”, or “liberal-Bolsheviks”, who, at a new historical turning point, with truly revolutionary fervor, began to destroy the no longer viable, but still gigantic, Soviet state system. However, at that time they had a great deal of trust among the population of the country, who believed in the possibility of jumping into the capitalist paradise of general prosperity and abundance in one fell swoop.

The most vulnerable point in pursuing their internal socio-economic and political course was their complete ignorance of Russian “specifics” (primarily mentality and political culture) and the absolute desire to carry out liberal market reforms, regardless of possible losses and even victims. In general, this is how their distant predecessors, the Bolsheviks, acted (for example, the famous grandfather of Yegor Gaidar, Arkady Gaidar). Among Gaidar’s assistants were a number of foreign experts, advisers, and even, as some sources testify, CIA employees.

The reforms were based not on the European “social” model, but on the American model with its ideology of an unlimited market. The reforms were supposed, according to the reformers, to lead to the capitalist mode of production (“pure capitalism”), liberal democracy and quickly form a large class of owners who could become a solid basis for the existing regime. To ensure the success of the reforms, the authorities, using control over the media in the country, conducted a large-scale propaganda campaign in the media in support of the ongoing reforms in order to neutralize the possible rejection by the population of its negative aspects.

The West, represented by the heads of state, the business environment of the largest corporations and international institutions (IMF and World Bank), provided ideological, organizational and technical, but not financial support to the Russian young reformers. The absence of financial assistance similar to that which post-war Western Europe received from the United States under the Marshall Plan is today confirmed by many in the West. Thus, the Swedish economist Anders Åslund stated: “The leading forces of the West did not provide Russia with the necessary financial assistance when...Russia began economic stabilization.”

However, it would be naive to assume that the West was inclined to sacrifice itself for the sake of creating a powerful economy and a prosperous society in Russia, in order to create a dangerous competitor for itself with its own hands. Western capitalism, which constituted the world capitalist center, looked at Russia as a rich cash cow, and without at all trying to make it prosperous, due to the lack of the very concept of altruism in the capitalist market.

But for the West, all that was important was the functioning in Russia of a stable regime, preferably democratic according to liberal-Western patterns, reliably controlling the military-nuclear potential and serving as a reliable supplier of cheap natural resources to Western markets.

The positive results of the reforms include: a sharp saturation of the consumer market and farewell to the humiliating Soviet era of general shortages and endless queues. The military-industrial complex, which is clearly bloated and absorbs huge amounts of money, has been reduced significantly. Social mobility and the movement of citizens between different social groups have increased sharply.

Hundreds of thousands of men and women, having said goodbye to their usual work (which did not provide them with a living) and way of life at their own peril and risk, became individual shuttle entrepreneurs and began to explore new countries (China, Turkey, Poland) and cities, bringing them home everything their countrymen needed. Their life was filled with dangerous adventures and not all of them were blessed with luck and material success. But there was a feeling of limitless freedom - freedom to choose a new way of life.

The social structure, which had previously been ossified, now acquired flexibility and mobility, while many new professions and specializations arose, and citizens had greater freedom to choose professions. The country ended the “closed borders”, and citizens received free travel abroad. Privatization ended the completely inefficient state monopoly in production and led to a large entrepreneurial class (initially clearly redundant, until many of them went bankrupt) with the most efficient labor productivity.

It is characteristic that at that time many Russian citizens were gripped by entrepreneurial fever and a strong desire to get rich (sometimes even through criminal means), which broke outdated stereotypes about the supposedly “non-capitalist mentality” of Russians. In addition, the formation of a private business sector in industry and trade on the basis of privatization, and the formation of a new banking system can be called positive results of reform.

Already in 1995, 65% of the country's gross domestic product was produced in the non-state sector. But the main thing is that in a country that for many decades was considered a stronghold of an unfree world, total control over its citizens and their views and state of mind, the long-awaited freedom of speech, conscience, choice of occupation and place of residence has arrived. Oppressed for centuries by the state and society, the personal freedom of citizens has received unprecedented development, sometimes even without boundaries.

The negative socio-economic consequences of the reforms include the manifold increase in social polarization of society and the violation of the principle of social justice, which is basic for all Russians. By 1995, the population with incomes below the subsistence level amounted to 48% of the population.

Large-scale unemployment appeared. All this led to social tension in society and became a breeding ground for the emergence of various extremist organizations and movements. Crime has increased sharply in the country, and the number of serious criminal offenses has increased, and OCGs (organized criminal groups) have also emerged. Citizens became completely socially unprotected as a result of the state's withdrawal from active social policy.

As a consequence of this, the life expectancy of Russians decreased (in 1994 it was only 64 years) and the largest population extinction since the Great Patriotic War began (mortality exceeded the birth rate by an average of 1 million people per year!). In essence, this meant a demographic catastrophe. There was a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production, a large-scale outflow of domestic capital abroad amounted to up to $10 billion a year, while the influx of foreign direct investment was no more than $1.5 billion.

The privatization of state property led to the fact that all national property went to a narrow group of people, and not to the broad masses of workers, as a result of which a broad layer of the middle class never emerged in the country. In addition, a considerable part of state and privatized property went into the “shadow” sphere, hiding from taxation.

According to the data of the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Kulikov, the “shadow” sphere in Russia already in 1995 covered 45% of the economy. More than 40 thousand different objects were in the sphere of criminal influence and control in the country, including 1,500 state enterprises, 4 thousand joint-stock companies, 550 banks, about 700 wholesale and retail markets. The foundation of all this was nomenklatura-mafia privatization. From 1992 to 1996 The 500 largest state-owned enterprises in Russia, worth at least $200 billion, were sold for just 7.2. billion (N. length)

According to other sources, all state enterprises by the end of the 90s. went literally for next to nothing, at a price of no more than 1.5% of world market prices. (Kagarlitsky) Moreover, unlike the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Russia received very small financial resources for its treasury during privatization, for 1992–1995. only 18,781 billion rubles, or 5.8% of all budget revenues.

The reforms dealt an irreparable blow to the country's scientific and technical potential. Due to a sharp reduction in funding for science and education, hundreds of thousands of scientists have gone into commerce (literally to feed their families!). Along with this, a “brain drain” unprecedented since the Civil War began - the departure of scientists and specialists abroad, mainly to the West. The former Soviet middle class: civil servants, intelligentsia, highly qualified workers, who provided the main support for the reforms of M. Gorbachev during perestroika and who, in turn, could become the social support of the “bourgeois reformers”, did not receive anything from the reforms, but rather lost. The middle layers have shrunk several times.

The proclaimed structural restructuring of the economy actually led to a sharp deindustrialization of the country, the destruction of scientific and technical potential, and ultimately to an increased resource orientation of the economy. The country lost its superpower status and found itself on the margins of world capitalism - a peripheral type.

Labor discipline and the very concept of service to society have fallen sharply. Anarchic-hedonistic values ​​prevailed, in the spirit - my house is on the edge, I don’t know anything. The preaching of profit and naked material interest at any cost has dealt an irreparable blow to the age-old traditions of morality and ethics. “Even such a catchy formula was put into circulation: what is effective is also moral (similar to the previous one: what is communist is also moral)” (quoted from V. Tolstykh).

But the main thing is that Russians have firmly associated Gaidar’s “democratic reforms” with rampant crime, lawlessness and monstrous injustice towards the country’s population. As a result, the population's trust in the reformers was completely lost, and at the same time in the state they headed. And this, in turn, strengthened the positions of national isolationists, revanchists, communists and other supporters of non-capitalist modernization of the country. Hence, the regressive nature of these reforms is more than obvious.

In November 1991, the young economist Yegor Gaidar was appointed Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Government for Economic Policy and Minister of Economy and Finance. A close group of like-minded people formed in and around the government, which determined the course of the economic reforms being carried out. Later they began to call it “Gaidar’s team.” Gaidar economist minister chairman

In November 1991, young economist Yegor Gaidar was appointed Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Government for Economic Policy and Minister of Economy and Finance. A close group of like-minded people formed in and around the government, which determined the course of the economic reforms being carried out. Later they began to call it “Gaidar’s team.” The core of the group was Alexander Shokhin, Petr Aven, Alexey Golovkov, Anatoly Chubais, Andrey Nechaev.

Gaidar entered the government when the economic situation in the country was catastrophic. The budget deficit approached 30% of gross national product.

According to the data cited by the famous economist Evgeny Yasin in his book “Russian Economy: Origins and Panorama of Market Reforms,” the country experienced a reduction in the population’s consumption of food in almost all of its main types. Sales of sausage, which was a kind of symbol of prosperity in Soviet “developed socialism,” decreased by 24% in 1991 (from 1835 to 1393 thousand tons). The same figure for dairy products was 41% (from 21.5 to 12.7 million tons). If inventory in retail trade (at the end of the year) in days of turnover in 1985 was 93 days, then in 1990 this figure dropped to 44, and in 1991 - to 39 days.

The threat of famine loomed. By the end of 1991, the norms for food supply on cards in most regions were: sugar - 1 kg per person per month, meat products - 0.5 kg (with bones), animal butter - 0.2 kg. Part of the food came in the form of humanitarian aid from Western countries.

While the demand for food grains was 5 million tons per month in January 1992, there were 3 million tons of resources available. According to calculations by Roskhleboproduct, the grain import deficit amounted to 17.35 million tons. The situation was complicated by the fact that foreign exchange reserves were practically exhausted.

At the end of November 1991, Gaidar outlined a plan for the government's priority actions to stabilize the economic situation: by lowering prices and wages while simultaneously pursuing a tough financial policy, stabilize the economy and restore its manageability on a market basis.

It was possible to begin carrying out the planned reforms only at the beginning of 1992.

From January 2, prices for the vast majority of goods (with the exception of bread, milk, alcohol, as well as utilities, transport and energy) were freed, and regulated ones were increased. A 28 percent value added tax has been introduced.

In addition to price liberalization, restrictions on imports were temporarily lifted and a zero import tariff was established. It was free imports at the beginning of 1992 that played a catalyst role in the development of private market trade.

On January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On Free Trade.” In accordance with this decree, enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, and citizens were given the right to carry out trade, intermediary and purchasing activities without special permits. The exception was the trade in weapons, explosives, poisonous and radioactive substances, drugs, medicines, etc. All this led to the gradual saturation of the consumer market and an increase in inventories in retail trade.

At the same time, the country's economy has experienced such negative phenomena as a crisis of mutual non-payments by enterprises, a cash shortage that caused acute social tension, a decrease in tax revenues to the budget, and inflation.

In his speeches on the eve of liberalization, Gaidar spoke of an upcoming initial price increase of 200-300%. In fact, in January 1992 their growth compared to the previous month was 352%.

At the end of February, a new government program was announced; An official memorandum on the economic strategy of the Russian leadership was sent to the International Monetary Fund, which included tough measures to limit the budget deficit and free up energy prices.

In April 1992, at the VI Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, the government's economic policy was sharply criticized. On April 11, the Congress adopted a Resolution “On the Progress of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation”, in which: it noted a number of problems in the economy: a decline in production, the destruction of economic ties, a decline in the standard of living of the population, growing social tension, lack of cash; invited the President of Russia to make significant adjustments to the tactics and methods of implementing economic reform, taking into account comments and suggestions.

On April 13, Gaidar announced the resignation of the government, citing the fact that the resolution on the progress of reforms adopted at the Congress actually meant the disagreement of the deputies with the economic course pursued by the government, and the additional budget expenditures envisaged by it would not allow this course to be implemented without catastrophic consequences for the economy.

In this situation, a compromise was found: the congress adopted a Declaration of Support for Economic Reforms, in which the norms of the adopted Resolution on the progress of economic reform were softened.

After the VI Congress, the “Medium-Term Economic Concept of the Government” began to be developed, which provided for a reduction in the share of regulated prices and volumes of government procurement, the deployment of mass privatization, and bringing energy prices to global levels only within 2 years.

In fact, under pressure from deputies and directors of state-owned enterprises, financial policy has become less stringent. Combined with the significant seasonality of some economic processes for Russia, the unsettled financial relations with the CIS countries, which led to the simultaneous operation of many ruble issuing centers, and the lack of control of the government of the Central Bank of Russia, this led to the end of the period of relative financial stability and the development of a new inflationary spiral at the end of the summer - early autumn 1992.

In the fall, the government was again criticized with demands to restore price regulation and increase direct government intervention in processes occurring in the national economy.

In December 1992, the VII Congress of People's Deputies did not approve Yegor Gaidar as chairman of the Council of Ministers. After Viktor Chernomyrdin was confirmed as head of government, Gaidar was dismissed.

The activities of Yegor Gaidar are assessed ambiguously. On the one hand, his price reform in January 1992, which actually meant the abandonment of state regulation of prices for most goods, including essential goods, made it possible to almost instantly replenish store shelves that had been completely empty in previous years. However, while maintaining the population's income unchanged, this led to a catastrophic drop in living standards.

Reformers managed to reduce the state budget deficit and transfer the Soviet planned economy to a free market, but the side effects of their actions were hyperinflation and economic crisis.

Experts are still debating whether it was the reforms of Gaidar and his supporters or the decades of ineffective Soviet rule that preceded them that caused the collapse of the Russian economy in the early 1990s.

Additional sources

• 1. Economy in transition. Essays on the economic policy of post-communist Russia 1991-1997 / Ed. E. T. Gaidar, pp. 91-93.
• 2. E. Yasin. Russian economy: origins and panorama of market reforms. Lecture course. - M.: State University Higher School of Economics, 2002.
• 3. Russian Economic Reform. Crossing the Threshold of Structural Change. World Bank, 1992.